03/29/2026
Monitor user traffic and behavior in your organization.
Discover how to secure human, non-human, and AI identities across on-premises, cloud, and SaaS environments with Falcon Identity Protection and MFA. This comprehensive solution monitors user traffic and behavior, detects anomalies, and enforces real-time threat prevention and IT policy enforcement.
Understand how Falcon monitors traffic to build user behavioral profiles to help identify unusual user behavior.
Falcon Identity Protection monitors network traffic to build user behavioral profiles to help identify unusual user behavior. It enables frictionless Zero Trust security with real-time threat prevention and IT policy enforcement through the use of identity, behavioral, and risk analytics.
Subscription:
Falcon Identity Threat Detection
Falcon Identity Threat Protection
Domain Controller OS: Falcon sensor supports domain controllers on Windows 2008 R2 or later.
Roles: These roles have access to Falcon Identity Protection:
Falcon Administrator
Falcon Security Lead
Falcon Investigator
Falcon Analyst - read only
Endpoint Manager
Identity Protection Policy Manager
Identity Protection Domain Administrator
When installed on a domain controller, the Falcon sensor collects domain info, processes network traffic, and evaluates and enforces policy rules in your environment.
This solution combines simple deployment with ease of management, and eliminates the need for additional resources.
To deploy Falcon Identity Protection, follow these high-level steps:
Install the Falcon sensor for Windows on your domain controllers.
Optionally, integrate Falcon Identity Protection with your existing federation software.
See:
Falcon Identity Protection is supported in multi-CID enterprise organizations with Falcon Flight Control. Contact Support. For US-GOV-1 and US-GOV-2 customers, contact Support to configure optimal Identity Protection performance.
For more information about Falcon Flight Control environments, see Falcon Flight Control and Multi-CID Support.
A parent CID that has a Falcon Identity Protection subscription enabled
Falcon Identity Protection identifies enterprise threats with a high degree of accuracy without adding significant overhead to help ensure that legitimate business activities are not disrupted.
By monitoring traffic both inside and outside your network, Falcon Identity Protection builds user behavioral profiles that can help identify anomalous user behavior.
In the initial training stage, which typically takes around two weeks, Falcon Identity Protection learns the behavior of every user, including when and where they log in, their role in the organization, the systems they access, the computers they use, the strength of their passwords, and other relevant info. For each user, a profile is created and a risk score is assigned.
Falcon Identity Protection builds these baselines of individual user behavior to identify anomalies that might indicate attacks or unauthorized access attempts. Baselines are built from data gathered by the Falcon Identity Protection detection engine and from third-party solutions such as cloud SSO, and other sources.
Over time, a user’s profile is updated as the network and the user’s behavior evolves, such as with new user roles and actions.
After the baselines are established, you can apply a policy to remediate issues without requiring intervention. Falcon Identity Protection can block traffic, notify administrators, or require that the user performs multi-factor authentication.
If a policy is in place, Falcon Identity Protection can detect when users misuse resources either intentionally or because an attacker has stolen their identity or credentials.
When Falcon Identity Protection detects a threat, it takes the appropriate action based on a configured policy.
This section gives an overview of the functionality Falcon Identity Protection provides, and links to in-depth documentation.
The Falcon Identity Protection app consists of these pages:
The Domain Security Overview
page gives you the tools you need to better evaluate the risks and
threats to which your network is exposed, enhancing the organizational
security posture.
It provides you with an overview of your environment and indicates whether your environment follows best security practices.
For example, you can see how many privileged users there are and how this number has changed over time, whether you are using unmanaged endpoints, how many users have compromised or GPO exposed passwords, and more.
You can find more information about entity trends in your environment with the following dashboards: Users, Privileged identities, Non-human identities.
For more information, see Identity Protection Monitoring.
The Identity-based Incidents
page lets you better evaluate the security events occurring in your
system and take the necessary actions to mitigate the risks they pose.
You can act on the incidents directly from the page. You can manage the incident life cycle, add notes, filter, sort, examine, and perform forensic analysis of incidents.
For more information, see Identity-based Incidents, Detections, and Risks.
The Policy Rules page is used to define a number of rules that determine what actions to take in response to certain triggers observed in your environment. These triggers can be authentication requests, alerts, or account changes, such as updating your password.
Each rule can have a set of conditions that must be met for the rule to apply. The combination of these rules forms your Identity Protection policy.
Each rule in your policy is made up of the following three components:
Trigger: Defines what invokes the rule.
Conditions: Any number of requirements that must be met for the rule to apply.
Actions: Defines what the rule does when its trigger occurs and all its conditions are met.
The Reports page allows administrators to perform a number of report oriented activities that include:
Saving predefined reports.
Scheduling the download and distribution of predefined reports.
Reviewing a list of saved predefined and custom reports.
Reports can be defined and downloaded immediately, or scheduled for later downloading and distribution. Most reports can be distributed in PDF or CSV formats. Depending on the type of info in a report, it might be limited to one format type though.
To view the Reports page, go to Identity protection > Configure > Reports.
For more information, see Identity Protection Reports.
Threat Hunter enables security analysts to proactively search through raw events, detect and identify security events, or further investigate security events reported by the system.
You can create your own search criteria, which you can save for use at a later stage, or you can use a predefined search. You can also modify a predefined search and save it for later use.
To display Threat Hunter, go to Identity protection > Explore > Threat Hunter.
For more information, see Identity Protection Threat Hunter.
System Notifications displays events that might require your attention. The number of active notifications is also shown in parenthesis.
To display the system notifications, go to Identity protection > Configure > System notifications.
You can filter notifications as follows:
All Notifications
Connectors
Software Update
System Coverage
For more information, see Identity Protection System Notifications.
You can configure these aspects of your Identity Protection environment:
MFA connectors: Configure integrations for multi-factor authentication (MFA).
IDaaS connectors: Configure integrations for Identity as a Service (IDaaS).
Domain Controller hosts View the traffic inspection status of each DC host.
Domains: View the domains monitored by Identity Protection.
Subnets: Configure subnets for use in Identity Protection.
Settings: Configure miscellaneous parameters.
Risk Configuration: View and configure Compromised Password Detection for your network.
For more information, see Identity Protection Administration.
For info about how you can combine Identity Protection policy rules with Fusion SOAR workflows to increase security, see Identity Protection in Fusion SOAR.
Understand and evaluate the risks and threats your network is exposed to so you can enhance your security posture.
The Domain Security Overview page gives you the tools you need to better evaluate the risks and threats to which your network is exposed, enhancing the overall security posture.
Laying out the foundations for a better network
security, company executives and security and risk teams members can
gain an immediate insight into the overall network risks based on a
specific objective. Go to Identity protection > Monitor > Domain security overview
to grasp at a glance the risk level and the priorities facing your
organization from the attack surface perspective, so you can timely
implement efficient mitigation steps.
It provides you with an overview of your environment and indicates whether your environment follows best security practices.
For example, you can see your risk score and how this number has changed over time, how many privileged users there are, a list of your highest risks, and more.
You can address different goals, each characterized by the specific risks. Whether you are preparing for pen testing or working on an AD Hygiene project, select the corresponding option from the Goal list to align the overview page to the specific requirements. The following goals are available:
| Goal | Description |
|---|---|
|
AD Hygiene |
Assesses the risks related to AD management and auditing: password vulnerabilities, suspicious privilege modifications, and stealthy privileges. |
|
Pen Testing |
Evaluates the security of your network by performing a simulated cyber attack, known as penetration test or pen test for short. |
|
Privileged Users Management |
Assesses the risks related to the management of privileged user accounts on critical devices and applications. |
|
Reduce Attack Surface |
Warns you about the different attack vectors that can be exploited in an attempt to enter data to or extract data from your network environment. |
This option allows you to limit the scope of
the security assessment by one of the network domains monitored by
Identity Protection.
This is an overall security risk score, with 10 being maximum risk, for the currently selected domain.
The issues that contributed to the risk score are listed below in descending order of severity. This allows you to identify the most critical issues of the greatest consequence and focus on their remediation.
This graph shows the general direction of
changes in the risk score during the last few weeks, helping you to
measure the security enhancement progress.
Clicking a date in the graph shows the risk score, and the risks for the selected date.
The matrix shows the risks rated by likelihood and consequences:
Likelihood is based on the Identity Protection research team’s extensive knowledge and reflects the easiness of exploiting a vulnerability in combination with commonly known attack vectors. The degrees of likelihood are: Unlikely, Possible, and Likely.
Consequences denote the severity of a specific event’s impact on the organization’s security posture. The consequences might range from the attacker taking over a specific account to moving laterally in the network or taking over the entire domain, and in each case the vulnerability is rated accordingly. The consequences can be: Minor, Moderate, and Major.
The various risk levels are color-coded as follows:
Red: Indicates high risks that present the most serious and far-reaching threats. To improve the organization's security posture, these risks must be targeted without delay.
Orange: Indicates medium risks that must be closely monitored and investigated and resolved or mitigated at the earliest.
Green: Indicates low risks that must be resolved at the earliest convenience.
The number inside the shape denotes the current number of risk factors with the same likelihood and impact.
For example, according to the following example matrix, there are, among others, one Unlikely low risk item with Minor consequences and four Possible medium risk items with Moderate consequences:
This panel contains the most up-to-date information about the current number of accounts, users, endpoints, and privileged users in the domain or tenant.
These are the different factors that negatively affect the security assessment score.
You can expand each of the risks contributing to the currently displayed risk score and learn about its nature and how it can be reduced or neutralized.
To view the entities involved in the risk or affected by it, click Show Related Entities. This opens a side panel with the list of entities that can be investigated individually, saved as a CSV file, or as a Custom Insight.
You can monitor the information by using the category tabs at the top of the page:
Category pages each provide the following functionality:
Use the Interval drop-down to limit the results to this from the Last Day, Last Week, Last Month, or a custom timeframe.
The trend graph shows how the number of entities in the selected subcategory has changed during the selected interval. For more info, see Score Trend.
Use the Filter button to define filters on the displayed entities and display exactly the cross section of data you require, save a filter as a Custom Insight, or apply a saved Custom Insight.
If you click CSV from the Save as drop-down menu, a CSV file of the data displayed in the Entity Table is downloaded to your workstation.
If you click PDF from the Save as drop-down menu, a PDF file showing the data displayed in the Trend and in the Entity Table is generated and downloaded to your workstation.
On the Privileged Identities, Users, Endpoints, Non-Human Identities, and Custom Insights pages, if you click Custom Report from the Save as drop-down menu, the New Custom Report dialog opens so that you can define the details for saving and distributing the data displayed in the Entity Table as a Custom Report. The report is saved as per your selections and added to the Saved Reports list on the Reports page. For more info, see Identity Protection Reports.
The figure above is an example of the Trend graph of privileged user entities detected during the last week.
If you click a point in the graph, the number of entities is displayed in the box that is opened at the point, and the net change is displayed in the summary statistics below.
The Entity table lists the entities satisfying the criteria defined by the Category, Interval and selected subcategory, or by a filter or Custom Insight, together with additional data about them.
The Entity table includes these columns:
| Column | Description |
|---|---|
|
Type |
Icons indicate one of these types:
|
|
Primary Name |
From the entity’s account. |
|
Secondary Name |
Used to uniquely identify an entity, using a format depending on the entity type. For example, an AD managed user entity might use the format |
|
Department |
From the entity’s account. |
|
Org Unit |
From the entity’s account. |
|
Attributes |
Icons that indicate entity attributes. Hover the pointer over an icon to see a description. For a complete list of entity attribute icons, see Entity attribute icons. |
|
Score |
The entity’s risk score. |
|
Actions menu (⋮) |
Allows you to perform an action on the relevant entity. See Entity actions. |
In addition to the entity actions described in the Entities section, there are additional actions available for entities within the table.
| Action | Description |
|---|---|
|
Exclude From Insight |
This entity is not displayed in this specific Insight. For example, Disaster Recovery accounts which are stale by definition. To view excluded accounts, click the Excluded counter above the list. |
|
Include in Insight |
Reverse the Exclude From Insight action. |
You can also perform actions on multiple lines or on all lines by selecting the checkboxes to the left of each line or to select all lines, by selecting the checkbox to the left of the heading label Type. As soon as you select a checkbox, a drop-down action menu appears on the right, from which you can select an action to perform on all the selected entities.
| Entity attribute | Description | Icon |
|---|---|---|
| Application Server | The endpoint is an application server. | |
| Authorized | The account has an authorizer or authorizers. For more info, see Authorizers. | |
| Cloud only | The entity only exists on the Azure AD Tenant. | |
| Compromised Password | The user has a password that Identity Protection has evaluated as vulnerable to being guessed using dictionary attacks. | |
| Deleted Account | The account was deleted. | |
| Disabled | The account has been disabled. | |
| DNS Server | A domain name server that stores the DNS records for the domain. | |
| Domain Controller | The server computer processes security authentication requests (logging in, checking permissions, etc.) within a Windows domain. | |
| Executive | The user account belongs to an executive. | |
| File Server | The endpoint is a file server. | |
| GPO Exposed Password | The user has a password that is likely to become known, or might have already become known, to persons that should not know it, for example a password found in Group Policy Preference objects. | |
| Honeytoken | The user account is intended to deceive an attacker into using the account. | |
| Hybrid account | The account exists on both the on-premises Active Directory Domain and the Azure AD Tenant. | |
| Inactive | The user account has been dormant or inactive for between 21 and 90 days. | |
| Locked | The account is locked. | |
| Mail Server | The endpoint is a mail server. | |
| Marked | The user has been singled out by security analysts for special attention so that they can easily identify them throughout the Falcon console. The user remains marked for 48 hours. | |
| Never Logged In | The user account has never logged into an endpoint. | |
| Privileged | The user or entity has permissions beyond those of a typical user or entity. For more info, see Identity protection privileges overview. | |
| Programmatic | A user account not belonging to a human user. | |
| Server | The endpoint is a server. | |
| Shared Endpoint | The endpoint is used by multiple users. | |
| Shared User | The privileged user logs in from multiple locations. | |
| Stale | The user account has been dormant or inactive for more than 90 days. | |
| Unmanaged Endpoint | The endpoint is not registered in the domain and does not have any Group Policies running on it. | |
| VDI Endpoint | The endpoint is a virtual desktop infrastructure endpoint. Identity Protection considers being an administrator on greater than 5% of total endpoints to be excessive. VDI endpoints are capped at contributing 3% of the 5% threshold, and each VDI endpoint is considered to be one-tenth of a physical endpoint when performing the calculation. | |
| Watched | A user that security administrators should pay special attention to, for example, users under notice or who have resigned or who for whatever reason are believed to be motivated to cause harm to the organization. |
Privileged identities are users or entities that have permissions beyond those of a typical user or entity. Identity protection tracks and analyzes privileged identities to reduce unintended risk to your system.
There are many types of privileges, which can be obtained in many ways. For more information, see Identity protection privileges overview.
These are the Insights menu subcategories when the Category is Privileged Users:
| Subcategory | Description |
|---|---|
|
Privileged |
Shows all privileged users and the change in their number during the selected interval. Best practice: Minimize the number of privileged users. |
|
Stealthy |
Shows a list of accounts that have privileges that were not obtained through AD protected groups. In some cases, those privileges might have been granted by mistake. Attackers might target such accounts because they are not as well protected as built-in privileged accounts. |
|
Using Unmanaged Endpoints |
Shows the privileged users who are using unmanaged endpoints, which are endpoints not registered in the domain and on which Group Policies are not running. Unmanaged endpoints are considered to be at greater risk of exposure to viruses and other malicious software, so privileged users put themselves and the organization at greater risk by using them. Best practice: Ensure that privileged users are not using unmanaged endpoints. |
|
Stale |
A stale user is one whose account has been dormant or inactive for more than three months. Stale users pose a risk because they are unlikely to be monitoring their email and can remain unaware of suspicious activity conducted in their accounts. A programmatic stale privileged user (a process or service rather than a human) poses the risk of a broken or out-of-date process with excessive privileges that can be leveraged by attackers. Best practice: Periodically (every 90 days) monitor stale users and delete or disable any that are found. |
|
Password Never Expires |
While it might be acceptable in restricted contexts for some programmatic users to have passwords that never expire, it is considered unacceptable for human users because it affords attackers an unlimited time frame to eventually guess passwords by brute-force attacks. Also, this might be an indication that the human user is running scripts, which should be done only from accounts dedicated to that purpose. Best practice: Enforce a policy that users must periodically change their passwords. |
|
Compromised Password |
Compromised passwords are vulnerable to being guessed using dictionary attacks. Identity Protection evaluates the strength of user passwords and marks as compromised those it finds as vulnerable. Best practice: Require as a policy that users use strong passwords. |
|
High Risk |
Privileged users with risk scores greater than 7.5 are labeled High Risk. You can define a Custom Insight to define high-risk privileged users using other criteria. |
|
GPO Exposed Password |
A GPO exposed password is one that is likely to become known, or might have already become known, to persons to whom it should not be known, for example a password found in Group Policy Preference objects. A privileged user with a GPO exposed password poses an exceptional risk, more so than a nonprivileged user. Best practice: Review the Group Policy and ensure that GPO Exposed Passwords are not used. |
|
Shared |
A privileged user who logs in from multiple locations. |
Privileged access puts your system at higher risk because it allows an entity to bypass standard controls and execute privileged operations that are not available to a standard account. For this reason, Identity protection tracks and analyzes privileged entities.
Privileges can be granted to an entity in many different ways, either directly or stealthily. For example, a user is considered privileged if they belong to a protected group or a nested group inside a protected group. Alternatively, a user is considered stealthy if their rights are granted using a direct delegation of the ACL and not through group membership.
You can also define an entity as privileged using custom configuration of Identity Protection through the Business Privileges function. To configure business privileges, go to Identity protection > Configure > Settings. For more information, see Business Privileges.
The following table gives a complete list of privileges and the way they are granted.
| Privilege | Description | Granted by |
|---|---|---|
| Account Operator | Can create, modify, and delete accounts for users, computers, groups and locations in the Users or Computers containers and organizational units in the domain, except the Domain Controllers organizational unit | Being a member of Account Operators protected group |
| Administrator | Has full control of all domain controllers in the domain | Being a member of Administrators protected group |
| Administrative Group Controller | A stealthy privilege type that indicates an entity has permission to add members to a group that is privileged (or can become one) | The
permission is calculated by examining which non-administrative groups
and users are allowed to modify the list of members of the
administrative group by either:
|
| Administrator Password Controller | A stealthy privilege type that indicates an entity has permission to change the password of another entity that is privileged (or can become one) | The permission is calculated by examining which non-administrative groups and users have Reset password permission or can edit the userPassword attribute.
For more info, see How to remove Administrator Password Controller privileges? |
| Any Azure Privileged | Has any Azure privileges | Having any of the following privileges:
|
| Any Privileged Account Service Delegation | Common ancestor type of service delegation type privileges | Having any of the following privileges:
|
| Azure Access Privilege | Has Azure access privileges | Having one of the following Azure AD Roles:
|
| Azure Application Privilege | Has control over cloud applications | Having one of the following Azure Administrative Roles:
|
| Azure Credentials Privilege | Has control over user credentials | Having one of the following Azure Administrative Roles:
|
| Azure Global Privilege | Has full control over the tenant | Having one of the following Azure Administrative Roles:
|
| Azure Security Privilege | Can manage security-related features in Azure | Having one of the following Azure Administrative Roles:
|
| Backup Operator | Can back up and restore all files on domain controllers in the domain, regardless of individual permissions on those files | Being a member of Backup Operators protected group |
| Builtin Administrator | Has full control over the system | Being a member of Builtin Administrators protected group |
| Business Privilege | Having any of the custom-configured Business Privileges | Custom
configuration of Identity Protection through the Business Privileges
function. A user or a group is added manually with privileges by
assigning the group or user to the Business Privileges and signaling to
the system that the users or group members are privileged beyond the AD
management.
To configure business privileges, go to Identity protection > Configure > Settings. For more information, see Business Privileges. |
| Certificate Publisher | Allowed to publish certificates for users in Active Directory | The endpoint is a member of the Cert publishers Active Directory group
For more info, see Certificate Authority Servers and related attack paths in Identity Protection. For US-GOV-1 and US-GOV-2 customers, see Certificate Authority Servers and related attack paths in Identity Protection. |
| Constrained Privileged Account Service Delegation | A stealthy privilege type that indicates an entity is permitted to access specific resources on behalf of privileged users | The
permission is calculated by examining which non-administrative groups
and users have delegation permissions on an administrator that allows
delegation.
For more info, see How to remove Constrained/Unconstrained Account Service Delegation privileges?. For US-GOV-1 and US-GOV-2 customers, see How to remove Constrained/Unconstrained Account Service Delegation privileges? |
| Domain Admin | Has full control of the domain | Being a member of Domain Admins protected group |
| Domain Controller | A server computer that processes security authentication requests (logging in, checking permissions, etc.) within a Windows domain | Having all of the following:
|
| Domain Level Admin | Common ancestor type of domain level type privileges | Having any of the following privileges:
|
| Effective Replicator | A stealthy privilege type that indicates an entity has permission to replicate domain information, including hashes | The permission is calculated by examining which non-administrative groups and users have Replicating Directory Change All permission on the domain.
For more info, see How to remove Effective Replicator privileges?. For US-GOV-1 and US-GOV-2 customers, see How to remove Effective Replicator privileges? |
| Enterprise Admin | Has full control of all domains in the forest | Being a member of Enterprise Admins protected group |
| Extensive Local Administrator | An entity which is a local administrator on many Endpoints (except Domain Admins) | Identity Protection considers greater than 5% of total endpoints to be excessive. VDI endpoints are capped at contributing 3% of the 5% threshold, and each VDI endpoint is considered to be one-tenth of a physical endpoint when performing the calculation. |
| Forest Level Admin | Common ancestor type of forest level type privileges | Having any of the following privileges:
|
| Krbtgt Account | A service account that is used by the Key Distribution Center (KDC) service | Being a member of the KRBTGT protected group |
| Object-SID History Takeover | A stealthy privilege type that indicates an entity receives privileges granted by the ‘sidHistory’ Active Directory attribute. The sidHistory attribute represents a list of previous SIDs of the object, which it can have if it was moved from another domain. For an example of a possible danger, see Unsecure SID History attributes. | The
risk is calculated by examining which non-administrative groups and
users have a privileged objectSID in their Object-SID History.
For more info, see How to remove Object-SID History Takeover privileges? |
| Operator Level Admin | Common ancestor type of operator level type privileges | Having any of the following privileges:
|
| Permissions On Account Controller | A stealthy privilege type that indicates an entity is allowed to modify the list of accounts that have effective privileges on an administrator. In actuality, this stealthy privilege occurs when an entity is permitted to gain control over an administrator account by modifying its ACL. | The privileges are calculated by examining which non-administrative groups and users have one of the following permissions:
|
| Print Operators | Can manage, create, share, and delete printers connected to domain controllers in the domain and Active Directory printer objects in the domain | Being a member of the Print Operators protected group |
| Privileged | Common ancestor type of all admin privileged (Any Administrative) | Having any of the privileges in this table |
| Privileged Application Controller | A stealthy privilege type that indicates an entity has an Azure role that can add credentials to an administrative application, and use it to login as a privileged application, or that it is an owner of a privileged application | The privileges are calculated by examining which non-administrative groups and users have either:
|
| Read-Only Domain Controller | A Domain Controller within a Windows domain that stores a read-only copy of the Active Directory database | Being a member of the Read-Only Domain Controllers protected group |
| Replicator | Supports directory replication functions and is used by the File Replication service on domain controllers in the domain | Being a member of the Replicators protected group |
| Schema Admin | The Schema Admins group is authorized to make schema changes in Active Directory | Being a member of the Schema Admins protected group |
| Server Operator | Can log in interactively, create and delete shared resources, start and stop some services, backup and restore files, format the hard disk, and shut down the computer | Being a member of the Server Operators protected group |
| Stealthy Administrators | Common ancestor type of effective admin type privileges (all stealthy admins) | Having any of the following privileges:
|
| Unconstrained Privileged Account Service Delegation | A stealthy privilege type that indicates an entity is permitted to access any resources on behalf of privileged users | The
permission is calculated by examining which non-administrative groups
and users have delegation permissions on an administrator that allows
delegation.
For more info, see How to remove Constrained/Unconstrained Account Service Delegation privileges?. For US-GOV-1 and US-GOV-2 customers, see How to remove Constrained/Unconstrained Account Service Delegation privileges? |
Privileges are arranged in a hierarchy that allows you to focus on multiple related privileges at once. For example, filtering for Any Privileged Account Service Delegation returns all entities with either Unconstrained Privileged Account Service Delegation or Constrained Privileged Account Service Delegation privileges.
These are the Insights menu subcategories when the Category is All Users:
| Subcategory | Description |
|---|---|
|
High Risk |
Users with risk scores greater than 7.5 are labeled High Risk. You can define a Custom Insight to define high-risk users using other criteria. |
|
Password Never Expires |
It is considered unacceptable for human users to have passwords that never expire because it affords attackers an unlimited time frame to eventually guess passwords by brute-force attacks. Also, this might be an indication that the human user is running scripts, which should be done only from accounts dedicated to that purpose. Best practice: Require as a policy that users must periodically change their passwords. |
|
Compromised Password |
Compromised passwords are vulnerable to being guessed using dictionary attacks. Identity Protection evaluates the strength of user passwords and marks as compromised those it finds are vulnerable. Best practice: Require as a policy that users use strong passwords. |
|
GPO Exposed Password |
A GPO exposed password is one that is likely to become known, or might have already become known, to persons to whom it should not be known, for example a password found in Group Policy Preference objects. Best practice: Review the Group Policy and ensure that GPO Exposed Passwords are not used. |
|
Shared |
A user who logs in from multiple locations. |
|
Stale |
A stale user is one whose account has been dormant or inactive for more than three months. Stale users pose a risk because they are unlikely to be monitoring their email and can remain unaware of suspicious activity conducted in their accounts. Best practice: Periodically (every 90 days) monitor stale users and delete or disable any that are found. |
|
Marked Users |
A marked user is one whom security analysts have singled out for special attention so that they can easily identify them throughout the Falcon console. A user remains marked for 48 hours by default. |
|
Watched Users |
A watched user is one to whom security administrators should pay special attention, for example, users under notice or who have resigned or who for whatever reason are believed to be motivated to cause harm to the organization. |
|
Honeytoken |
An account flagged as honeytoken is used to deceive an attacker to use those accounts. Account activities or changes will trigger a dedicated detection that indicates potential malicious activities in the network. For more information, see the Knowledge Base article, What are the best practices for setting up honeytoken accounts in Falcon Identity Protection? |
These are the Insights menu subcategories when the Category is Endpoints:
| Subcategory | Description |
|---|---|
|
High Risk |
Endpoints with risk scores greater than 7.5 are labeled High Risk. You can define a Custom Insight to identify high-risk endpoints using other criteria. |
|
Unmanaged |
An unmanaged endpoint is one not registered in the domain, and on which Group Policies are not running. |
|
Shared |
Endpoints from which multiple users log in, for example, a kiosk. |
|
Unmanaged Used by Privileged Users |
Unmanaged endpoints from which privileged users log in. |
|
Shared Used by Privileged Users |
Shared endpoints from which privileged users log in. These represent a risk because attackers or malware on the shared endpoint might be able to locate traces of an administrator’s password that remain even after the administrator has logged out. |
|
Stale |
A stale endpoint is one that has not been used for more than three months. |
Non-human identities are digital identities for applications, services, or devices such as service accounts. Identity protection tracks and analyzes non-human identities to reduce unintended risk to your system.
These are the subcategories on the Non-Human Identities tab:
| Subcategory | Description |
|---|---|
|
From Active Directory |
Non-human identity from the Active Directory. This list includes accounts that were classified as programmatic automatically or manually. |
|
From Entra ID |
Entra ID-based non-human identities. This list includes Entra Service Principals defined in your environment. Microsoft Entra service principals are security identities that applications, services, and automation tools used to authenticate and access specific Azure resources. They represent the local instance of an application within a specific tenant, enabling non-human access to protected resources. Organizations should implement the principle of least privilege with service principals, granting only the minimum permissions necessary for automated processes to function properly. |
|
Privileged |
Shows all privileged non-human identities and the change in their number during the selected interval. Best practice: Minimize the number of privileged non-human identities. |
|
Privileged from Active Directory |
Privileged non-human identities from the Active Directory. This list includes accounts that were classified as programmatic automatically or manually. |
|
Privileged from Entra ID |
Privileged Entra ID-based non-human identities. This list includes Entra Service Principals defined in your environment. |
|
High Risk |
Non-human identities with risk scores greater than 7.5 are labeled High Risk. You can define a Custom Insight to define high-risk non-human identities using other criteria. |
|
Medium Risk |
Non-human identities with risk scores labeled Medium Risk. You can define a Custom Insight to identify medium-risk non-human identities using other criteria. |
|
Low Risk |
Non-human identities with risk scores labeled Low Risk. You can define a Custom Insight to identify low-risk non-human identities using other criteria. |
| Compromised Password |
Compromised passwords are vulnerable to being guessed using dictionary attacks. Identity Protection evaluates the strength of user passwords and marks as compromised those it finds as vulnerable. Best practice: Require as a policy that users use strong passwords. |
| Duplicate Password |
Two or more user accounts share the same password. Using duplicated passwords across multiple accounts can lead to lateral movement and credential stuffing attacks if one account is compromised, resulting in a breach. Best practice: Ensure each account has a unique password. |
| Stale |
A stale non-human identity is one whose account has been dormant or inactive for more than three months. A stale non-human identity poses the risk of a broken or out-of-date process with excessive privileges that can be leveraged by attackers. Best practice: Periodically (every 90 days) monitor stale non-human identities and delete or disable any that are found. |
| Watched | A watched non-human identity is one to whom security administrators should pay special attention, for example, accounts that were detected as suspicious by external sources. |
| Stealthy | Shows a list of non-human identities that have privileges that were not obtained through AD protected groups. In some cases, those privileges might have been granted by mistake. Attackers might target such accounts because they are not as monitored as other well known privileged accounts. |
| External Registered Application | A service principal that represents an application registered in a different tenant has an External registered application attribute and the registered tenant field includes the external tenant ID only.
Tip: External applications that are registered in known Microsoft tenants also display this information. |
| Application Controllers |
Users that have management authority over organizational applications and can leverage their permissions to perform administrative tasks related to those applications. These individuals manage Microsoft Entra service principals, which are security identities that applications and services use to authenticate and access Azure resources, with some applications potentially having privileged access. Best practice: Implement proper governance for application controllers, carefully monitoring those who manage applications with elevated permissions while maintaining comprehensive audit trails of their activities. |
These are the Insights menu subcategories when the Category is Risk Analysis:
| Subcategory | Description |
|---|---|
|
Membership by Severity |
A bar graph showing the distribution of risk score by severity across OUs or Departments (depending on your selection) is displayed along with a detailed breakdown for each OU or Department. |
|
Membership by Impact |
A bar graph showing the distribution of risk score by impact across OUs or Departments (depending on your selection) is displayed along with a detailed breakdown for each OU or Department. The Risk Analysis - Membership by Impact page displays a four-quadrant graph. The X-axis plots the OU’s or Department’s risk scores and the Y-axis plots the impact of the scores, which indicates the potential damage the OU or Department poses to the enterprise. For example, OUs with a high risk score whose users have limited access privileges pose a lesser risk than OUs with the same high risk score whose users have extensive access privileges. |
|
Outliers |
The Risk Analysis page displays a four-quadrant graph by users. The X-axis plots the user’s risk scores and the Y-axis plots the impact of the user’s risk score, which indicates the potential damage the user poses to the enterprise. For example, users with a high-risk score and limited access privileges pose a lesser risk than users with the same high-risk score but with extensive access privileges. Note: Identity Protection considers the following factors when assessing impact: the user’s business role, privileges, exchange delegations, and similar users. Each of the quadrants in the graph represents a different combination of risk score and impact. Each bubble represents the number of users in a region of the graph (a given combination of risk score and impact). The larger the bubble, the greater the number of users in that region. Users in the upper-right quadrant (high impact, high risk score) are of the greatest concern, and you should investigate those as a priority. Users in the other quadrants pose less of a danger to the enterprise.
|
The table below lists the Insights menu subcategories when the Category is Events Analysis.
| Subcategory | Description |
|---|---|
|
Top User Account Lockouts |
Shows the number of top users by account lockouts. |
|
Password Changes |
Shows the number of password changes every day. |
|
Account Modified |
Shows the number of accounts modified every day. |
|
New User Accounts |
Shows the number of new user accounts created every day. |
|
Disabled User Accounts |
Shows the number of accounts disabled every day. |
|
Top User Login Failures |
Shows the number of top users with failed logins. |
|
Login Failures by Error Code |
Shows details of the reasons for logon failures. |
|
Top Active User by Access |
Shows details of the top users by service access events. |
|
Login Failures by Department |
Shows details of the login failures by department. |
|
User logins by type |
Shows the number of user logins by type, such as SSO, VPN, or Domain. |
Click the button for each subcategory to show the total number of events for that subcategory that happened in your domain over the selected time period. The information is shown in either a logarithmic or linear bar chart. Click an event in the bar chart or in the list to view a detailed list of events on the Threat Hunter page.
Custom insights are insights you can create with a custom filter and save for future use.
Filters enable you to display any cross-section of the entities in the Entity Table. You can define a filter to search for the relevant data and save it as a Custom Insight so that you can reuse it later.
When you define a filter, apply a custom insight, or change and save it, the Trend and Entity Table data changes accordingly.
To apply a custom insight filter, select it from the list.
To delete a custom insight filter, click the delete icon (X) in the upper-right corner, and then click Yes, Continue.
To define a custom insight filter:
Click New Custom Insight.
On the filter page, specify any of these applicable parameters:
Entity Name: The full or partial name of an entity.
Endpoint Classification: Select the endpoint classification in the network. The available classifications include, but are not limited to, application server, DNS server, domain controller, Exchange Server, File Server, VDI (Virtual Desktop Infrastructure) endpoint, workstation, and more.
Group: Select or enter any Group that exists in the monitored domains.
Microsoft Entra Role: Select or enter any Azure AD Role that exists in the monitored tenant.
Entra join type: Limit the search by the Entra join type: Hybrid-joined, Joined, or Registered.
Risk Factors: Limit the search by any of the risk factors detected and prevented by Identity Protection.
Privileges: Select from the privileges assigned to the entity.
Has Incidents: To search for the entities with reported incidents, select Yes. To ignore whether the entity has reported incidents, select Any Or None.
Attributes: Select the entity’s attributes.
Domain / Tenant: Select any or all domains or tenants monitored by Identity Protection.
Organization Unit: This list contains the entire Organization Unit (OU) tree for every domain monitored by Identity Protection. To limit the search by an OU, select it in the list.
Department: Select from a list of all departments available in Active Directory.
Account Type: Select the entity’s account type: Any User, Endpoint, Group, Human, Programmatic or Role.
Business Privileges: Select from all available business roles.
Risk Severity: Specify a range of the entity’s risk severity values by dragging and dropping the ends of the scale.
Subscription Assigned Roles: Find entities that have the specified assigned role in any subscription.
Subscription Name: Find entities that have an assigned role in the specified subscription.
To see the results of the filter in the Trend and the Entities table, click Apply.
To save the filter as a custom insight:
Click the menu icon, and then click Save As Custom Insight.
Provide a title, and then click Save.
An Entity encapsulates and summarizes all the system information about an organizational or network entity. The most common entities are users and endpoints, but there are also entities representing Azure Service Principals and entity groups, such as Active Directory groups.
Entity objects are usually derived from external data sources. For instance, all user accounts in an Active Directory domain covered by Falcon Identity Protection are represented as entities.
Moreover, entities do not always represent a single account. An LDAP user, for example, might be correlated with an IDaaS account, resulting in a single, unified entity.
These hybrid and cloud-only entities are created when Identity Protection extracts data from either an Active Directory (AD) domain or an Entra tenant. We refer to Hybrid entities as those which exist on both the on-premises AD domain and the Entra tenant. Whereas we refer to cloud-only entities as those which only exist on the Entra tenant.
Click an entity’s name to open the entity profile overview panel. Click the entity name again or click More beside any panel name to open the full Entity page.
When the Entity page is fully expanded, you can navigate it by selecting any of the following tabs:
Overview
About
Assets
Activity
Risk
Timeline
The Overview tab
provides a high-level summary of an entity's profile. The top section
shows the entity name, their current risk score, their attributes
represented as icons, and the time of their latest detected activity in
the network and on the cloud or other SSO sources
.
In addition, the top section includes a vertical ellipsis icon (⋮) that opens the Actions menu.
The rest of the Overview tab is made up of a number of panels, each corresponding to another tab—About, Activity, Assets, and Risk—and containing a subset of fields from the respective tab.
This unified view allows you to evaluate at a glance whether the user requires special attention. To delve into any particular set of user-related details, click More beside the respective panel name and the corresponding tab opens. When the Entity page is fully extended, the link More changes to the Show more bar below the panel.
This is a comprehensive set of data pertaining to each user or endpoint in the domain. It is comprised of the following categories, depending on the entity type, each represented in a separate card:
Business Card (Users and Groups) / Endpoint Information (Endpoints)
Privileges
Local Administrators
Azure AD Roles
Groups
This section contains information about users, groups, Azure Service Principals, or endpoints. Some of the data is gathered from identity providers such as Active Directory or Azure AD.
| Item | Description | Entity Type |
|---|---|---|
|
Enabled |
Yes or No |
User, Endpoint |
| Source accounts | The number of source accounts for the entity. Click See details to see the Data source, Account Name, Most Recent Activity, and Status of each source account. |
User, Endpoint |
|
Organizational Unit |
A subdivision within an on-premises Active Directory to which the account belongs. This field shows the entire hierarchy, starting from the top organizational unit. |
User, Endpoint, Group |
|
Created |
The date and time the account was created. |
All |
|
Account type |
The account type of the entity. One of:
Note: accounts flagged as honeytoken will have this information displayed next to their account type.
|
All |
|
Domain / Tenant |
A list of the AD domains and tenants in which the account exists. |
User, Group, Azure Service Principal |
|
Title |
The account owner’s title in the organizational structure. |
User |
|
Department |
The department to which the account belongs. |
User |
|
Managed by |
The account’s direct manager, as specified in an on-premises Active Directory. |
User |
|
Description |
Entity description |
User, Endpoint, Group |
|
Email address |
The account’s primary email address |
User |
|
Classification |
Identity Protection learns accounts over time and classifies them as Human, Programmatic, or Executive. To assist with classification, Identity Protection uses information such as:
If Identity Protection incorrectly classifies an account, you can alter it by clicking Classify As... and selecting the correct option.
Notes:
|
User, Endpoint |
|
ZTA Score |
The Zero Trust Assessment (ZTA) score given to the endpoint. ZTA scores are between |
Endpoint |
|
Last password change |
A relative period when the latest account password change occurred, for example, a month ago. To see the exact time, hover over the relative time value. |
User |
|
Password policy strength |
An evaluation of the password policy applied to the account. The evaluation considers both password length and complexity. Clicking See details displays the Password Policy (group or fine-grained) and its configuration parameters. |
User |
|
Entra ID registered authentication methods |
A list of the user’s Entra ID registered multi-factor authentication methods. Clicking See details displays more info about the user’s Entra ID registered authentication methods. You might see users with listed authentication methods but still receive an Account without MFA configured risk if the user does not have an authentication method that meets the organization policy in Entra ID. |
User |
| Linked accounts | A list of accounts that are linked to the entity. For more info, see Linked accounts. | User |
|
Distinguished name |
An attribute used by Active Directory to
uniquely reference the entity. It is often referred to as DN or FDN. It
is a fully qualified path of the names that traces the entry back to the
root of the tree. For example the distinguished name of a group entity
called Partners could be: |
Endpoint, Group |
|
Enabled for users to sign-in |
Specifies whether the service principal account is enabled, or not. One of:
|
Azure Service Principal |
|
Supported account types |
The Microsoft accounts that are supported for the current application. Comes from the signInAudience property of Azure service principals. One of:
|
Azure Service Principal |
|
Service principal object ID |
The unique identifier of the service principal in Azure. |
Azure Service Principal |
|
Registered tenant ID |
Specifies the type and ID of the tenant where the application is registered One of:
|
Azure Service Principal |
|
Owners |
The users who are configured in Azure as owners, and therefore have control over the application associated with the service principal. Note: Shown if the service principal AND associated app are both in the same tenant |
Azure Service Principal |
|
Application ID |
The unique identifier of the application associated with the service principal. |
Azure Service Principal |
|
App registration object ID |
The Azure unique identifier of the app registration object associated with the app and service principal. Note: Shown if the service principal AND associated app are both in the same tenant |
Azure Service Principal |
|
SPNs |
The Service Principal Names (SPN) attribute of the user or endpoint. Tip: Hover over an SPN and then click the Show Related Events icon to open Threat Hunter and see actual service usage: This can be a good starting point for additional investigations. |
User, Endpoint |
|
SID |
The Security IDentifier (SID), is a unique ID number that a computer or domain controller uses to identify an entity. It is a string of alphanumeric characters assigned to each user on a Windows computer, or to each user, group, and computer on an on-premises domain-controlled network. |
User, Endpoint, Group |
|
Scope |
Defines what types of objects can belong to the group, what types of groups the group can be a member of and the scope of objects that security groups can be given access to. Active Directory Domain Services defines three group scopes: Universal, Global and Domain Local. |
Group |
|
Type |
Indicates whether a group is defined as a Security group, Distribution group, or Microsoft 365 group. |
Group |
|
Default AD group |
Indicates whether the group is a built-in Active Directory group. |
Group |
|
Membership Type |
Indicates Azure AD membership type of Assigned or Dynamic. |
Group |
|
AD Roles Enabled |
Indicates if roles can be assigned to a cloud group in Azure AD. |
Group |
|
Operating system |
Operating System name. For example, Windows 7 Enterprise 6.1. |
Endpoint |
|
Entra join type |
Indicates the endpoint’s Entra join type: Hybrid-joined, Joined, or Registered. |
Endpoint |
|
Device ID |
The endpoint’s Entra device ID. |
Endpoint |
|
Object Owner |
Entra ID has a dedicated field for the device owners, represented in Identity Protection as endpoint owner. This property exists for eligible devices, in addition to analytic-based association for users that usually or uniquely use specific devices. |
Endpoint |
|
MDM |
Mobile Device Management used to manage this device. For example, Intunes. |
Endpoint |
|
Compliant |
Indicates whether the endpoint is configured as compliant by Entra ID. |
Endpoint |
|
Registration date |
The endpoint’s Entra ID registration date. |
Endpoint |
Linked accounts are two or more independent accounts that belong to the same person, for example, administrators that have a privileged account for their administrative tasks and a personal account for daily usage. Identity Protection uses ML algorithms to determine if two accounts are linked based on their properties. The most similar accounts are linked automatically. You can also manually link or unlink two accounts by following these steps:
For more info about linked accounts, see Linked accounts in Identity Protection.
This panel of the About tab is available only for Privileged accounts. It shows you the reasons why the account is classified as such. Privileged entities belong to protected groups or a nested group inside a protected group. For example, within Active Directory, a default set of highly privileged accounts and groups are considered protected accounts and groups.
An entity can become privileged for a number of reasons. For example, the entity has an Azure AD privileged role, belongs to a group with privileged role, or belongs to a nested group inside a privileged group.
Local Administrator is a user account that is allowed to perform any action on a local computer, but is unable to modify information in Active Directory for other computers and other users.
Local administrators are commonly used as a starting point for penetrating the network and exploiting this breach to move laterally, gradually expanding the attack surface. This threat, however, usually remains siloed and can be detected only in the aftermath. Identity Protection retrieves information about local administrators based on deployed Falcon sensors.
In user accounts, the Local Administrators section contains the list of endpoints where the user has Local Administrator privileges as a domain group member, a domain user, or a local user.
In group accounts, the Local Administrators section contains the list of endpoints where the domain group members have Local Administrator privileges.
In endpoint accounts, the Local Administrators section contains the list of users that have Local Administrator privileges on this endpoint. To see when the latest query was performed, hover over the Information button adjacent to the section name.
The indication that a user account is also a Local Administrator on an endpoint appears in the user account's Assets tab.
A special case of the local administrator is a local account that controls access to a single endpoint, where local account credentials are stored. Local accounts can be duplicated if machines are created from the same image and inherit the same local administrator username and password. By compromising one of these machines, an attacker can extract the credentials from the local Security Account Manager (SAM) database and move laterally to other machines. This is why duplicated local accounts are considered a risk factor that will be detected during a security assessment. A local account defined on an endpoint is shown in the Local Administrators section of the endpoint's About tab. If this local account is duplicated on more than one machine, it will appear as: Local account (shared on X endpoints), where the number of endpoints is a link opening the list of endpoints in a side panel.
If no information is displayed in the Local Administrators section of an endpoint account, it might be due to any of the following reasons:
The endpoint is not a Windows machine. Local administrators cannot be defined on a non-Windows machine, therefore, no local administrator information can be retrieved from it.
The endpoint is a Domain Controller. Local administrators cannot be defined on a Domain Controller, therefore, no local administrator information can be retrieved from it.
A Falcon sensor isn’t detected on this endpoint. This could be because it is not yet installed or the Identity Protection subscription doesn’t exist for this CID.
Note: It might take up to 24 hours after sensor deployment for a value to appear here.
The endpoint is not joined to the domain and is not covered by the local administrator’s query.
Users or groups that have a significant footprint as local administrators present a greater security risk and must be watched more closely.
Identity Protection considers being an administrator on greater than 5% of total endpoints to be excessive
VDI endpoints are capped at contributing 3% of the 5% threshold, and each VDI endpoint is considered to be one-tenth of a physical endpoint when performing the calculation.
Such accounts are classified as Extensive Local Administrators, which allows you to apply filters and create custom insights to monitor them.
The Azure AD Roles panel of the About tab displays information retrieved from Azure Active Directory. The Azure AD Roles panel lists Azure Administrative Roles that the account holds in the tenant that is configured using the Azure IDAAS connector. Click a role to display a panel that lists the Role members and their attributes.
You can access roles:
From an entity's About page
By searching for them by name in the Search bar
By opening them from any point in the application in which they appear
Click an Azure AD role to open the Azure AD role overview page and view the role's members and a selection of their attributes.
Click an Azure AD role's name or icon to:
View the privileges granted to that role.
See a link to the description of the role.
Some Azure AD roles are considered privileged. For a list of Identity privilege types, see Identity protection privileges overview.
When you view a role's members the default view shows you all the entities that have the applicable role.
You can export a list of a role's members and their attributes as a CSV file by clicking Export CSV located above the members list.
Groups display information retrieved from Active Directory and Azure AD that provides you with the context and scope within which the group operates, such as the group type, its members, and their connection to other entities.
You can access groups:
From an entity’s About page.
By searching for them by name in the Search bar.
By opening them from any point in the application in which they appear.
An entity’s About page lists the groups for which the entity is a member. A group that is marked with a crown icon indicates that the group is a privileged group, and that its members are privileged.
Click a group to open the group overview page and view the group's members, a selection of their attributes, and their risk score.
Click a group's name or icon to:
Drill down to view the group’s details as displayed in the group’s business card.
See if a group is nested within another group.
View the privileges of that group.
One characteristic of a group is that they can be nested. When you view a group's members the default view shows you all the entities that belong to the group and its subgroups.
To view members that only belong to the selected group, click Show direct members only.
You can export a list of a group's members and their attributes as a CSV file by clicking Export CSV located above the members list.
This tab includes the endpoints, applications, and top destinations that the user accesses often, which makes them part of their behavioral baseline. This information is available after Identity Protection gains visibility of the account traffic and determines usage patterns. Once assets are shown, they are used to detect anomalous activity and to define policy rules using the Baseline condition.
The tab contains the following sections:
This section lists the endpoints that the user regularly accesses. Each entry contains:
Endpoint name
IP
Last login time
Owner: this tag is added if this is the only user using this endpoint
Local administrator: this tag is added if the user is a local administrator of the endpoint.
This section lists applications that have been regularly accessed. Each entry contains:
Application Name
Last login time
This section contains a list of the servers the user RDPs to on a regular basis. Each entry contains:
Endpoint name
IP
Last login time
Local administrator: this tag is added if the user is a local administrator of the endpoint.
This section lists the assigned built-in roles for subscriptions an entity has in Azure. Each entry contains:
Subscription Name
Subscription ID
List of assigned built-in roles
Click Open menu in an entry to:
View all users assigned to the subscription
View the subscription details in Azure
This tab contains comprehensive information about the user's recent and current network activity.
These sections show info in the Activity tab:
| Section | Description |
|---|---|
|
Login History |
The history of the user's logins for the last 90 days, including the type of connection, the endpoint from which the login originated, its type and IP address, and the login date and time (to see the exact time, hover over the date). The connections shown here comprise, among others, LDAP, Kerberos, and Cloud SSO logins. The login geolocation is indicated on the map. Regular, unusual, and forbidden locations are color-coded, allowing you to quickly detect any anomaly. Clicking an endpoint in the table opens its profile in a side panel.
Note: Login geolocation is only available for SSO logins.
|
|
Logged On |
The endpoints on which the user was recently active. This is determined by examining the LDAP GPO Searches performed in the last 4 hours. The information includes the endpoint type, its primary and secondary names, the department and organizational unit to which the endpoint belongs, its attributes (for example, Server, Privileged, and so on), its risk score, and the login date and time. Clicking an endpoint in the table opens its profile in a side panel. |
|
Application Usage |
This section contains the details about the user's access to cloud applications, including the application name, the type and IP address of the device used, and the access date and time (to see the exact time, hover over the date). |
|
User sign-ins |
Shows details about the users who have signed into an application that is associated with a service principal, including:
|
|
On-Prem Service Access |
This section contains the details about the user's access to services, including the originating endpoint, the service type, the destination, and the access date and time (to see the exact time, hover over the date). |
This section shows the user's risk trend for the last 30 days and the main risk factors. Hovering over a date in the trend diagram shows the risk score on this particular date and its difference from the previous risk score.
The Timeline is a chronologically presented series of events related to an account. The categories of events shown in the timeline include:
Alerts. These are the main components of incidents relating to the account.
Changes to the account. For example, the account name changed, it was disabled or deleted, or its authorizers were modified.
Changes in the state of the account. These state changes include the account becoming stale or inactive, or a compromised password was detected.
Policy rule matches. The account has matched the criteria for an existing Identity Protection policy.
These actions are available from the Entity actions menu. The actions menu differs according to the entity type and its attributes. For example, whether the entity is a user or an endpoint, on the watch list or not on the watch list, is Cloud Only or Hybrid, and other attributes.
| Action | Description |
|---|---|
|
Mark entity |
Mark the entity so that it can be easily identified elsewhere in the Falcon console. An entity remains marked for 48 hours by default. |
|
Unmark entity |
Unmark the entity. This action is only available for marked entities. |
|
Add to watchlist |
Add the entity to the watch list. This action also increases the entity’s risk score. |
|
Remove from watchlist |
Remove the entity from the watched list. This option appears only for watched entities. |
|
Set classification |
Override automatic classification. For example, the analyst can specify that an endpoint classified as a server is a workstation, or that a human user is actually an executive, or an unclassified user account is a programmatic account. This is valuable when the user wants to override classification or speed up classification. Identity Protection does not change the analyst’s classification even if it determines that the entity should be classified otherwise. Also, Identity Protection uses the analyst’s classification as input for its own classifications, for example, for determining similar users.
Note: Classifying an endpoint as an impersonator server causes Credential scanning or Password brute force attack
detections from it to have a lower severity or be completely filtered
out of detection results in some cases. Classifying an endpoint as an
impersonation server causes Unusual login to an endpoint detections to be completely filtered out of detection results in all cases.
|
|
Manage authorizers |
Specify a user, multiple users, or groups, who will authenticate other accounts when a policy requires authentication or verification. Notifications that appear as Authorizers Changed are: authorizers added, authorizers removed, or the combination of both authorizers added and authorizers removed. For more information, see Authorizers. |
|
Flag as honeytoken |
Flag a specific entity as honeytoken. Account activities or changes will trigger a dedicated detection. For more information, see the Knowledge Base article, What are the best practices for setting up honeytoken accounts in Falcon Identity Protection? |
|
Remove honeytoken flag |
Remove the honeytoken flag from the entity. This option appears only for entities flagged as honeytokens. |
|
Show Recent Events |
Displays a list of recent events for the selected user. |
The authorizer can be a user, a group of users, or a combination of both. When an MFA is triggered for an account with multiple authorizers, the account user is prompted to choose an authorizer from the list of options. In instances when that user-driven choice is not possible, an MFA is sent to all authorizers assigned to the account, but only one authorizer needs to approve. For information about MFA options, see MFA connectors.
The policy rules that apply to the account determine when an MFA is sent to the authorizer or authorizers. For more information, see Identity Protection Policy.
Understand and work through the info provided in detections and incidents.
An incident is a group of detections and supplemental or extra information of anomalous security events. An incident is indicative of malicious intent, over time, involving the same entities, and that require the attention of administrators.
Identity Protection categorizes incidents according to their type and severity.
A detection is a warning about an anomalous security event, an event that does not conform to the pattern of behavior for an entity as observed by Identity Protection in the past or which is known to be indicative of malicious intent. For example, protocol manipulation typically associated with attack tools.
As more detections occur that relate to an incident, the incident type might change. For example, an Unusual use of endpoint incident can become, as it accumulates additional related detections, a Suspicious movement incident or even a Probable Insider Threat incident.
The diagram below shows the flow of information from events to incidents, as events occur over time.
Note the following:
Not all events are security events that become elements of detections.
An event can become an element of a detection that preceded it in time.
A detection can become an element of an incident that preceded it in time.
The policy by its nature acts in real time based on the information available at the time it is triggered. Detections are generated in retrospect, after the event occurs, based on its conformance or nonconformance to the involved entities’ historical patterns of behavior over time, and require a holistic analysis of a wide range of data.
You can get an overview of identity-based detections in a dashboard, or details of individual detections in a table.
Identity-based detections are also available in the unified detections view. For more info, see Detection Monitoring.
View a summary of identity-based detections in a dashboard by navigating to Identity Protection > Monitor > Detections dashboard .
The Detections dashboard can be filtered by time, severity, status, detection name, user name, assigned to, hostname, objective, tactic, tags, technique (by MITRE), and domain/tenant.
You can view widgets containing the following information in the Detections dashboard:
Number of detections by severity
Note that informational-severity detections are filtered by default.
Most recent detections
Assigned detections per user
Detections by objective
Detections by severity
Detections by status
Detections by name
Source users most involved in detections
Source endpoints most involved in detections
You can use these widgets in custom dashboards. For more info, see Customizable dashboards.
View detailed info about identity-based detections on the Identity-based detections page by navigating to Identity Protection > Monitor > Identity-based Detections.
You can use the open menu to perform these actions on identity-based detections:
View detection details, such as the users and endpoints involved.
Update the detection status.
Assign the detection to a user for further investigation or resolution.
Add tags or comments to the detection.
The Identity-based Detections page displays the list of detections. You can search or filter the list and view details for individual detections.
Go to Identity Protection > Monitor > Identity-based Detections .
Use the Search detections field or filter menus to find specific types of detections. Type the search criteria or select the filter and then click Apply.
From Manage detections attribute templates or the open menu :
Customize detection attributes to adjust what information appears in the list of detections, helping you triage detections more quickly and easily. For more info, see Detection Attribute Management.
Click a detection to get more context in the summary panel.
To view more details about elements involved in the detection, select an option from the Investigate menu:
Investigate activities. Search for activities relating to the detection, using the activity ID. You must have a subscription for Falcon Investigate to perform the search.
Investigate involved users. Search for activities involving the user relating to the detection. You must have a subscription for Falcon Investigate to perform the search.
Investigate involved endpoints. Search for activities involving the source endpoint relating to the detection. You must have a subscription for Falcon Investigate to perform the search.
Search for involved entities in Threat Hunter. Search in Identity Protection Threat Hunter for activities performed by the entities involved in the detection.
In the summary panel, click See full detection to view all detection details. The specific sections shown vary by detection type.
Update the status, assign a user, or add tags and comments to identity-based detections.
Go to Identity Protection > Monitor > Identity-based Detections .
Select one of these options:
Modify a single detection: Locate the detection and from the Actions menu, select Edit status.
Tip: You can also modify a detection from the summary panel by using the Actions menu.
Bulk modify detections: Select multiple detections, and then click Edit.
Modify the detection as needed.
Use the Status and Assigned to options to change the status or assigned user.
Enter a new tag or remove existing tags using the Detection tags field.
Enter a comment in the Add comment field.
Click Update status.
Orchestrate automated actions triggered by identity detections in Fusion SOAR.
To reach your workflows, go to Fusion SOAR > Fusion SOAR > Workflows .
A workflow has only one trigger. Edit the trigger for an existing workflow or create a new workflow.
In the Add trigger panel, search for identity and then expand Identity & Access.
Click Detection > Identity Detection.
In the workflow, you can add conditions based on the detection details.
For more information, see Fusion SOAR.
Apply filters to update the detection information shown in your dashboard or table. For example, you can filter to show only activity during the past day or only activity with a certain severity. You can also save your preferred filter combinations to use later.
To apply a filter:
Click a filter to view the available values.
Specify the values you want to filter by:
Select the values you want to include in the filter.
For filters that have a search field, you can enter a value and select it. You can also use a wildcard (*).
To exclude a value, hover over it and click Exclude.
When you’re finished, click Apply.
You can apply multiple filters and values. Typically, filter behavior works as follows:
Selected values within a filter combine with an OR operator
Multiple filters combine with an AND operator
For example, this filter combination is evaluated as:
(OS version is Windows 10 OR Windows Server 2019) AND (Group is CR Systems)
Create custom filters to save frequently used filter combinations:
Apply the filters you want to use as a custom filter.
Open the Add or remove saved filters menu and click Save.
Apply custom filters from the Saved filters menu.
Modify existing custom filters:
Select the filter from the Saved filters menu.
Open the Add or remove saved filters menu and select an action:
Save: Save your filter changes.
Save as: Save a copy of the filter without affecting the original.
Delete: Delete the filter.
Rename: Rename the filter.
When you modify a saved filter, an asterisk appears by its name until you save your changes.
You can act on the incidents directly from the page. You can manage the incident life cycle, add notes, filter, sort, examine, and perform forensic analysis of incidents.
The structure of the Incidents page is as follows:
Interval: In the upper-right corner, a drop-down menu lists available intervals to display incidents. For example, Last Day, Last Week, Last Month, All Time. You can also specify a Custom date range.
Incidents by Status: A color-coded graph providing an overview of the total number of incidents and their status. Click a metric on the graph to display a list of the corresponding incidents.
Incidents by Severity: A color-coded bar graph that helps to evaluate the number of incidents based on their severity. Click a bar on the graph to display a corresponding list of the incidents. User similarity is one of the factors used to determine the severity of an incident.
New vs. Closed: A list of recent dates, showing the number of incidents opened and closed on each of those dates. This helps to evaluate and track the incident resolution rate. Click a bar on the graph to display a corresponding list of the incidents.
Involved Entities by Type: A bar graph showing the distribution of incidents among users (human and programmatic) and endpoints (non-domain-joined and managed). This information helps to identify the users and endpoints most frequently involved in incidents and whether the incidents are caused by user actions or are programmatic (in which case addressing the problem might require assistance from IT personnel).
A Filter box, by which you can search incidents by tags, for example, by Incident Type, Severity, Status or Entities.
A list of incidents, depending on the selections in the other controls, as well as sorting by incident type, severity, and status. By default, incidents are sorted by last update time. You can change this default sort to be based on incident create time.
The Filter box enables you to filter incidents by predefined tags. Where available, you can drill down to lower levels on a tag. For example, the tag Severity, enables you to drill down further to select the level of severity of High, Medium, or Low (or you can select all).
To filter incidents:
On the Incidents page, click Add Filter.
Select the required tag. The selected tag appears in the filter box.
If there are additional optional tags available, a Plus icon appears next to the tag name. Select all applicable tags.
To reset filter tags, click Reset. To clear the last selected filter option, click Clear All.
You can change the status of a single incident or multiple incidents with the same current status.
These statuses are available for incidents:
| Status | Description |
|---|---|
|
New |
This is the initial status of a newly-opened incident. An incident remains in the New status until an administrator changes its status or it is automatically changed by Identity Protection. |
|
Open |
An investigation of the incident has begun, but the incident’s status has not yet been changed. |
|
Suppressed |
An administrator changed the status of the incident to Suppressed, indicating that future incidents of this type should be considered as not carrying any risk and should not appear in the reports. A suppressed incident continues to be updated with any relevant new events, but the incident is not flagged and its time and severity is not changed. If, after 5 days, new events occur, a new incident is created and the new events added to the new incident. |
|
Resolved |
An administrator changed the status of the incident to Resolved after completing an investigation. When this happens, the incident no longer contributes to the involved entity’s risk score. |
|
Auto Resolved |
The incident was resolved automatically, for example by verifying the user’s identity, or based on other valid criteria. Only the Identity Protection system can set an incident’s status to Auto Resolved. For example, an incident is triggered due to the first use of an endpoint by a user. Assuming a policy rule triggered Identity verification and the end user approved the action, this incident might be auto-resolved. The detection rules evaluate additional events. If there is no additional evidence to support or indicate that the activity is malicious, it credits it by marking it as Auto Resolve. The purpose of this is to reduce the load from the Security Analysts so they can review the meaningful incidents. |
Click an incident’s menu icon. The available actions depend on the incident’s current status.
Select one of the actions from the menu.
Select the check box of all applicable incidents with the same status.
Click Actions and select the status.
Note: If the selected incidents have different statuses, a warning icon appears next to the word Action and you are not able to change their statuses. The available actions depend on the current status of the incidents.
Click Save.
Click an incident on the Identity-based Incidents page to see the Incident details page:
The Incident details page contains the following:
A chronological list of the events (including supporting events) comprising the incident, including a short description of each event.
Involved Users: A profile of the users. Click the name to go to the entity’s page.
Involved Endpoints: A profile of the endpoints. Click the name to go to the entity’s page.
Comments: See related comments and log information during the incident investigation, for example reference tickets to external systems or data about the involved entities.
Recommendations: Lists the recommended actions to take to resolve the incident.
You can change an incident’s status using the Actions menu.
The Related Events option is available from the following locations:
Policy Audit Log entry
Threat Hunter event
This option enables you to view events related to the current event. Hover over an event to see the event details. If the event has related events, the Show Events icon appears on the bottom right of the event details. To display a list of related events, click the Show Events icon.
By using exceptions you can build a set of rules that are applied to security incidents encountered by your organization. Setting up the rules allows you to modify industry best practices with respect to Incidents and Incident detections, and to modify the default response to incident detections to match your organization's needs. This includes:
Enabling or disabling detections
Adding exceptions to detections to reflect specific behavior and practices inherent in your organization
Using Acknowledge & Trust to provide visibility of the exceptions that you implement across your organization
Go to Identity protection > Configure > Detection exclusions to view a list of alerts and any exceptions that you put in place to modify the treatment of the alerts.
For any alert that contains exceptions, a label that indicates the number of exceptions associated with the alert is shown next to the alert name.
The alert title bar functions as a toggle to show or hide the alert's details. Click anywhere in an alert's title bar to alternately expand or collapse an alert's details pane.
Alerts are enabled by default.
You can search for Alerts by name or by type.
To add an exception to an alert.
From the list of alerts, select and expand the alert for which you want to add an exception.
Click Add New Exception.
In the Select condition type list, select a condition. For a list of conditions, see Understand conditions.
If options are available for the selected condition, select one or more conditions from the available list.
Click Save.
You can use the Acknowledge & Trust feature as a quick means of assigning a specific exception to an alert. This determination is used to evaluate future alerts.
For example, if a user’s access to a peer’s endpoint was flagged as abnormal, and this alert was later deemed to be an Acknowledge & Trust exception, then later alerts of the same conditions are not flagged.
Creating an exception using Acknowledge & Trust:
Click an incident to display the list of incident alerts.
Hover over an alert and click Acknowledge & Trust.
In the Acknowledge & Trust dialog, review the exception condition. Optionally, add a comment and then click Acknowledge & Trust Alert.
The icon associated with the incident alert is now shown in Grey and an exception for the alert is added to the Exceptions list.
Go to Identity protection > Configure > Detection settings to set the detections aggression level and configure the geolocation settings.
You can increase the Detections aggression level above our best practice recommendation. We do not recommend enabling Detections aggression level setting outside of PEN testing or other internal testing scenarios.
This setting might trigger a significant increase in specific detections and tag routine activities as malicious. For example, similar suspicious activities that previously produced a single detection during a specific timeframe will now produce repeated detections in that timeframe. For a complete list of impacted detections and conditions, see Identity Protection increased aggression level. For US-GOV-1 and US-GOV-2 customers, see Identity Protection increased aggression level.
Set the Detections aggression level:
Go to Identity protection > Configure > Detection settings .
Enable Detections aggression level.
When Identity Protection is integrated with a Federation provider (PingFederate or AD FS) or with a Cloud SSO, it gains visibility into the real IP addresses and the geographic locations from which users access the network. You can add countries to a blocklist and trigger an alert when there is access from these locations. Conversely, you can add countries to an allowlist and block access from countries not included in the allowlist.
For example, if North Korea is in the blocklist, any access attempt from that country triggers an Access from Forbidden Country alert.
If you add the US and Canada to the allowlist, then any access attempt from outside these countries triggers an Access from Forbidden Country alert.
Be aware that when you add a location to an allow or blocklist, Unusual Location detection is disabled. This means if the origin country for a particular activity is included in an allow or blocklist, it's excluded from unusual location reviews. It doesn't mean that unusual detections aren't generated for activity that originates in a country that isn't included in an allow or blocklist.
Configure locations lists:
Go to Identity protection > Configure > Detection settings .
In the Geolocation configuration area, click Configure.
Select Blocklist or Allowlist.
You can add an entire continent to a list by selecting it, or add individual countries by clicking the plus sign and then selecting the countries one by one.
Click Save.
The following detections are generated by Identity Protection. Each is listed with how it is detected, the possible scenarios (malicious and non-malicious), and the recommended actions to address and resolve it.
A user accessed the network or cloud from a blocklisted country, region, or from outside the permitted regions.
This could indicate stolen credentials being used by hackers to access enterprise data.
Check if other users accessed from the same IP
Check if the account activity is known to the user
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
The end user is on a vacation or business trip
Automated services are accessing monitored cloud services on servers hosted in a forbidden country
This is an exception for a group of user accounts
Create a policy to enforce MFA for all user activities
If the location is usually allowed in the network, consider updating the country allowlist or blocklist
If the activity is found to be malicious:
Force a password change for the compromised user account
Investigate what further activities were performed by the user account
Add the user to the watch list
A user accessed the network or cloud from an IP that has a bad reputation of being associated with internet attacks.
This could indicate that user account credentials were stolen and are now being used by an adversary from a suspect IP.
Check if other users accessed from the same IP
Check the following, depending on the specific IP reputation:
Check if the account activity is known to the user
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
A user shared their account with another user for legitimate purposes and both are using the account
A user account is being used by an automated script or service that performs operations on behalf of the user from a datacenter location
This is an exception for a group of user accounts
Create a policy to enforce MFA for all user activities
If the specific IP address is triggering multiple benign detections, add the IP address or IP range to the allowlist by marking the detection as an exclusion
If the activity is found to be malicious:
Force a password change for the compromised user account
Investigate what further activities were performed by the user account
Add the user to the watch list
A user accessed the network or cloud from more than one location in close time proximity. The distance between the locations was greater than the theoretical speed of travel between them.
This could indicate that user credentials were stolen, for example by phishing, and the account is being abused by multiple adversaries.
Check if other users accessed from the same IPs
Check if the account activity is known to the user
Check if the IP is known to be associated with the organization. Most benign cases are a result of a corporate proxy or gateway not being recognized by Identity Protection
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
The user is travelling to an anomalous location that is not common for the organization's users
This is an exception for a group of user accounts
Create a policy to enforce MFA for all user activities
If the activity is found to be malicious:
Force a password change for the compromised user account
Investigate what further activities were performed by the user account
Add the user to the watch list
A user accessed the network or cloud from an unusual location not common to the user or the network.
This could indicate that user credentials were stolen, for example by phishing, and the account is being abused by an adversary.
Check if other users accessed location from the same IP
Check if the account activity is known to the user
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
The user is travelling to an anomalous location that is not common for the organization's users
This is an exception for a group of user accounts
Create a policy to enforce MFA for all user activities
If the activity is found to be malicious:
Force a password change for the compromised user account
Investigate what further activities were performed by the user account
Add the user to the watch list
A user executed an account discovery DCE/RPC command targeting a domain controller (DC) for the first time.
This could indicate an attacker using an anomalous DCE/RPC command to configure DC.
Check if the account activity is known to the user
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
A new or rare IT tool configures the DC by using DCE/RPC commands
This is an exception for a group of endpoints, IPs, or users
Review source endpoint data to find the initiating process, and remediate the endpoint
Create a policy to enforce MFA for all user activities
A user executed a credential access DCE/RPC command targeting a domain controller (DC) for the first time.
This could indicate an attacker using an anomalous DCE/RPC command to configure DC.
Check if the account activity is known to the user
Check if the user account has domain admin or equivalent privileges
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
A new or rare IT tool configures the DC with a DCE/RPC command
This is an exception for a group of endpoints, IPs, or users
Review source endpoint data to find the initiating process, and remediate the endpoint
A user executed a remote service DCE/RPC command targeting a domain controller (DC) for the first time.
This could indicate an attacker using an anomalous DCE/RPC command to configure DC.
Check if the account activity is known to the user
Check if the user account has domain admin or equivalent privileges
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
A new or rare IT tool configures the DC with a DCE/RPC command
This is an exception for a group of endpoints, IPs, or users
Review source endpoint data to find the initiating process, and remediate the endpoint
Create a policy to enforce MFA for all user activities
A user executed a scheduled task DCE/RPC command targeting a domain controller (DC) for the first time.
This could indicate an attacker using an anomalous DCE/RPC command to configure DC.
Check if the account activity is known to the user
Check if the user account has domain admin or equivalent privileges
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
A new or rare IT tool configures the DC with a DCE/RPC command
This is an exception for a group of endpoints, IPs, or users
Review source endpoint data to find the initiating process, and remediate the endpoint
Create a policy to enforce MFA for all user activities
A user executed a valid accounts DCE/RPC command targeting a domain controller (DC) for the first time.
This could indicate an attacker using an anomalous DCE/RPC command to configure DC.
Check if the account activity is known to the user
Check if the user account has domain admin or equivalent privileges
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
A new or rare IT tool configures the DC with a DCE/RPC command
This is an exception for a group of endpoints, IPs, or users
Review source endpoint data to find the initiating process, and remediate the endpoint
Create a policy to enforce MFA for all user activities
A ZeroLogon exploit attempt was detected.
Check if the relevant domain controller is patched for CVE-2020-1472
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
A new or rare IT tool configures the DC with a DCE/RPC command
This is an exception for a group of endpoints, IPs, or users
Review source endpoint data to find the initiating process, and remediate the endpoint
Make sure to patch all domain controllers for CVE-2020-1472
A constrained delegation flow was performed by an account without sufficient privileges, indicating a Bronze Bit attack was executed.
This could be caused by an adversary that has compromised an account with delegation permissions to a privileged resource, and they used it to access the privileged resource as any desired user.
Check if the relevant domain controller is patched for CVE-2020-17049
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
Protocol transition was recently enabled for an account with constrained delegation privileges
This is an exception for a group of endpoints, IPs, or users
Make sure to patch all domain controllers for CVE-2020-17049
Review constrained delegation privileges of the additional account and remove them if not necessary
Review endpoint data to find the initiating process and remediate both source and target endpoints
Create a policy to enforce MFA for all user activities
Multiple failed authentication attempts were made in a short time frame, from the same machine within the domain.
This could indicate that malware or an automated script installed by a rogue end user is trying to guess passwords for multiple end user accounts.
Check the pattern and volume of failed authentication attempts to assess if volume of failed authentication attempts is common for the endpoint
Machines with multiple authentications are statistically more prone to an excessive number of failed authentication attempts
Check how the attacker launched the credential scanning attack:
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
A machine that is performing multiple authentication attempts on end users' behalf, for example delegation or impersonation, has been incorrectly classified
This is an exception for a group of endpoints or IPs
If the attacker was able to launch the credential scanning attack:
Applicable to case one: Apply relevant firewall rules to block attacker’s network accessApplicable to case two: Review endpoint data to find the initiating process and remediate endpoint activityApplicable to all: Review successful authentication attempts originating from the same source. If this type of activity is found, it’s often also malicious.
If the user account is successfully authenticated:
Force a password change for the compromised user account
Investigate what further activities were performed by the user account
Add the user to the watch list
Multiple failed authentication attempts were made in a short time frame, from the same IP address outside the domain.
This could indicate that malware or an automated script is trying to guess passwords for multiple end user accounts.
Check the pattern and volume of failed authentication attempts to assess if volume of failed authentication attempts is common for the endpoint
Machines with multiple authentications are statistically more prone to an excessive number of failed authentication attempts
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
This is an exception for a group of endpoints or IPs
Review successful authentication attempts originating from the same source. If this type of activity is found, it’s often also malicious.
If the user account is successfully authenticated:
Force a password change for the compromised user account
Investigate what further activities were performed by the user account
Add the user to the watch list
A user executed a PsExec command on a domain controller (DC) for the first time.
This could indicate that an attacker has obtained credentials for a system and is attempting to access it by running a local executable file with root level privileges on the remote system.
Check if the account activity is known to the user
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
A domain administrator is using PsExec for the deployment of updates
This is an exception for a group of endpoints, IPs, or users
Review source endpoint data to find the initiating process, and remediate the endpoint
Create a policy to enforce MFA for all user activities
If this isn’t an approved action, take active measures to rebuild your AD environment
A user performed network logins from an unusual number of endpoints compared to the maximum usage in previous periods.
This could indicate that malware is spreading across multiple machines in the network.
Check if the account activity is known to the user
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
An administrator is fixing or configuring multiple machines in the network
This is an exception for a group of users
Review source endpoints data to find the initiating process, and remediate endpoints
Create a policy to enforce MFA for all user activities
A user performed network logins to an unusual number of endpoints compared to the maximum usage in previous periods.
This could indicate that malware is attempting to move laterally across the network, or an end user attempting to access various services. This user might be over-privileged.
Check if the account activity is known to the user
Check if the targets are mainly user accounts or machine accounts
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
An administrator is fixing or configuring multiple machines in the network
This is an exception for a group of users
Review endpoint data to find the initiating process, and remediate endpoints
Create a policy to enforce MFA for all user activities
A Forged PAC attack was executed in the network.
This may indicate that malware is attempting to move laterally across the network.
Check if domain controllers are patched for MS14-068
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
Unusual software is using unusual Kerberos commands, a possible but improbable scenario
This is an exception for a group of endpoints, IPs, or users
Make sure to patch your domain controllers for MS14-068
Create a policy to enforce MFA for all user activities
Review source endpoint data to find the initiating process, and remediate the endpoint activity
If the attempt was successful:
Review the activities that were performed with the ticket and remediate all affected accounts and machines
Take active measures to rebuild your AD environment
A Golden Ticket was detected, based on the analysis of Kerberos ticket PAC fields. This could indicate that malware is attempting to move laterally across the network.
Check for suspicious domain replication detections in your environment
Compare Kerberos ticket duration to the value configured in your group policy objects (GPO):
Kerberos tickets with durations longer than the configured value might indicate a Golden Ticket attack. However, if you have recently updated your GPO values, Identity Protection might not have the updated settings, and flagged a Golden Ticket attack
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
The default Kerberos configuration was changed
Review source endpoint data to find the initiating process, and remediate the endpoint activity
Track Golden Ticket activities to find other affected endpoints and users
Take active measures to rebuild your AD environment
Create a policy to enforce MFA for all user activities
A hidden account was discovered, the ACL on the account prevents its discovery by administrators and all users. Hidden objects can't be found by AD management searches.
This could indicate that an account is being used as a backdoor and is under the control of an attacker who tries to prevent the account from being enumerated.
Check the relevant deny ACL and validate its need
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
The account has some legitimate reason for being configured by admins to prevent enumeration
This is an exception for a group of users
Revert the relevant deny ACL
Create a policy to enforce MFA for all user activities
A user denied a policy identity verification request.
This could indicate that account credentials were used by malware or by a rogue end user unaware of policy.
Not applicable
Check if the account activity is known to the user
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
The user does not understand MFA, a possible but improbable scenario
This is an exception for a group of users
Assume the machine and end user account have been compromised
A user didn't respond to a policy identity verification request.
This could indicate that account credentials were used by malware or by a rogue end user unaware of policy.
Not applicable
Check if the account activity is known to the user
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
The user forgot their phone, or the phone is out of signal range
The user simply neglected to respond in time
The user account is used by a script
This is an exception for a group of users
If activity is non-interactive, modify policy to stop challenging user for the particular use-case
Traffic analysis revealed NTLM credentials were used to attack a machine that wasn't the original target of the authentication session.
This could indicate that an attacker used malware to steal NTLM credentials and then attempted to run code and perform other malicious activities on another server.
Check if the source endpoint, which is suspected of relaying credentials, shared an IP with the target endpoint to rule out noise created by endpoint association errors
Check if the target endpoint enforces SMB signing or if the target DC enforces LDAP signing and LDAPS channel bindings
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
A machine has multiple DNS records or NetBIOS names. On this machine, one identity was used to connect to a server and another identity was used to generate NETLOGON.
This is an exception for a group of endpoints, IPs, or users
Review source endpoint data to find the initiating process, and remediate the endpoint
Review target endpoint to examine the activities performed using the suspected relayed session and remediate endpoint
Create a policy to enforce MFA for all user activities
Work to disallow NTLM traffic in your network
Enforce SMB signing, LDAP signing and LDAPS channel bindings on all endpoints in the network
Falcon OverWatch has detected malicious activity related to an identity-based event.
An OverWatch Identity detection can be triggered by the OverWatch team of threat hunters due to any underlying identity-based detection type included in this document.
For more information, see View OverWatch Identity Detections.
Falcon Overwatch using the technique relevant to the underlying identity detection type
A user’s password was repeatedly entered incorrectly from an unusual machine within the domain.
This could indicate that an end user is trying to guess another end user’s password.
Check the authentication pattern to determine if it's likely for the user
Check if the account activity is known to the user
Check successful authentication attempts originating from the same source
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
An end user who accidentally attempted to log in to another end user’s account and thus entered an incorrect password
An unusual coincidence where an end user logs in from a new machine and also forgets their password
This is an exception for a group of endpoints, IPs, or users
If the brute force attack appears to be successful:
Check if the authentication machine is the target endpoint, it's common for an attacker to have network access to the endpoint. For example, an externally facing server.Check if the authentication machine is the source endpoint; the machine might be compromised
Apply relevant firewall rules to block attacker’s network access
Check if the authentication machine is the target endpoint, it's common for an attacker to have network access to the endpoint. For example, an externally facing server. Check if the authentication machine is the source endpoint; the machine might be compromised
Review endpoint data to find the initiating process, and remediate the endpoint
If there was a successful authentication attempt originating from the same source, it's often also malicious:
Force a password change for the compromised user account
Investigate what further activities were performed by the user account
Add the user to the watch list
A user’s password was repeatedly entered incorrectly from an unusual IP address outside of the domain.
This could indicate that a malicious adversary is trying to guess an end user’s password.
Check the authentication pattern to determine if it's likely for the user
Check if the account activity is known to the user
Check successful authentication attempts originating from the same IP
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
An end user who accidentally attempted to log in to another end user’s account and thus entered an incorrect password
An unusual coincidence where an end user logs in from a new machine and also forgets their password
This is an exception for a group of IPs, or users
An Identity Protection policy rule was triggered by access. The severity level is predefined when creating the policy.
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
An Identity Protection policy rule was triggered by an account event. The severity level is predefined when creating the policy.
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
An Identity Protection policy rule was triggered by a detection. The severity level is predefined when creating the policy.
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
An Identity Protection policy rule was triggered by federated access. The severity level is predefined when creating the policy.
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
An Azure service principal received new privileges.
Investigate how the service principal received the additional privilege
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
This is an exception for a group
Revert the relevant new privilege
Create a policy to enforce MFA for all user activities
An endpoint received new privileges.
Investigate how the endpoint received the additional privilege
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
This is an exception for a group
Revert the relevant new privilege
Create a policy to enforce MFA for all user activities
A user received new privileges.
Investigate how the account received the additional privilege
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
This is an exception for a group
Revert the relevant new privilege
Create a policy to enforce MFA for all user activities
An account was created and deleted by the same actor within a short time window, with activity detected between creation and deletion, potentially indicating suspicious activity.
Check if the account creation and deletion pattern is known to IT administrators
Review the activities performed between account creation and deletion
Check if the account was added to any privileged groups
Verify if this aligns with legitimate IT operations or automation processes
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
A legitimate IT tool or script creates temporary accounts as part of normal operations
Authorized automation systems that use temporary service accounts for specific tasks
This is an exception for a group of endpoints, IPs, or users
Force a password reset for any accounts that may have been compromised
Investigate what activities were performed by the temporary account
Review and strengthen account creation policies and monitoring controls
A user or machine account executed a suspicious domain replication (DRSUAPI) request.
This could indicate that malware or malicious code is trying to steal domain secrets or is attempting to configure the domain with malicious configuration.
Check the user or machine account and source endpoint
Check if new software was deployed on the relevant endpoint that legitimately performs domain replication
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
A machine was installed with software that fetches domain information, or even passwords, regularly
This is an exception for a group of endpoints, IPs, or users
If the activity is found to be malicious, then the DC is compromised
Take active measures to rebuild your AD environment
An account was modified in a suspicious manner that may indicate malicious activity such as persistence or privilege escalation attempts.
Check if this change is part of an authorized account modification by a legitimate administrator
Review the account alteration details to understand what was changed
Review recent activities for the modified account and the account that performed the modification to identify any suspicious access patterns
Determine if the target account is privileged, as this increases the severity of potential compromise
Investigate the account that performed the modification for signs of compromise
Check the alteration type:
BadSuccessor: Examine the target account to determine if the msDS-SupersededManagedAccountLink attribute also references the dMSA DN. The impersonation only works with mutual references.
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
The account modification is legitimate and part of documented administrative tasks
The change was performed by an authorized identity team member as part of planned account management activities
If unauthorized, immediately revert the account changes
Force a password change on the affected accounts
Consider disabling the account as an immediate containment action if compromise is suspected
A Kerberos ticket generated by one machine was used by another machine.
This is consistent with a Pass the Ticket attack, and could indicate that malware is attempting to move laterally across the network and escalate its privileges.
Check if the source endpoint shared an IP with the additional endpoint to rule out noise created by endpoint association errors
Check if the compromised IP is part of a NAT segment
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
Incorrect IP address resolution has occurred
A machine with several DNS records and/or using a dynamic IP address on multiple networks. For example, WIFI and VPN.
This is an exception for a group of endpoints, IPs, or users
Review the source endpoint and additional endpoint data to find the initiating process, and remediate endpoints
Track compromised ticket activities to find other affected endpoints and users
Create a policy to enforce MFA for all user activities
If the compromised IP is part of a NAT segment, add a network label to reduce noise from the segment
A user performed a network login from a machine that doesn't normally serve remote requests.
This could indicate that malware is using valid credentials to access data or to move laterally across the network.
Check if the account activity is known to the user
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
A maintenance script is performing unusual administrative actions. For example, a network scanner.
An administrator is working from an unusual server or workstation.
This is an exception for a group of users
Review source endpoint data to find the initiating process, and remediate both source and target endpoints
Create a policy to enforce MFA for all user activities
A user executed a suspicious LDAP search request to enumerate AD accounts. These searches are commonly performed by known reconnaissance attack tools, such as Bloodhound or Impacket.
This could indicate that an attacker is trying to gather initial data from the network and discover vulnerabilities by using LDAP commands.
Check if the source endpoint is running an AD management software package
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
The same LDAP command is being used by a legitimate IT tool to configure the network
This is an exception for a group of endpoints, IPs, or users
Review source endpoint data to find the initiating process, and remediate the endpoint activity
Review further activities performed with the user account from the compromised endpoint
A user executed a suspicious LDAP search enumerating Active Directory Certificate Services configurations.
This could indicate that an attacker is trying to gather initial data from the network and discover vulnerabilities by using LDAP commands.
Check if the source endpoint is running an AD management software package
Check if the account activity is known to the user
Check if the LDAP command is common in the organization and has been seen before
The same LDAP command is being used by a legitimate IT tool to configure the network
This is an exception for a group of endpoints, IPs, or users
Review source endpoint data to find the initiating process, and remediate the endpoint activity
Look for tools known for carry out this reconnaissance behavior: for example certipy (using events such as ProcessRollup2)
Try to determine the kind of reconnaissance that was carried out from the command line, for example look for the find command line
Check for other related reconnaissance detections
Review further activities performed with the user account from the compromised endpoint
A user executed a suspicious LDAP search request looking for Kerberos misconfigurations. These searches are commonly performed by known reconnaissance attack tools, such as Bloodhound or Impacket.
This could indicate that an attacker is trying to gather initial data from the network and discover vulnerabilities by using LDAP commands.
Check if the source endpoint is running an AD management software package
Review further activities performed with the user account from the compromised endpoint
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
The same LDAP command is being used by a legitimate IT tool to configure the network
This is an exception for a group of endpoints, IPs, or users
Review source endpoint data to find the initiating process, and remediate the endpoint activity
A user executed a suspicious LDAP search request that meets the cloud-based behavioral machine learning model high confidence threshold for malicious queries. This detection is based on query similarities, such as filter or attributes, to known attack tools or attackers’ TTPs.
This could indicate that an attacker is trying to gather initial data from the network and discover vulnerabilities by using LDAP commands.
Check if the account activity is known to the user
Check if the LDAP command is common in the organization and has been seen before
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
The same LDAP command is being used by a legitimate IT tool to configure the network
This is an expected behavior for the involved user, endpoints, or IPs
Review source endpoint data to find the initiating process, and remediate the endpoint activity
Review further activities performed with the user account from the compromised endpoint
A user performed a web-based activity that is considered anomalous according to a machine learning model.
This could indicate that user credentials were stolen, for example by phishing, and the account is being abused by an adversary.
A user performed an anomalous certificate-based authentication, which might indicate suspicious activity originating from the source endpoint.
Check if the account activity is known to the user
Check the settings of the certificate template that was used
Check if the certificate template was previously used by other users
Check the authentication pattern to determine if it's likely to be performed by the user
Check if there are any successful authentication attempts originating from the same source user and endpoint
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
This is the first time certificate template authentication was enabled by the domain policy
The same authentication was performed by a legitimate IT tool
Review all of the certificate template settings, to determine whether they are configured according to the domain policy or not
Review further activities performed by the user account
If the activity is found to be malicious:
Open the certificate management tool from the certificate authority (CA) endpoint that issued the misconfigured template
Revoke the certificate template
A lower-privileged entity performed an unusual Kerberos certificate-based authentication to a higher-privileged entity, which might indicate malicious activity.
Check if the account activity is known to the user
Check the settings of the certificate template that was used
Check if the high-privileged user has previously authenticated from the same source endpoint
Check if the certificate template was previously used by other users
Check the authentication pattern to determine if it's likely to be performed by the user
Check if there are any successful authentication attempts originating from the same source user and endpoint
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
This is the first time certificate template authentication was enabled by the domain policy
The same authentication was performed by a legitimate IT tool
Review the certificate template that was used for the misconfigured settings, if needed
Review all of the certificate template settings, to determine whether they are configured according to the domain policy or not
Review further activities performed by the user account
Review source endpoint data to find the initiating process, and remediate the endpoint
If the activity is found to be malicious:
Open the certificate management tool from the certificate authority (CA) endpoint that issued the misconfigured template
Revoke the certificate template
A user executed a self-request for a Ticket Granting Service (TGS), following a Kerberos certificate-based authentication, which may indicate malicious activity.
Check if the account activity is known to the user
Check if the user previously performed Kerberos certificate-based authentication
Check the authentication pattern to determine if it's likely to be performed by the user
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
The same authentication was performed by a legitimate IT tool
Review the certificate template that was used for the misconfigured settings, if needed
Review further activities performed by the user account
Review source endpoint data to find the initiating process, and remediate the endpoint
A machine account was altered in a way that indicates a noPac exploitation attempt, for example CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287.
Check if the relevant domain controller is patched for CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
Machines are being configured in an irregular manner
This is an exception for a group of endpoints, IPs, or users
Make sure to patch all domain controllers for CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287
Review DC event log data to check if CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 were used
Take active measures to rebuild your AD environment
An NTLM authentication occurred with fields indicating that their authentication was used in an NTLM relay attack.
This could indicate that malware is attempting to move laterally across the network and escalate its privileges.
Check if the account activity is known to the user
Check if the target endpoint enforces SMB signing or if the target DC enforces LDAP signing and LDAPS channel bindings
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
Legacy software exists on the network that uses deprecated encryption standards
Incorrect network configuration exists
This is an exception for a group of endpoints, IPs, or users
Review endpoint data to find the initiating process and remediate endpoint
Review the target endpoint to examine the activities performed using the suspected relayed session, and remediate the endpoint
Create a policy to enforce MFA for all user activities
Work to disallow NTLM traffic in your network, especially NTLMv1
Enforce SMB signing, LDAP signing, and LDAPS channel bindings on all endpoints in the network
An authentication protocol, such as NTLM, Kerberos, or SMB, occurred with fields indicating that their authentication was used in a Pass the Hash attack.
This could indicate that malware is attempting to move laterally across the network and escalate its privileges.
Check if the source endpoint is executing a legacy software product and authenticating with a proprietary authentication stack
Check if the account activity is known to the user
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
Legacy software exists on the network that uses deprecated encryption standards
Incorrect network configuration exists
This is an exception for a group of endpoints, IPs, or users
Review source endpoint data to find the initiating process, and remediate the endpoint
Create a policy to enforce MFA for all user activities
An authentication protocol, such as NTLM, Kerberos, or SMB, was used in an unusual manner consistent with known attack tools such as Mimikatz or Impacket.
This could indicate that malware is attempting to move laterally across the network and escalate its privileges.
Check if the source endpoint is executing a legacy software product and authenticating with a proprietary authentication stack
Check if the account activity is known to the user
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
Legacy software exists on the network that uses deprecated encryption standards
Incorrect network configuration exists
This is an exception for a group of endpoints, IPs, or users
Review source endpoint data to find the initiating process, and remediate the endpoint
Create a policy to enforce MFA for all user activities
An end user accessed the service principal name (SPN) that is registered to a user account. The access was deemed anomalous based on several factors such as user classification, requested encryption type, and previous activities.
This could indicate that an end user requested a service ticket for offline password cracking (Kerberoasting).
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
A user accessed an application for the first time.
This could indicate:
An end user accessing servers to illicitly acquire information, usually because the end user is over-privileged
Malware is using valid credentials to access data or to move laterally across the network
Check if the account activity is known to the user
Check for other anomalies from the user account
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
An end user is performing anomalous activity for a legitimate business purpose, such as a position change, new project, or rare administrative maintenance
This is an exception for a group of endpoints, IPs, or users
Force a password change for the user account
Review the application logs to assess user activity
Create a policy to enforce MFA for all user activities
A user logged in interactively or programmatically to a machine for the first time.
This could indicate an end user stealing another end user’s credentials to access data for which they do not have the required privileges, or malware using credentials acquired by illicit activities in the network.
Check if the account activity is known to the user
Check the source endpoint logs to verify that the IP is associated with the correct machine
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
An end user is performing anomalous activity for a legitimate business purpose
This is an exception for a group of endpoints, IPs, or users
Review source endpoint data to find the initiating process, and remediate the endpoint
Create a policy to enforce MFA for all user activities
A user requested access to a service on an endpoint for the first time.
This could indicate:
An end user accessing servers to illicitly acquire information, usually because the end user is over-privileged
Malware using valid credentials to access data or to move laterally across the network
Check if the account activity is known to the user
Check the source endpoint logs to verify that the IP is associated with the correct machine
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
An end user is performing anomalous activity for a legitimate business purpose, such as a position change, new project, or rare administrative maintenance
This is an exception for a group of endpoints, IPs, or users
Review source endpoint data to find the initiating process, and remediate the endpoint
Create a policy to enforce MFA for all user activities
An endpoint not used in the last 90 days became active.
This could indicate:
Malware attempting to use or forge a stale unused computer or end user account
A former end user, such as a former employee attempting to connect his own device to the network
Review previous and current endpoint activity
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
An end user returned after a very long absence
This is an exception for a group of endpoints
Confirm that the endpoint was stale because of a legitimate end user absence, such as vacation or sick leave, and is not an overlooked outdated account. You can schedule a stale endpoint report to help with this.
A user account not used in the last 90 days became active.
This could indicate:
Malware attempting to use a stale account
A former end user, for example a former employee is attempting to connect with their previous password
Check if the account activity is known to the user
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
An end user returned after a very long absence
This is an exception for a group of users
Create a policy to enforce MFA for all user activities
A domain controller (DC) is rejecting recommended cryptographic algorithms, and is demanding a weaker RC4 algorithm instead.
This could indicate that the domain is compromised, or that the DC is incorrectly configured.
Check that the domain controller is not explicitly configured to only accept the RC4 algorithm.
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
You have a strong technical reason why your domain controllers can only accept the RC4 algorithm.
If you have not explicitly configured the domain controller to accept only the RC4 algorithm, assume that your domain is compromised, and alert the Incident Response Team.
A user executed a suspicious LDAP search indicative of a privilege escalation attempt. These searches are commonly performed by known attack tools, such as KrbRelay or KrbRelayUp.
This could indicate that an attacker is trying to gather initial data from the network and discover vulnerabilities by running LDAP commands.
Review related accounts activities:
The account whose identity was impersonated.
The account from which the tool was run.
Review source endpoint data to find the initiating process:
Look for tools known to carry out this attack: krbrelay.exe, krbrelayup.exe (using events such as ProcessRollup2).
Try to determine the kind of privilege escalation that was carried out from the command line.
Check for other related detections.
Review related network activity that occurred close to the time of the detection (using events such as NetworkConnectIP4 and ProcessRollup2):
Look for a local TCP connection from a COM server (svchost.exe) to a suspicious process which then connects to a domain controller.
Look for usage of port 12345 in local traffic.
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in this scenario:
The same LDAP search is being used by a legitimate IT tool to configure the network.
Consider creating a policy to enforce MFA for activities related to the involved accounts and endpoints.
Determine the scale of the attack and perform the appropriate remediation actions. If you determine that the full domain was compromised, rebuild your AD environment.
A honeytoken account was altered in a way that can indicate an exploitation attempt.
We monitor one of the following changes to the account:
Password reset
Disabled account becoming enabled
Email change
Check if the detected account is suspicious.
Investigate who performed the change using audit logs and rule out account compromise.
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
This is an exception for a group of users.
This is an expected activity from a specific source endpoint. In this case, use Exception Manage view to select specific source endpoints to exclude.
Account alteration-based detections for this honeytoken aren't relevant.
If the account change is suspicious, restore the account settings to their original state.
Remediate any compromised endpoints and/or user accounts if any were found during the investigation.
A honeytoken account activity was detected.
Check if the detected activity is suspicious.
If the activity is suspicious, investigate the source endpoint from which the activity originated to rule out any compromise.
Check additional related activities using the Investigate menu.
You might be able to mark this detection as an exclusion in these scenarios:
This is an exception for a group of users or endpoints.
This is an expected activity from a specific source endpoint. In this case, use Exception Manage view to select specific source endpoints to exclude.
Activity-based detections for this honeytoken aren't relevant.
Remediate any compromised endpoints and/or user accounts if any were found during the investigation.
If the activity is suspicious, reset the account password.
Make sure the selected account should be flagged as honeytoken.
Risk factors negatively affect an entity’s risk score. Each factor is listed with the nature of the risk and how it can be reduced or neutralized.
If a risk shares similar characteristics with MITRE ATT&CK® tactics and/or techniques then these are also listed.
You can disable specific risk factors so that they do not contribute to risk scores, and are no longer added to the risk factor lists. For more info, see Identity Protection Administration.
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
A user account doesn't have an authentication method that is allowed in the Entra ID authentication policy, making it vulnerable to account takeover attacks. |
|
Recommended actions |
Configure and require an MFA method that is allowed in Entra ID authentication policy. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
A user account is configured to encrypt all tickets with DES encryption. An attacker with the ability to obtain a user ticket can crack the user hash more easily. |
|
Recommended actions |
Enable strong encryption for all users. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
An account has a privileged SID in their SID History property. Users with a privileged SID possess higher permissions than their role allows. It is very likely that the privileged SID was added as part of an attack. |
|
MITRE ATT&CK® tactics and techniques |
|
|
Recommended actions |
Remove the privileged SID from the user's SID History and investigate how they obtained this potentially malicious property. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
The end user’s password has not been changed for more than 6 months. The longer an end user keeps the same password, the greater the risk of the password being cracked by an advanced attack. Even strong passwords can be cracked by brute force methods within three months. Note: This risk factor is disabled by default. See Manage risk detection. |
|
Recommended actions |
Increase the frequency of password changes in the GPO policy. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
End users regularly access a risky endpoint. A risky endpoint is more vulnerable to attacks, and end users who regularly access risky endpoints are more likely to have to have their credentials compromised or stolen. |
|
Recommended actions |
Address the underlying factors that cause the endpoint to be risky. If this is not possible or seriously impacts end users, consider moving the end user to another workstation. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
An attacker with access to an account, user, or endpoint, can move laterally between endpoints in the network to access an account and eventually acquire permissions to function as a domain administrator. If an account is compromised in this way the entire domain is compromised. |
|
Steps in a Path |
For example: A user, StartUserName, has one or more attack paths available to the Privileged account of another user, EndUserName. Possible steps that an attack might take include:
|
|
Recommended actions |
For more info, see How can I resolve an attack path risk in Identity Protection. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
An Azure account is using an application that does not enforce MFA. The user's credentials can be brute-forced from the internet without mitigation. If an application is open for all users, the entire organization might suffer a credentials scanning attack. |
|
Recommended actions |
Use only applications with modern authentication and enable MFA for all accounts. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
An end user’s password is on a list of passwords (word lists) known to be compromised. This list is usually collected from known password breaches or contains commonly used phrases. Compromised passwords are easy to guess. |
|
Recommended actions |
Direct users to change passwords that Identity Protection flags as weak or compromised, and educate users about the risk of using passwords that are prone to dictionary-based attacks. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
Two or more machines were created from the same image and still have the same local administrator username and password. By compromising one of these machines, an attacker can extract the credentials from the local Security Account Manager (SAM) database and move laterally to other machines by using pass-the-hash or privilege escalation. |
|
Recommended actions |
Change the passwords of the cloned local administrators. To easily manage local administrator passwords, consider using Microsoft LAPS or another password management solution. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
Two or more user accounts share the same password. Using duplicated passwords across multiple accounts can lead to lateral movement and credential stuffing attacks if one account is compromised, resulting in a breach. |
|
Recommended actions |
Ensure each account has a unique password. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
The computer account password is configured to never expire. Domain-joined machines are required to rotate their password every 30 days. The password should be randomly generated to ensure system integrity from outside breaches. An endpoint with a never-changing password doesn’t change its password regularly and raises further suspicion of a weak and even shared machine password. |
|
Recommended actions |
|
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
An account using NTLM to access an unusual number of servers/workstations. A user accessing machines using NTLM is exposed to the risk of password cracking and NTLM relay. |
|
Recommended actions |
If the software performing actions supports Kerberos, make sure that only Kerberos is enabled. You can also do this by disabling NTLM for the account. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
This endpoint has a local administrator whose password is stored in the Group Policy Preferences in a reversible format. This exposes the password to any domain user. The endpoint can be compromised by any user in the network by fetching exposed local admin credentials. |
|
Recommended actions |
Remove the exposed password from the Group Policy and reset the respective account's password. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
The account’s password can be extracted by any authenticated account in the domain. Any rogue end user or malware can acquire and use the account password. |
|
Recommended actions |
Remove the password from GPO; there is no valid reason to keep it. If it is used by scripts, change the scripts to use a more secure solution such as Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS). |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
A user can connect to a machine with a local guest user account, that is without a password. If the guest account is enabled, any user can connect to the machine and potentially escalate their privileges to become a Local Administrator. |
|
Recommended actions |
Disable the guest accounts on all endpoints. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
CA server has at least one certificate template with the Request Agent enhanced key usage (EKU) that is accessible to users without admin privileges which might allow the user that uses that certificate to authenticate as any other user with that certificate. |
|
Recommended actions |
|
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
CA server has at least one certificate template with authentication related enhanced key usage (EKU) that is accessible to users without admin privileges which might allow the user that uses that certificate to authenticate as any other user with that certificate. |
|
Recommended actions |
|
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
Attributes have been set on an account in such a way that it does not appear to Active Directory administrators. An account might be under the control of an attacker who tries to hide their presence from defenders. |
|
Recommended actions |
Investigate whether the account was hidden by an administrator for a legitimate reason, or by accident. If so, consider altering the account to make it visible. If it wasn’t hidden for a legitimate reason, consider disabling or deleting the account. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
An account that has not generated any activity for a given time period greater than 21 days. The account is not monitored by any person who would alert administrators about unusual activity (for example, password change). Also, prolonged inactivity is an indication that the account should be deleted. |
|
Recommended actions |
|
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
The password policy for the account allows setting a password that is too short and/or lacks complexity. Short passwords have relatively low entropy and can be cracked by specialized hardware or even through the use of plain modern CPUs if the password is short enough. |
|
Recommended actions |
Make sure the password policy is set to a minimum of 14 characters. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
Each detection in which a user is involved is added to the user’s risk factors. The detection is graded according to its severity and number of alerts. In addition, over time, the impact of detections on risk declines, and 30 days after the detection it no longer affects the user’s risk factor. An end user engaged in anomalous activity (even when not malicious) is at a higher risk of being compromised. In addition, his anomalous activity is more difficult to track and his security posture more difficult to evaluate because of alert fatigue. |
|
Recommended actions |
Wait until the detection is over or resolve the incident. Where possible, reduce the unexpected behavior in the network. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
The end user is configured with a password that never expires and the password was not rotated for more than 6 months. If a password that never expires is compromised, the risk to the network is severe. You might not be able to resolve some consequences. |
|
Recommended actions |
|
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
A user account is defined to obtain TGTs (Ticket-Granting Tickets) without Kerberos pre-authentication. This is an uncommon feature of legacy service accounts. If a password that never expires is compromised, the risk to the network is severe. You might not be able to resolve some consequences. |
|
Recommended actions |
Enforce pre-authentication data for all user accounts. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
A KRBTGT service account password hasn’t changed in more than 180 days. An attacker with a Golden Ticket could remain active if the password isn’t changed. |
|
Recommended actions |
Change the KRBTGT password every 180 days. For more information, see KRBTGT account in the Microsoft documentation. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
The Domain controller does not require LDAP Signing for LDAP connections. When a domain controller does not require LDAP Signing for LDAP connections, it is susceptible to various credential relay attacks, for example NTLM Relay. |
|
Recommended actions |
Strictly enforce LDAP Signing on all domain controllers. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
The Domain controller does not require LDAPS Channel Binding for LDAPS connections. When a domain controller does not require LDAPS channel Binding for LDAPS connections, it is susceptible to various credential relay attacks, for example NTLM Relay. |
|
Recommended actions |
Strictly enforce LDAP Channel Binding on all domain controllers. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
An endpoint is configured through GPO to respond with NTLMv1 and/or LM responses. NTLMv1 and/or LM responses are encrypted with a very weak encryption (DES), making the user account password on this endpoint extremely vulnerable. |
|
Recommended actions |
Ensure that all endpoints send only NTLMv2 responses. To enforce NTLMv2 responses through GPO, configure the Network security: LAN Manager authentication level security policy setting to one of these options:
For information on how to configure this setting, see Network security: LAN Manager authentication level in the Microsoft documentation. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
The end user’s password is configured to never expire. If a password that never expires is compromised, the risk to the network is severe and might never be mitigated. |
|
Recommended actions |
|
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
A user account is defined with a Service Principal Name (SPN). Usually, only computer accounts and service accounts are defined with SPNs. An account with SPNs is at risk of password cracking with a technique called Kerberoasting when the account has a weak password or when its password policy does not enforce strong passwords. |
|
Recommended actions |
|
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
Print Spooler Service is enabled on a machine. When the Print Spooler Service is enabled on a machine, an attacker can trigger the machine to perform authentication on an arbitrary machine. This authentication can be exploited in various credential relay attacks. For example, NTLM Relay. |
|
Recommended actions |
Turn off the Print Spooler Service on any machine with special privileges. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
A computer account with special administrative privileges. Except for domain controllers, no machines should have any special privileges. If a machine has special privileges, so do their local administrators, which can lead to complex attack paths. |
|
Recommended actions |
Remove special privileges from the machines. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
Non-domain-joined endpoints are being used by privileged users. Such endpoints are considered to be at greater risk of exposure to viruses and other malicious software because no group policies, and in many cases no software updates, are applied to these endpoints. Privileged users put themselves and the organization at greater risk by using non-domain-joined endpoints. |
|
Recommended actions |
Ensure that privileged users do not use non-domain-joined endpoints. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
There is a linked user account that has a risk score that is higher than this entity's score, and has at least medium severity. Having risky accounts that belong to the same person may put the rest of the linked accounts at risk as well. |
|
Recommended actions |
Investigate and remediate the risks on the linked accounts that have a higher risk score. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
An endpoint is being used by multiple users. The credentials of all the users are stored on the endpoint, and they all have permission to execute code on the endpoint. |
|
Recommended actions |
Use personal machines as much as possible. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
Privileged users are using shared endpoints. These are endpoints that are used by multiple users with various levels of permissions. This increases the attack surface of shared endpoints. Privileged users put themselves and the organization at greater risk by using shared endpoints. |
|
Recommended actions |
Ensure that privileged users do not use shared endpoints. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
An end user who is using multiple machines. The user’s credentials are present on all the endpoints. |
|
Recommended actions |
|
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
An endpoint is configured through GPO to allow unsecure SMB and DCE/RPC connections. When an endpoint is configured to allow unsecure connections, it is vulnerable to NTLM relay and MiTM attacks that could result in remote code execution. |
|
Recommended actions |
Edit the group policies that apply on the endpoint to enforce SMB signing. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
An account that has not generated any activity for a given time period of more than 3 months. The account is not monitored by any person who would alert administrators about unusual activity (for example, password change). Also, prolonged inactivity is an indication that the account should be deleted. |
|
Recommended actions |
|
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
An account that has special permissions and could be used to elevate a user to have AD protected group privileges.
|
|
Recommended actions |
Review the privileges that the user account currently has. If they are required, add the user to an AD protected group. If the privileges are not required, remove them. For more info, see our knowledge articles: How to remove Effective Replicator privileges? How to remove Administrator Password Controller privileges? How to remove Permissions On Account Controller privileges? How to remove Administrative Group Controllers privileges? How to remove Constrained/Unconstrained Account Service Delegation privileges? |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
An account has one or more irregular Service Principal Names (SPNs). These SPNs can be used maliciously in some man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack scenarios. |
|
Recommended actions |
Verify if the SPNs are needed, and remove them if not. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
The userPrincipalName (Active Directory UPN) field for a user without admin privileges was set to a high privileges username with an invalid UPN format which could indicate suspicious activity. |
|
Recommended actions |
|
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
Non-domain-joined endpoints are being used by privileged users. Such endpoints are considered to be at greater risk of exposure to viruses and other malicious software because no group policies, and in many cases no software updates, are applied to these endpoints. Privileged users put themselves and the organization at greater risk by using non-domain-joined endpoints. |
|
Recommended actions |
Ensure that privileged users do not use non-domain-joined endpoints. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
An non-domain-joined host is active on the network but is not registered in the domain and, as such, is not protected by domain policies. An non-domain-joined host is not monitored by any person and is not being regularly patched by the Windows infrastructure. |
|
Recommended actions |
|
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
The risk identifies when a privileged account accesses an endpoint that has a nonprivileged local administrator. The privileged account logged into an endpoint that has a nonprivileged local administrator, which can be used to compromise this account's credentials. |
|
Recommended actions |
Make sure that privileged accounts only use protected machines. For example, PAW. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
An end user is connecting to the network over a VPN. Typically, a VPN user is away from the office with a personal computer in a physically unsafe location where their credentials and equipment are more likely to be compromised. Note: This risk factor is disabled by default. See Manage risk detection. |
|
Recommended actions |
Limit the use of VPNs to as few users as is practical. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
An endpoint is running an old version of its operating system that is no longer supported. An operating system version that is no longer supported does not receive regular software updates and is exposed to known vulnerabilities that are normally and regularly patched by newer operating system versions. |
|
Recommended actions |
Limit the use of old versions of operating systems that are no longer supported. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
The end user is being watched, either manually by the system administrator or automatically by a policy action. Watched end users are being watched for a reason, and Identity Protection treats these users with greater attention. Note that the reason the user is being watched is sometimes outside the scope of Identity Protection. For example, the end user is under notice. |
|
Recommended actions |
Address all the end user’s external risk and then remove the user from the watch list. |
| Topic | Details |
|---|---|
|
Description |
A user has logged in to Entra ID from a machine that is not updated and is known to have 0-days that can compromise it. The user's credentials (passwords, tokens, OTPs, cookies) and sensitive data can be compromised along with the insecure endpoint that the user is using. |
|
Recommended actions |
Train employees to only use approved machines. Monitor users closely and enforce MFA for these users wherever possible. |
Save, schedule, and review predefined and custom reports.
The Reports page allows administrators to perform a number of report oriented activities that include:
Saving predefined reports.
Scheduling the download and distribution of predefined reports.
Reviewing a list of saved predefined and custom reports.
Reports can be defined and downloaded immediately, or scheduled for later downloading and distribution. Most reports can be distributed in PDF or CSV formats. Depending on the type of info in a report, it might be limited to one format type though.
To view the Reports page, go to Identity protection > Configure > Reports.
The Reports page displays the following:
Saved Reports list
The Saved Reports list displays all the reports that are saved and indicates; the reporting period over which data is collected, the output format, the frequency that a report is generated and distributed, and the number of recipients that receive the report.
Predefined reports appear in the upper part of the list.
User defined reports appear after the predefined reports.
Scheduling Panel
The Scheduling panel includes fields for choosing a predefined report and then setting the following settings:
Reporting period
Generation and distribution frequency
Output format
Recipients
The domain on which the report is generated
Action menu
The action menu is located on the right of each report entry in the Saved Reports list.
The Action menu lets you:
Edit the report scheduling settings
Download the report
Send the report as an email attachment
Delete the report from the list
Use the reports scheduling options to define the breadth of information contained in a report, the frequency that a report is generated, the delivery format, and the recipients of the report.
The table lists and describes the scheduling options.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
|
Subject |
List of predefined and custom reports. |
|
Reporting period |
The period for which data is included in the report. Choose from:
|
|
Frequency |
How often the report is published. Depending on your choice, you can refine the publication frequency where relevant by choosing the day and hour to publish a report. Choose from:
|
|
Format |
Depending on the report type, you can choose to publish the report in one of the available formats. Choose from:
|
|
Recipients |
The email address for anyone who should receive the published report. The Enter key functions as a separator to include the email address of multiple recipients. To remove recipients from the recipients list, click the x adjacent to their email address. |
Select a report Subject.
Select a Reporting Period.
Select a report Format (PDF or CSV).
Configure the report Frequency.
Fill the Recipient email list.
Click Save.
Select a report Subject.
Select a Reporting Period.
Define the Frequency.
Select a report Format (PDF or CSV).
Click Download.
Predefined reports include both executive and operational reports, for example:
Activity: Account lockout by user/endpoint, NTLM usage, inactive administrators, and unused servers/endpoints reports
Incidents: Top incidents, new incidents, top users with incidents, and incidents summary reports
Insights: Top risky users, added/disabled/removed computer accounts, and administrative login reports
Authorized Accounts: A detailed configuration of all authorized accounts
You can generate custom reports based on the results of Insights and Threat Hunter queries.
For Insights you can create custom reports for queries associated with the Privileged, Users, and Endpoint categories.
For Threat Hunter you can save custom reports based on any generated query.
Review events about connectors, software updates, and system coverage.
System Notifications displays events that might require your attention. The number of active notifications is also shown in parenthesis.
To display the system notifications, go to Identity protection > Configure > System notifications.
You can filter notifications as follows:
All Notifications
Connectors
Software Update
System Coverage
The creation and last update time appears on every notification and the notification remains active for as long as the problem persists. When the problem is resolved, the notification automatically moves to the Resolved Notification area, and the resolution time replaces the last update time.
If the same problem occurs again within the next 24 hours, the same notification is reused. If the same problem occurs more than 24 hours after the last notification, a new notification is opened. Notifications are all managed by the system. You cannot dismiss system notifications manually.
You can mark notifications as read. Read notifications are hidden by default. To show the read notifications, click Show read notifications.
| Notification | Description |
|---|---|
|
{connector name} Connector down. Unable to connect to service |
A connector cannot communicate with a third-party IDaaS or MFA provider. |
|
{protocol} inline health-check failed for {DC sensor name}. Sensor IP address: {IP address} |
The DC Sensor detected that specific protocol data has not been processed successfully. If this message does not resolve itself, contact CrowdStrike Support. For US-GOV-1 and US-GOV-2 customers, contact CrowdStrike Support. |
|
The watchdog for {DC sensor name} has triggered policy stop due to metric {metric name} |
The DC Sensor Watchdog stopped the policy calculation due to a metric that exceeded a threshold. This notification is automatically resolved when the DC Sensor Watchdog resumes the policy calculation. |
|
The watchdog for {DC sensor name} has triggered traffic stop due to metric {metric name} |
The DC Sensor Watchdog stopped the DC Sensor from collecting and analyzing traffic due to a metric that exceeded a threshold. This notification is automatically resolved when the DC Sensor Watchdog resumes the traffic digestion. |
|
The watchdog for {DC sensor name} has triggered restart of CS Protocol Analyzer service due to metric {metric name} |
The DC Sensor Watchdog restarted the analyzer service due to a metric that exceeded a threshold. |
|
The watchdog for {DC sensor name} has triggered restart of CS Management service due to metric {metric name} |
The DC Sensor Watchdog restarted the management service due to a metric that exceeded a threshold. |
|
The watchdog for {DC sensor name} has triggered restart of CS Monitoring service due to metric {metric name} |
The DC Sensor Watchdog restarted the monitoring service due to a metric that exceeded a threshold. |
|
Domain {domain name} was removed |
A domain is no longer covered by Identity Protection. Sensors were uninstalled or no sensors communicated with Falcon for a week. |
|
Appliance {DC sensor name} connectivity check failed |
A sensor has not communicated with the Falcon cloud for a while. |
|
Domain Controller {DC name} is not monitored |
A domain controller in your domain is not sending data. This might cause loss of data of user activities and might disrupt detection and enforcement of traffic. |
For more info about Fusion SOAR workflows, see Fusion SOAR.
Proactively search through raw events, detect and identify security events, and investigate security events reported by Falcon.
Threat Hunter enables security analysts to proactively search through raw events, detect and identify security events, or further investigate security events reported by the system.
You can create your own search criteria, which you can save for use at a later stage, or you can use a predefined search. You can also modify a predefined search and save it for later use.
To display Threat Hunter, go to Identity protection > Explore > Threat Hunter.
Threat Hunter enables you to define search criteria for events that you want to view using tag-based selection. As you select a tag, other tag options become available. This process continues until no other tags are available in that particular category.
You can select your own search criteria from the following categorical groupings:
Event Types
Authentication
Service
User Account Events
Alerts
General
Sort Order
Time Zone
Related to
Data Source
Identity
Username
Group
Department
OU
Azure
Types
Attributes
Privileges
Risk Severity
Source endpoint
Endpoint Name
Group
OU
Site
Geo
Attributes
Endpoint Classification
IP Reputation
CIDR/IP
Network Type
Network Label
Risk Severity
Destination
Destination Name
Group
Department
OU
Type
Attributes
Privileges
Endpoint Classification
Risk Severity
By default, search queries return data for the past 24 hours. Beneath the major categories, you can choose a window of time for the data you want to see. Threat hunter comes with preset time values and the ability to define your own by selecting custom.
The major categories are linked using the AND operator. This means that if you select search criteria from more than one category, the results must match those in all selected categories.
A Saved Searches list is next to the time configuration. You can select one of the following predefined searches from this list for easy access to common queries and use cases.
Administrative Account Lockouts
Privileged Escalations
Last Day Failed Authentications
Last Day Watched Users Activity
Last Day Marked Users Activity
Traffic based events with NTLMv1 version
Remote Desktop to Domain Controllers
Interactive logins for Service Accounts
Unencrypted LDAP
To save your search criteria as a custom search, open the Options menu and click Save as custom search.
To clear the selections on the page, click Reset.
After selecting your search criteria, click Hunt to view a list of the events according to your selection.
The date and time that appear in the Date & Time column depend on what you selected in the Time Zone field of the General search settings:
Use Browser's Time Zone: The default option. The time zone is retrieved from the browser settings.
UTC: Coordinated Universal Time, which is the 24-hour time standard commonly used across the world.
Use System Time Zone: The time zone configured in Identity protection > Configure > Settings.
The Destination column shows the event's endpoint. In rare cases, it might show a user account that performs Kerberos authentications on behalf of other services. For example, an exchange service and/or web service can authenticate in front of a service that extends the authentication to the final destination.
To export the list of events to CSV, open the Options menu and click Export to CSV.
To view additional details about an event, click the event.
To view events related to the selected event, click the Show Related Events icon.
To save the report as a custom report, open the Options menu, click Save as Custom Report, and fill out the New Custom Report fields.
The report is saved with your selections and added to the Saved Reports list on the Reports page.
Configure MFA, IDaas, Appliances, Domains, Subnets, Settings, and Risk Configurations.
You can configure these aspects of your Identity Protection environment:
MFA connectors: Configure integrations for multi-factor authentication (MFA).
IDaaS connectors: Configure integrations for Identity as a Service (IDaaS).
Domain Controller hosts View the traffic inspection status of each DC host.
Domains: View the domains monitored by Identity Protection.
Subnets: Configure subnets for use in Identity Protection.
Settings: Configure miscellaneous parameters.
Risk Configuration: View and configure Compromised Password Detection for your network.
The Domains tab shows the domains in your environment. Go to Identity protection > Configure > Domains.
Domains that are not being monitored by Identity Protection are identified by a gray Disabled status icon. For more info about enabling Identity Protection on a domain, see Domain management.
When first adding a sensor on a DC from a
domain, the relevant row in the domains table displays an orange status
icon, which indicates that Identity Protection is initializing the new
domain, and is populating the system with entities from it, such as the
users and endpoints.
When initialization completes, the status icon turns green.
If the status icon turns red, there might be an issue communicating with the sensor. For more information, see Domain controller monitoring status.
Identity Protection can be enabled on new domains with the Automatically enable Identity Protection on a new domain toggle. If the toggle is disabled, new domains will be added in a disabled status. To manually enable a domain, hover over it and click Enable.
On the Domain tab, quickly see how many domain controllers are configured in a domain and how many of them are monitored by Falcon Identity Protection. This ratio is shown in the DC Monitoring column of the Domains table.
To check DC monitoring status:
Select a domain from the list of configured domains.
Click the umbrella icon in the DC Monitoring column to open the [domain name] Monitoring side panel.
Identity Protection updates the monitoring status every 5 minutes. A domain controller is considered as monitored if the sensor is installed and communicating, Authentication traffic inspection is enabled, and a successful health check message is received from it within one hour of each status update. For more info, see Enabling Identity Protection configuration policies.
Sensors usually send messages every minute, however a newly provisioned sensor might not send a message in the first 15 minutes.
The [domain name] Monitoring panel contains the following tabs:
Monitored: Lists the domain controllers whose network traffic is monitored by Identity Protection traffic inspection.
Not Monitored: Lists the domain controllers whose network traffic is not monitored by Identity Protection traffic inspection. This tab appears only when such domain controllers exist.
All: Shows all domain controllers configured in the respective domain.
The graph in the Domain Controllers Activity area shows the activity of the domain controllers in the defined domain, plotting time on the X-axis and service requests on the Y-axis.
Filter the information displayed by DC name, Domain, Protocol, or Sites.
The Transaction by list lets you further filter the graph by selecting the transactions you want displayed in a time frame of up to one week. You can select from DC, Domain, or Site.
The Domain Controller hosts tab contains a table of the DC hosts.
The following columns are displayed for each DC host by default:
Hostname
Status
Status details
Domain
Sensor version
Traffic inspection: Enabled or Disabled
Identity configuration policy: Click the policy name to open the policy page in a new tab
To edit the columns that are displayed on your Domain controller hosts page, click the Configure table columns button , then select or deselect the columns as needed.
To view a DC host in Host Management, click the vertical ellipsis icon next to the desired DC host.
Configure subnets for usage in Identity Protection. These can be used as a condition in policy rules. You can configure a single subnet or a range of subnets as well as their types. For example, you can use this feature to apply more restrictive actions to an activity originating from a Guest WiFi network
In the CIDR/IP field, enter the subnet’s IP address or range of IP addresses in CIDR format.
From the Type list, select the network type of the subnet:
NAT: Indicates that the subnet uses network address translation (NAT). Identity Protection does not perform hostname resolution on endpoints in a NAT subnet. Also, those endpoints will not trigger suspicious ticket reuse or unusual use of endpoint alerts. For more info, see Identity-based Incidents, Detections, and Risks.
Wifi: Indicates that the subnet is wifi-based. Label your endpoints that use a wifi network, and filter by the network type in Threat Hunter.
Internal: Indicates that the subnet is internal. Label your endpoints that use an internal network, and filter by the network type in Threat Hunter.
VPN: Indicates that the subnet makes use of a VPN. Label your endpoints that use a VPN connection, and filter by the network type in Threat Hunter.
In Label, enter a descriptive name for the subnet.
Click Add Subnet.
You can see details of which of your sensors have been updated with the changes you make to subnets, and when.
To view the details of policy rule distribution:
In Subnet Distribution, click View distribution status.
In the DC servers panel you can:
Sort a column by clicking the heading.
View details of a domain controller by clicking its name.
Export the results to a comma-separated file by clicking CSV.
View the exact time a domain controller was updated by hovering over the Date Applied value.
MFA (multi-factor authentication) adds a second layer of security to access requests of on-premises apps, endpoints, or other applications by using a second factor – such as a smartphone, tablet, or smartwatch – to verify the user’s identity through additional mechanisms.
When Identity Protection detects abnormal or risky user behavior based on policy rules, it can automatically apply a security control to challenge the user to provide a second factor. The user engaged in the process can approve, deny, or ignore the request. Unless the end user approves the challenge, an incident will be created and escalated as needed. An audit log is written for every policy match, regardless of whether the end user response is successful or not.
To enable sending MFA requests to end users, configure an integration with the external MFA provider in Identity protection > Configure > Connectors, and enroll users according to the MFA vendor’s specifications. When a new user is enrolled, enabled or disabled, or if a device is changed, the change is registered within 5 minutes.
Additionally, a policy rule must be configured to trigger the request.
If an end user is enrolled in multiple MFA providers, Identity Protection allows the admin to defer the selection of the provider and factor to the end user, by choosing Any in the connector settings of their policy rules.
The user is presented with the available options by the Falcon Identity Verification Dialog, which is executed on the machine that initiated the authentication, referred to as the source endpoint.
These are the minimum requirements for showing the Falcon Identity Verification Dialog on the end user machine. This is relevant for the Access trigger only:
Internet Explorer 9
.NET 3.5
Any supported Windows OS
Windows Server 2008
To enable the Falcon Identity Verification Dialog for the end user, ensure the following:
A Falcon Sensor must be installed on the end user’s computer.
For more info, see Falcon Sensor for Windows Deployment.
Your sensors must be able to perform reverse DNS lookups to your source endpoints so they can be correctly identified during MFA.
put and run commands on your hosts. For more info, see Real Time Response.
[email protected]. This account appears in Investigate > Search > Advanced event search , in events relating to the use of the Verification Dialog, such as Event_AuthActivityAuditEvent.
The endpoint on which the Falcon Identity Verification Dialog appears must be part of a domain monitored by Falcon Identity Protection.
The endpoint on which the Falcon Identity Verification Dialog appears needs outbound network access on HTTP port 443 to the CrowdStrike API endpoint for that cloud:
US-1: https://api.crowdstrike.com
US-2: https://api.us-2.crowdstrike.com
EU-1: https://api.eu-1.crowdstrike.com
US-GOV-1: https://api.laggar.gcw.crowdstrike.com
US-GOV-2: https://api.us-gov-2.crowdstrike.mil
You can configure Identity Protection to integrate directly with Microsoft Teams.
To integrate Identity Protection with Microsoft Teams, follow these steps:
Step 1. Confirm an existing, configured Entra IDaaS connector
Step 2. Configure the Microsoft Teams SOAR Actions plugin in the CrowdStrike Store
Step 3. Confirm the Identity Protection Microsoft Teams connector
Step 1. Confirm an existing, configured Entra IDaaS connector
The Teams integration requires an existing, configured Entra IDaaS connector. For more info, see Microsoft Entra ID (entity and activity ingestion).
Step 2. Configure the Microsoft Teams SOAR Actions plugin in the CrowdStrike Store
You need to configure a new Microsoft Teams SOAR Actions plugin in the CrowdStrike Store. For more info about how to configure the plugin, see Microsoft Teams SOAR Actions.
Step 3. Confirm the Identity Protection Microsoft Teams connector
You can configure Identity Protection to integrate directly with Slack.
To integrate Identity Protection with Slack, follow these steps:
Step 1. Configure the Slack v2 SOAR plugin in the CrowdStrike Store
Step 1. Configure the Slack v2 SOAR plugin in the CrowdStrike Store
You need to configure a new Slack v2 SOAR plugin in the CrowdStrike Store. For more info about how to configure the plugin, see Slack v2 SOAR.
Step 2. Confirm the Identity Protection Slack connector
After the connector is added and configured, you can create policy rules that use Slack. For more info about setting up a policy, see Verify identity by using MFA.
Identity Protection can integrate directly with a number of cloud-based MFA providers.
The following table lists the supported MFA data connectors and the authentication methods each of them supports.
| Name | Supported Authentication Methods |
|---|---|
|
Microsoft Entra MFA See Microsoft Entra MFA (including Legacy Microsoft Entra MFA) |
Identity Protection supports these Entra Cloud MFA factors:
Note: Allows you to choose your factor.
Note: Push with number matching requires the Put and Run options to be enabled within your RTR Response policy.
|
|
Legacy Microsoft Entra MFA See Microsoft Entra MFA (including Legacy Microsoft Entra MFA) |
Identity Protection supports these Entra Cloud MFA factors:
Note: Relies on the Entra MFA default factor configuration.
|
|
Mobile authenticator app (OTP, Push), OATH OTP, phone call, text message (SMS) |
|
|
Push, Token, Callback, Hardware Token, SMS Passcode If you are using DUO MFA with more than one enrolled device, you can choose which of the devices to use for identity verification. Only the supported verification types will be shown for each device. |
|
|
Entrust Soft Token, Grid Card, One-time Password (Voice and SMS), Software/Hardware Token |
|
|
OTP, Push |
|
|
Token |
|
|
Approve, Authenticate Tokencode, Device Biometrics, Emergency Tokencode, SecureId |
|
|
Push, Token, Hardware Token, Callback, Text message (SMS) If you are using Okta Verify MFA with more than one enrolled device, you can choose which of the devices to use for identity verification. Only the supported verification types will be shown for each device |
|
|
OneLogin Protect mobile app, Text message (SMS), Phone call |
|
|
Push, Token |
|
|
SMS Passcode, Callback The mobile application supports Push and Token |
|
| Cloud MFA (protocol based) | Supported authentication methods depend on third-party provider |
You can configure Identity Protection to integrate directly with Entra Cloud MFA. If you do not want to connect directly and instead use the NPS extension, see Integrate Cloud Microsoft Entra MFA using NPS extension.
Identity Protection supports these Entra Cloud MFA factors:
Mobile authenticator app (OTP, Push with number matching)
SMS messages
Phone call
Legacy Identity Protection supports these Entra Cloud MFA factors:
Mobile authenticator app (OTP, Push)
SMS messages
Phone call
To integrate Identity Protection with Entra MFA or Legacy Entra MFA, follow these steps:
Step 1. Obtain the tenant domain and assign a secret to the Entra Multi-Factor auth client
Step 2. Configure the Entra MFA connector in the Falcon console
Step 1. Obtain the tenant domain and assign a secret to the Entra Multi-Factor auth client
You need to obtain the tenant domain from Entra, and also assign a client secret to the Entra Multi-Factor Auth client so that you can integrate it with Identity Protection.
Prerequisites
The machine on which you run the script must have internet connectivity. The script will ensure you are using a strong cipher for making network connections.
You must run Powershell as an administrator to successfully run the script. The script will warn you if you are not running it as an administrator.
You will need to enter at least Entra ID Global Administrator credentials when the script connects to Entra ID. You may also need to complete an MFA challenge to authenticate to Entra ID.
Use the Powershell script
In the Falcon console, go to Support and resources > Tool downloads , and download the latest version of the Entra MFA Credential Assignment Script ZIP file.
Extract the Powershell script from the ZIP archive.
On a machine with access to the Entra cloud servers, open Powershell as an administrator, and then set the execution policy to allow the script to run as required:
Set-ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted
Run the script:
.\EntraMFACredentialAssignmentScript.ps1
When prompted, enter your Entra ID global administrator credentials.
If requested, complete the MFA challenge.
A successful operation produces this output:
Tenant Domain Client Secret ------------- ------------- example.onmicrosoft.com 4NlmJRM8mahkULIWpWYCAs49SMgyiMx=
If the script is not successful, check the cs_script_output.txt file for errors. The file is created in the directory from which you executed the script.
Make a note of the tenant domain and the generated client secret. You will use these values in the Tenant Domain and Client Secret fields in the next step.
Step 2. Configure the Entra MFA connector in the Falcon console
In the Falcon console, go to Identity Protection > Configure > Connectors .
From the Select connector menu, in the Cloud MFA category, select Microsoft Entra and then click Add.
In the connector settings, specify the required values:
Tenant Domain. Such as example.onmicrosoft.com
Client Secret. Such as 4NlmJRM8mahkULIWpWYCAs49SMgyiMx=
In User Identifier, select the attribute that contains the value the MFA provider requires to uniquely identify a user.
For example, you might have your MFA provider configured to require Entra principal name (Entra UPN). We recommend that you keep the Default setting.
Note: The possible choices for Entra MFA User Identifier are UPN, Entra UPN, and Email. If you select Entra UPN, an active Entra IDaaS configuration is required.
Click Save.
The indicator turns green within a minute, indicating that the connection was successfully established.
If you need multiple Entra MFA connectors, repeat Step 2 through Step 5.
After the connector is added and configured, you can create policy rules that use Entra MFA. For more info, see Identity Protection Policy.
The CyberArk Identity Platform provides a range of authentication methods that add a second layer of security to access requests.
Using CyberArk MFA, you can get the protection you need without sacrificing the convenience your users demand. CyberArk MFA makes two-factor authentication easy for both administrators and users.
Prerequisites
Before starting the integration, make sure that the following prerequisites are met:
A CyberArk Identity administrative account is set up.
For more info, see the CyberArk Identity article Assign domain users or groups to System Administrator role.
A CyberArk confidential OAuth 2.0 client and associated service account is set up.
For more info, see the CyberArk Identity article Use the client credentials flow.
All the relevant users are enrolled in CyberArk MFA.
For more info, see the CyberArk Identity article Require users to set up MFA factors.
To integrate Identity Protection with CyberArk Identity, follow these steps:
Step 1. Get your Tenant URL and Tenant ID values from CyberArk Identity
Log in to the CyberArk Identity Admin Portal as an administrative user.
Go to Settings > Customization > Tenant URLs, and make a note of your Tenant URL value. For example, abc1234.my.idaptive.app.
Click your username and from the dropdown menu, select About. Make a note of your Tenant ID value. For example abc1234.
Step 2. Create an authentication profile in CyberArk Identity
Make a note of the name of your authentication profile, for example CrowdStrikeIdentityProtectionPolicy. You will use this value in the CyberArk Policy property when configuring the connector.
The CyberArk Identity connector supports the following factors:
Mobile Authenticator
Phone call
OATH OTP Client
Text message (SMS) confirmation code
Step 3. Create an authentication policy in CyberArk Identity
As described by Create authentication rules in the CyberArk Identity documentation, create an authentication policy that defines the criteria for applying the MFA profile you created earlier.
When creating the authentication policy:
We recommend that you specify the authentication profile you created in the previous step as the default profile that is used if no custom conditions match.
In Third Party Integration, click Add Challenge Policy.
Set Enable authentication policy controls to Yes.
In Default Profile, select the profile defined in Step 2. Create an authentication profile in CyberArk Identity.
Step 4. Create an OAuth 2.0 client and service account in CyberArk Identity
As described by Client Credentials Flow in the CyberArk Identity documentation, create a confidential OAuth 2.0 client web app, and the service account credentials that Identity Protection can use to connect to it.
When creating the client:
Make a note of your Application ID value, for example CrowdStrikeIdentityProtectionApp. You will use this value in the CyberArk Application ID property when configuring the connector.
Set the Client ID Type to Confidential.
Select Must be OAuth Client.
When configuring tokens:
Set Auth Methods to Client Creds.
Ensure Token Lifetime is at least 5 minutes.
When configuring scope definitions:
Make a note of the Name of your scope definition, for example CrowdStrikeIdentityProtectionScope. You will use this value in the CyberArk Application Scope property when configuring the connector.
In Allowed REST APIs, add these values:
Security/OnDemandChallenge
Security/AdvanceAuthentication
When configuring permissions:
Add the System Administrator role, and assign these permissions:
Identity verification
User Management
When creating a service account to access the confidential client:
Make a note of the Login Name and Suffix values; you will use these values, with an @ symbol in between, in the Client ID property when configuring the connector.
For example, [email protected].
Make a note of the Password value; you will use this value in the Client Secret property when configuring the connector.
In the Status section, select Is Service User and Is OAuth confidential client.
After creating the service account, add it as a member of the System Administrator role (Core Services > Roles > System Administrator > Members).
Step 5. Configure the CyberArk Identity connector in the Falcon console
In the Falcon console, go to Identity protection > Configure > Connectors .
In the Select connector list, select CyberArk Identity and click Add.
Enter the values you obtained from CyberArk Identity into the following fields:
Tenant URL
Tenant ID
CyberArk Application ID
CyberArk Application Scope
CyberArk Policy
Client ID
Client secret
Optionally, in User Identifier, select the attribute that contains the value the MFA provider requires to uniquely identify a user.
For example, you might have your MFA provider configured to require the email address or principal name.
We recommend that you keep the Default setting.
Click Save when done.
The indicator turns green within a minute, indicating the connection was successfully established.
If the indicator does not turn green:
Refresh the page.
Verify that the hostname is accessible.
Verify that all the parameters are entered correctly. If not, re-enter the parameter and click Save.
If you need multiple CyberArk Identity MFA connectors, repeat Step 2 through Step 6.
Test the connection by creating an identity verification policy rule for a CyberArk Identity MFA-enrolled user. Make sure to select one of the CyberArk Identity options in the Connector list.
When attempting to log in to a workstation that is not associated with them, the user should receive an on-screen notification to perform MFA.
For more information, see Identity Protection Policy.
Duo Security provides an easy-to-use, secure mobile authentication app, named Duo Mobile, for quick, push notification-based approval to verify your user’s identity.
Users’ Enrollment Duo Security MFA is a cloud service. User enrollment is done by the administrator of the system in a simple, one-time operation.
Before starting the integration, make sure that the following prerequisites are met:
You have a Duo administrator account. If you do not already have one, follow the Getting Started with Duo instructions.
Your Active Directory users are synchronized with Duo. If they are not synchronized, proceed as described in the Duo article Synchronizing Users from Active Directory.
The relevant users - and their phones, tablets, or hardware tokens - are enrolled in Duo. If you need to enroll them, follow the Duo instructions for Enrolling Users.
For new users, the default option in New User Policy must be Require enrollment.
Create a new protected application by following the Duo instructions for Protecting Applications. From the list of services that can be protected with Duo (step 2), choose Auth API.
Note: The policy for unknown users must be defined as Enrolled.
In the Falcon console, go to Identity protection > Configure > Connectors .
In the Select connector list, select DUO connector and click Add.
Copy the following information from DUO: integration key, secret key, API hostname.
Click Save when done.
The indicator turns green within a minute, indicating the connection was successfully established.
If the indicator does not turn green:
Refresh the page
Verify that the hostname is accessible
Verify that all the parameters are entered correctly. If not, re-enter the parameter and click Save.
If you need multiple Duo MFA connectors, repeat Step 3 through Step 6.
Test the DUO connection by creating an identity verification policy rule for a DUO-enrolled user. Make sure to select DUO in the Data Connector list. When attempting to log in to a workstation that is not associated with them, the user must receive an on-screen notification. For more information, see Identity Protection Policy.
You can configure Identity Protection to integrate directly with Entrust MFA.
Identity Protection supports these Entrust MFA factors:
Entrust Soft Token
One-time Password (Voice and SMS)
Software/Hardware Token
To integrate Identity Protection with Entrust MFA, follow these steps:
Step 1. Create an Authentication API application in Entrust IDaaS
As described in the Entrust documentation, create an authentication API application that enables the MFA factors supported by Identity Protection. Go to Create an Authentication API application in IDaaS.
Make note of the Application ID, which you will need to initialize the Authentication API.
Step 2. Add a resource rule to your Authentication API application in Entrust IDaaS
On the Complete tab, click Add Resource Rule.
On the Add Resource Rules page and the General Settings tab, click Next.
On the Authentications Conditions tab, configure your resource rule:
Set First Factor to Skip Password.
To allow using these factors in the integration, for Second Factor, select:
Entrust Soft Token Push
Grid Card
One Time Password
Software/Hardware Token
Click Submit.
Step 3. Note user details in Entrust IDaaS
Go to Members > Users > Select a user. Open the details of a user and note the User Identifier:
SAM account name
SAM account name and domain
User principal name
Step 4. Configure the Entrust MFA connector in the Falcon console
In the Falcon console, go to Identity Protection > Configure > Connectors .
From the Select connector menu, in the Cloud MFA category, select Entrust and then click Add.
In Hostname, enter your Entrust account URL.
In Application ID, enter the Application ID you copied from the IDaaS Admin portal.
In User Identifier, select the User Identifier that you noted in Step 3.
Click Save.
If you need multiple Entrust MFA connectors, repeat Step 2 through Step 6.
You can now configure rules using the Identity Protection policy and apply MFA using Entrust to the end users.
You can configure Identity Protection to integrate directly with ForgeRock MFA.
Identity Protection supports these ForgeRock MFA factors:
OTP (one-time password)
Push
Before starting the integration, make sure that the following prerequisites are met:
You have a ForgeRock administrator account.
AD users must be synchronized to both ForgeRock and Falcon Identity Protection.
Users must be registered to either push or OTP factors in ForgeRock.
To integrate Identity Protection with ForgeRock MFA, follow these steps:
Step 1. Configure the ForgeRock journey
In the ForgeRock tenant, import the example journey. For an example journey, see Appendix B.
Edit the journey details:
Rename the journey, if required.
Make sure the Identity Object is set to all users in your realm.
Step 2. Configure the ForgeRock MFA connector in the Falcon console
In the Falcon console, go to Identity Protection > Configure > Connectors .
Add a new Forgerock connector with the following parameters:
Access Management URL: the URL to the ForgeRock tenant. Such as https://openam-mytenant.forgeblocks.com/am
Access Management Realm: the intended ForgeRock realm. Such as /realms/root/realms/alpha
Journey: the journey name configured in Step 1
Scope: keep as Default. This field should be used if setting up multiple ForgeRock connectors by mapping the users to different tenants by domain
Click Save to save the connector.
TOTP-compatible authentication applications implement two-step verification services using the Time-based One-time Password Algorithm (TOTP). Typically, a user installs the TOTP-compatible authentication application on a smartphone. To log in to a service that uses two-factor authentication, the user provides username and password to the service and runs the authentication app. In this scenario, the authentication process is controlled by Identity Protection. The mobile app displays a six-digit one-time password and the user is asked what that password is. The user enters it, thus authenticating the user's identity.
With this kind of two-factor authentication, mere knowledge of username and password is not sufficient to break into a user's account. The attacker also needs knowledge of the shared secret key or physical access to the device running the authentication app.
To be enrolled, a user must have the TOTP-compatible authentication application installed on their device.
In the Falcon console, go to Identity protection > Configure > Connectors .
In the Select connector list, select TOTP Authenticator and click Add.
The data connector is now added and enabled.
Click Enroll Users and select the users you want to enroll in the service.
An enrollment request event is logged in the timeline of every user that was on the list.
In the Select a user field, specify the user you want to enroll.
Click Send Enrollment Request.
End users receive an email with a QR code.
Scan the QR code with the TOTP Authenticator application.
This secret key will be used for all future logins.
Test the TOTP Authenticator connection by creating an identity verification policy rule for an enrolled user. Make sure to select TOTP Authenticator in the Data Connector list.
When attempting to log in to a workstation that is not associated with them, the user must receive an on-screen notification. For more info, see Identity Protection Policy.
As soon as the end user enters a code, the OK button is enabled. The code is then verified and the user is granted access. If the user verification code is valid, Identity Protection logs the transaction and does not create an Incident, eliminating the need for a security analyst to examine the incident. If the end user fails to enter the correct code or close the dialog, it is logged as an incident, the severity is raised based on the number of occurrences, and it is escalated appropriately.
RSA CAS helps accelerate business while mitigating identity risk. With multi-factor authentication, access management, identity governance and user lifecycle solutions, it helps to strengthen security, ensure compliance and facilitate business growth.
Before starting the integration, make sure that the following prerequisites are met:
You have an RSA CAS Admin account
Generate an Authentication API Key in RSA CAS:
Log in to RSA CAS.
Go to My Account > Company Settings > Authentication API Keys.
Add a new Authentication API Key.
Copy the API key and URL to use when setting up the connector.
If the integration will use assurance levels, validate that they are defined correctly in RSA CAS.
In the Falcon console, go to Identity protection > Configure > Connectors .
In the Select connector list, select RSA CAS and click Add.
Enter the API Key and URL copied from RSA CAS.
Optionally, in User Identifier, select the attribute that contains the value the MFA provider requires to uniquely identify a user.
For example, you might have your MFA provider configured to require the email address or principal name.
We recommend that you keep the Default setting.
Click Save.
The indicator turns green within a minute, indicating the connection was successfully established.
If you need multiple RSA CAS MFA connectors, repeat Step 2 through Step 5.
Use RSA CAS assurance levels in Identity Protection Policy
RSA CAS defines assurance levels as lists of authorization factors (MFA methods) which allow an admin to limit an end user to a subset of the authentication factors when accessing a resource. For example, access to one resource requires push or OTP and access to another resource requires both a push and an OTP. RSA CAS has 3 predefined levels (Low, Medium, High) which can be assigned to policy rules in an Identity Protection policy to trigger this behavior.
To assign an assurance level to a policy rule:
Create a policy rule with the requested trigger.
In the actions menu, select RSA CAS (Any).
Select the correct Assurance Level.
Complete the rule with a condition and additional settings.
By integrating with Okta’s Adaptive Multi-Factor Authentication, Identity Protection can create an MFA challenge based on risk. Depending on the risk, the policy engine can either approve and auto-resolve the security incident or take a different action such as step up or block the user.
Identity Protection supports these Okta Verify MFA factors:
Push notifications
One-time passwords (OTP), including hardware tokens
Phone calls
Text messages (SMS)
Before starting the integration, make sure that the following prerequisites are met:
Your company has an Okta Portal and you know its domain URL.
You will use this domain URL value when configuring the connector. See Integration process.
The users are enrolled in Okta MFA.
For more information, see Multifactor Authentication (MFA) in the Okta developer documentation.
You have added the CrowdStrike IP addresses to the Gateway IPs field of the Okta IP Zone. See Create an IP Zone in the Okta Help Center.
Add the CrowdStrike proxy IP addresses to the Gateway IPs field of the Okta IP Zone so that your users do not see the geolocation of these servers when performing MFA.
The IP addresses to add depend on the CrowdStrike cloud region you use. See Appendix A: IP addresses used to contact third-party services.
To integrate Identity Protection with Okta Verify, follow these steps:
Step 1. Create a service account and API key in Okta
You need to create a service account and API token in your Okta instance that Identity Protection can use to authenticate to Okta APIs.
API keys in Okta inherit the permissions of the account that creates them. Identity Protection requires that the API key has the Helpdesk Admin permission. You must also temporarily give the Read-only Admin permission to the service account so that it can create the API key.
Log in to the Okta console as an administrator.
For more information, see Administrator roles and permissions in the Okta developer documentation.
Create a service account for use by Identity Protection.
In the Password section, select Set by admin, and create a strong password.
Add the following permissions to the service account:
Helpdesk Admin
Read-only Administrator
Note: This will be removed in a later step. It is only required to allow the creation of an API key.
For more information, see Add users manually in the Okta developer documentation.
Log in to the Okta console with the new service account.
Create an API token while logged in with the service account.
Make a note of the API token value. You will use this value when configuring the connector.
For more information, see Create an API token in the Okta developer documentation.
Log out of the service account and log back in to the Okta console as an administrator.
Remove the Read-only Administrator permission from the service account.
Okta updates the API key generated earlier to only have the Helpdesk Admin permission that is required by Identity Protection.
Step 2. Configure the Okta Verify connector in the Falcon console
In the Falcon console, go to Identity protection > Configure > Connectors .
In the Select connector field, select Okta Verify, and then click Add.
In the Okta Verify data connector:
In the Domain field, enter the URL of your organization’s Okta portal.
In the Token field, enter the Okta API token that has Helpdesk Admin permission.
Optionally, in User Identifier, select the attribute that contains the value the MFA provider requires to uniquely identify a user.
For example, you might have your MFA provider configured to require the email address or principal name.
We recommend that you keep the Default setting.
If you need multiple Okta Verify MFA connectors, repeat Step 2 through Step 3.
After the connector is added and configured, you can create policy rules that use Okta Verify for MFA. For more info, see Identity Protection policy.
OneLogin provides a range of authentication methods that add a second layer of security to access requests.
Protect your organization’s mission-critical assets with policy-based OneLogin MFA.
The users are enrolled in OneLogin MFA and you have created a security policy to enable supported MFA factors.
For more information, see Add Multi-Factor Authentication in the OneLogin knowledge base.
To integrate Identity Protection with OneLogin, follow these steps:
Step 1. Create API credentials in OneLogin
As described by Creating an API Credential Pair in the OneLogin Developer documentation, create API credentials that Identity Protection can use to connect to OneLogin.
When creating the credentials:
Make a note of your Client ID and Client Secret values.
You will use these values when configuring the connector in the Falcon console.
Assign the API credentials the Manage Users scope.
Step 2. Configure the OneLogin connector in the Falcon console
In the Falcon console, go to Identity protection > Configure > Connectors .
In the Select connector field, select OneLogin, and then click Add.
In the OneLogin data connector:
In the Client ID and Client Secret fields, enter the values obtained when creating API credentials in OneLogin.
Optionally, in User Identifier, select the attribute that contains the value the MFA provider requires to uniquely identify a user.
For example, you might have your MFA provider configured to require the email address or principal name.
We recommend that you keep the Default setting.
If you need multiple OneLogin MFA connectors, repeat Step 2 through Step 4.
After the connector is added and configured, you can create policy rules that use OneLogin for MFA. For more info, see Identity Protection policy.
Symantec VIP Intelligent Authentication protects your network and applications against unauthorized access without altering a legitimate user’s authentication experience. Using a combination of device and behavior profiling, VIP Intelligent Authentication delivers multi-factor authentication to users without requiring hardware or software-based authentication credentials, and enables your organization to defeat attacks designed to steal your organization’s confidential information.
Symantec VIP integration requires loading a certificate that is used to authenticate communication with the Symantec API (cloud service).
For instructions, see the Symantec article Obtaining the VIP certificate.
Ensure these prerequisites:
Use PKCS#12 format
Take note of the certificate export password
Do not change the certificate name
In the Falcon console, go to Identity Protection > Configure > Connectors .
In the Select connector list, select Symantec VIP and click Add.
In the connector settings, upload the certificate file downloaded from Symantec VIP and enter the password.
Optionally, in User Identifier, select the attribute that contains the value the MFA provider requires to uniquely identify a user.
For example, you might have your MFA provider configured to require the email address or principal name.
We recommend that you keep the Default setting.
Click Save when done.
The indicator turns green within a minute, indicating the connection was successfully established.
PingID is a cloud-based authentication solution that enables users to authenticate to applications by using their phone.
Log in to admin.pingone.com.
Go to PingID > Client Integration and download Ping identity properties by clicking Download in the Integrate with PingFederate and other clients section.
In the Falcon console, go to Identity Protection > Configure > Connectors .
In the Select connector list, select MFA > PingID and click Add.
Click pingid properties file and browse for the previously downloaded Ping identity properties file.
Optionally, in User Identifier, select the attribute that contains the value the MFA provider requires to uniquely identify a user.
For example, you might have your MFA provider configured to require the email address or principal name.
We recommend that you keep the Default setting.
If you need multiple PingID MFA connectors, repeat Step 3 through Step 6.
Use the newly created connector to apply a control to an Identity Protection policy rule. For more info, see Identity Protection policy.
<falcon>/api2/id-protect/openid/callback.
Identity Protection can communicate with MFA providers within your network, such as RADIUS-based servers, by using the CrowdStrike on-premises MFA enablement tool.
This tool acts as an API client of Falcon and communicates with your on-premises MFA provider, acting as a bridge between Identity Protection and your on-premises MFA providers.
To set up the CrowdStrike on-premises MFA enablement tool in your environment and enable MFA through on-premises providers, follow these steps:
Before installing the on-premises MFA enablement tool, ensure your server meets the following requirements:
Windows Server 2008 R2 or later
.NET Framework 4.5.1 or later
Outbound network access on HTTP port 443 to the CrowdStrike API endpoint for your cloud:
US-1: https://api.crowdstrike.com
US-2: https://api.us-2.crowdstrike.com
EU-1: https://api.eu-1.crowdstrike.com
US-GOV-1: https://api.laggar.gcw.crowdstrike.com
US-GOV-2: https://api.us-gov-2.crowdstrike.mil
Administrator access
Tip: The installer prompts you for admin credentials if your current credentials are insufficient.
Create an API client in Falcon that the CrowdStrike on-premises MFA enablement tool can use for communication.
Add these scopes to the API client:
Identity Protection on-premises enablement: read and write
Make a note of the API client ID and secret; you will need them to install the tool.
Install the CrowdStrike on-premises MFA enablement tool interactively
Using the Chrome browser, download the CrowdStrike on-premises MFA enablement tool installer from Support and resources > Resources and tools > Tool downloads .
Run the CrowdStrike on-premises MFA enablement tool installer on a server within the domain. For example, your on-premises MFA server.
Select I accept the license agreement and privacy notice, and then click Next.
Specify the installation folder and click Next.
On the Properties page, specify the following info:
Client ID: Specify the ID of the API client you created earlier.
Client Secret: Specify the secret of the API client.
API URL: Specify the API URL of the Falcon cloud you are using. One of:
US-1: https://api.crowdstrike.com
US-2: https://api.us-2.crowdstrike.com
EU-1: https://api.eu-1.crowdstrike.com
US-GOV-1: https://api.laggar.gcw.crowdstrike.com
US-GOV-2: https://api.us-gov-2.crowdstrike.mil
Proxy host / Proxy port: Optionally specify the host and port of a proxy if it is required to access the API URL or Internet.
Click Next.
On the Ready to Install page, click Install to begin the installation.
To close the installer when done, click Finish.
The service starts automatically.
Install the CrowdStrike on-premises MFA enablement tool using the command-line
Using the Chrome browser, download the CrowdStrike on-premises MFA enablement tool installer from Support and resources > Resources and tools > Tool downloads .
Open a command prompt using the Run as administrator option.
Run the CrowdStrike on-premises MFA enablement tool installer on a server within the domain, for example your on-premises MFA server:
msiexec /i CSOnPremiseMFAEnablement-<version>.msi /qn CLIENT_ID=<client_id> CLIENT_SECRET=<client_secret> API_URL=<api_url> PROXY_HOST=<proxy_host> PROXY_PORT=<proxy_port> /L*V "<log_file>"
The service starts automatically.
Command-line installation options
When you run the installation command, you can use any of these optional flags:
/qn: Install silently.
/qb: Show only a progress bar and minimal dialog.
CLIENT_ID: The ID of the API client you created earlier. See Create an API client.
CLIENT_SECRET: The secret of the API client. See Create an API client.
API_URL: The API URL of the Falcon cloud you are using. One of:
US-1: https://api.crowdstrike.com
US-2: https://api.us-2.crowdstrike.com
EU-1: https://api.eu-1.crowdstrike.com
US-GOV-1: https://api.laggar.gcw.crowdstrike.com
US-GOV-2: https://api.us-gov-2.crowdstrike.mil
PROXY_HOST: (Optional) The IP address of a proxy if it is required to access the API URL or Internet. For example, 10.159.148.1.
PROXY_PORT: (Optional) The port number of a proxy if it is required to access the API URL or Internet. For example, 8080.
L*V "<log_file>":
(Optional) The file for verbose logging info. This file is located in
the same folder as the installer by default. You can specify a different
path.
Example of installing silently, with log file output:
msiexec /i CSOnPremiseMFAEnablement-1.1.55-x64.msi /qn CLIENT_ID=8985f876f0571491c CLIENT_SECRET=cef1844308364b API_URL=https://api.crowdstrike.com/ /L*V "CS-MFA-install.log"
Remove the CrowdStrike on-premises MFA enablement tool
To remove the CrowdStrike on-premises MFA enablement tool from your server:
In Windows Server, go to Start > Control Panel.
In the Programs category, click Uninstall a program.
Select CrowdStrike on-premises MFA enablement, and then click Uninstall.
This table lists the supported on-premises MFA data connectors and the authentication methods each of them supports.
| Name | Supported Authentication Methods |
|---|---|
|
RADIUS-based: Integrate Cloud Microsoft Entra MFA using NPS extension |
|
|
RADIUS-based: Integrate generic RADIUS servers |
|
|
RADIUS servers each support a variety of MFA vendors for user authentication, and each vendor requires a specific configuration.
Before starting the integration, make sure that the following prerequisites are met:
You have installed the CrowdStrike on-premises MFA enablement tool within your network.
You know the IP address and/or hostname of your configured RADIUS server.
You have obtained the shared secret that secures communication between your RADIUS server and its clients, if required.
Integrate Cloud Microsoft Entra MFA using NPS extension
To prepare for on-premises RADIUS-based Cloud Entra MFA using NPS extension:
Install the Network Policy Server (NPS) extension for Entra ID Multi-Factor Authentication. For more information about installing the extension, see Microsoft's documentation.
In the Network Policy Server console, add the CrowdStrike on-premises MFA enablement tool as a RADIUS client:
Expand RADIUS Clients and Servers, right-click RADIUS Clients, and then click New RADIUS Client.
On the New RADIUS Client page:
Select Enable the RADIUS client.
Enter a Friendly name for the RADIUS client.
Enter the Address (IP or DNS) of the server where you installed the CrowdStrike on-premises MFA enablement tool.
Select Manual to enter your own Shared secret, or select Generate to create one for you.
Keep the shared secret value safe. You must enter it when configuring the connector in the Falcon console.
Click OK.
For more information, see Add the Network Access Server as a RADIUS Client in NPS in Microsoft's documentation.
In the Network Policy Server console, create a Connection Request Policy that allows the CrowdStrike on-premises MFA enablement tool to access the RADIUS server:
Expand Policies, right-click Connection Request Policies, and then click New.
On the Specify Connection Request Policy Name and Connection Type page:
Enter a Policy name.
Set the Type of network access server field to Unspecified.
Click Next.
On the Specify Conditions page:
Click Add.
Select Client IPv4 Address, and then click Add.
Enter the IP address of the CrowdStrike on-premises MFA enablement tool, and then click Add.
Click Next.
On the Specify Connection Request Forwarding page:
Click Authentication.
Select Accept users without validating credentials.
Click Next.
On the Configure Settings page:
Add any attributes as required.
Click Next.
Verify your configuration, and then click Finish.
In the Network Policy Server console, create a Network Policy as follows:
Expand Policies, right-click Network Policies, and then click New.
On the Specify Network Policy Name and Connection Type page:
Enter a Policy name.
Set the Type of network access server field to Unspecified.
Click Next.
On the Specify Conditions page:
Click Add.
Select Client IPv4 Address, and then click Add.
Enter the IP address of the CrowdStrike on-premises MFA enablement tool, and then click Add.
Click Next.
Verify your configuration, and then Finish.
To configure the connector:
In the Falcon console, go to Identity Protection > Configure > Connectors.
From the Select connector field, choose RADIUS-based and then click Add.
From the Choose Template field, select Entra (using NPS).
In IP / Host, enter the IP address or the hostname of your NPS server.
Enter values for the Authentication Port (often 1812) and Accounting Port (often 1813).
Optionally, in User Identifier, select the attribute that contains the value the MFA provider requires to uniquely identify a user.
For example, you might have your MFA provider configured to require the email address or principal name.
We recommend that you keep the Default setting.
Click Save.
Note: Due to a limitation of the RADIUS protocol, Identity Protection is not able to show the connectivity status accurately. The status icon is always green.
Integrate generic RADIUS servers
You might need to configure your RADIUS server to accept connections from the CrowdStrike on-premises MFA enablement tool.
Consult your vendor's documentation for information on how to configure client connections.
To configure the connector:
In the Falcon console, go to Identity Protection > Configure > Connectors.
From the Select connector drop-down list, choose RADIUS-based and click Add.
From the RADIUS-based integration options drop-down list, select Generic.
In IP / Host, enter the IP address or the hostname of the RADIUS server.
In RADIUS Shared Secret, enter a shared secret that your RADIUS server might require to authenticate the tool.
Enter values for the Authentication Port (often 1812) and Accounting Port (often 1813).
If the MFA vendor your RADIUS server is using requires additional authentication, enable Prompt for passcode.
Optionally, in User Identifier, select the attribute that contains the value the MFA provider requires to uniquely identify a user.
For example, you might have your MFA provider configured to require the email address or principal name.
We recommend that you keep the Default setting.
Click Save.
Note: Due to a limitation of the RADIUS protocol, Identity Protection is not able to show the connectivity status accurately. The status icon is always green.
Use RSA Authentication Manager (RSA AM) on-premises MFA server to verify identities in Identity Protection policies.
Prerequisites
Before starting the integration, make sure that the following prerequisites are met:
You have installed the CrowdStrike on-premises MFA enablement tool within your network.
The RSA SecurID Authentication API is enabled in the RSA Authentication Manager administration console.
For more information, see Configure the RSA SecurID Authentication API for Authentication Agents in the RSA documentation.
An authentication agent is set up in the RSA Authentication Manager administration console.
For more information, see Deploying an Authentication Agent that Uses the REST Protocol in the RSA documentation.
To integrate Identity Protection with RSA AM, follow these steps:
Step 1. Import the RSA AM server certificate into the on-premises MFA enablement tool
Download a copy of the root server certificate file from the RSA Authentication Manager administration console.
For more information, see Download an RSA Authentication Manager Server Certificate in the RSA documentation.
As a local administrator on the endpoint that is running ths on-premises MFA enablement tool:
In a command prompt, change directory to C:\Program Files\CrowdStrike Identity Protection\CrowdStrike On-premises MFA Enablement\jre64\bin
If you did not install the on-premises MFA enablement tool in the default directory, update the path as required.
Run the following command:
keytool -import -trustcacerts -keystore "C:\ProgramData\CrowdStrike Identity Protection\CrowdStrike On-premises MFA Enablement\cacerts_crowdstrike" -storepass changeit -alias <MyAlias> -file "<path/to/rsa_server_certificate.cer>"
Specify the path to the CER file you downloaded from RSA AM, and specify an alias to help you identify the certificate.
Restart the on-premises MFA enablement tool service to start using the newly imported certificate.
Step 2. Enable the SecurID authentication API in RSA AM
As described by Configure the RSA SecurID Authentication API for Authentication Agents in the RSA documentation, enable the authentication API to allow the on-premises MFA enablement tool to access your RSA AM instance..
Make a note of the API Access Key value. You will use this value in the Authentication API Key property when configuring the connector.
Step 3. Create an authentication agent in RSA AM
As described by Deploying an Authentication Agent that Uses the REST Protocol in the RSA documentation, create an authentication agent to help you identify the source of authentication events when viewing RSA AM logs, and configure the connection port.
Make a note of the Hostname value. You will use this value in the Authentication API Agent Name property when configuring the connector.
Also make a note of the port number the authentication agent will use, often 5555. You will use this value in the Port Number property when configuring the connector.
Step 4. Configure the RSA AM connector in the Falcon console
In the Falcon console, go to Identity Protection > Configure > Connectors.
In the Select connector list, select RSA AM and click Add.
Enter the values you obtained from RSA AM into the following fields:
Domain (the domain name that hosts your RSA AM server)
Port Number
Authentication API Key
Authentication API Agent Name
Optionally, in User Identifier, select the attribute that contains the value the MFA provider requires to uniquely identify a user.
For example, you might have your MFA provider configured to require the email address or principal name.
We recommend that you keep the Default setting.
Click Save when done.
The indicator turns green within a minute, indicating the connection was successfully established.
If the indicator does not turn green:
Refresh the page
Verify that the hostname is accessible
Verify that all the parameters are entered correctly. If not, re-enter the parameter and click Save.
Test the connection by creating an identity verification policy rule for a RSA AM MFA-enrolled user. Make sure to select the RSA AM option in the Connector list.
When attempting to log in to a workstation that is not associated with them, the user should receive an on-screen notification to perform MFA.
For more information, see Identity Protection Policy.
Identity Protection integrates with Falcon for Mobile to provide a phish-resistant multi-factor authentication solution. For more info, see FalconID.
Identity as a Service (IDaaS) is an authentication infrastructure that is built, hosted and managed by a third-party service provider. IDaaS can be thought of as a single sign-on (SSO) for the cloud.
Identity Protection supports the following identity management services:
Microsoft Entra ID (previously known as Azure AD) was created as part of Microsoft’s effort to make Office 365 and other apps use SSO. It can be integrated with the on-premises AD or serve as an independent directory service for businesses that do not have on-premises presence.
Microsoft synchronizes the data from the on-premises AD and keeps identifiers that help Falcon Identity Protection correlate SSO transactions to the hybrid user accounts. Identity Protection can integrate with Entra ID for multiple tenants.
The following procedure covers the Identity connector for data ingestion. For more info about configuring response actions in Entra, see Integrate with Microsoft Entra ID.
Before starting the integration, make sure that the following prerequisites are met:
You have a paid Microsoft Entra ID license.
To integrate Identity Protection with Microsoft Entra ID, follow these steps for each Azure tenant.
Step 1. Create an application in Entra ID and grant it the required permissions
Step 2. Get your Tenant Domain value
Step 3. Get your Application ID and Application Secret values
Step 4. Create a custom role with access to read RBAC properties
Step 5. Configure the Microsoft Entra ID connector in Identity Protection
Step 1. Create an application in Entra ID and grant it the required permissions
Create an application in Entra ID to allow Identity Protection to connect.
In your Azure portal, open the left portal menu, and then click Microsoft Entra ID Active Directory.
On the Microsoft Entra ID Active Directory page, from the Add menu, select App registration.
On the Register an application page:
In Name, enter a friendly name for the application, for example "Identity Protection Connector".
In Supported account types, select Accounts in this organizational directory only (Default Directory only - Single tenant).
In Redirect URI, select Web and then enter https://localhost
Click Register.
The Azure portal displays the Overview page for your new app.
In the left app menu, click API permissions.
On the API permissions page, click Add a permission.
In the Request API permissions panel, click Microsoft Graph, and then click Application permissions.
Important. In Select permissions:
Type directory, expand Directory and select Directory.Read.All
Type audit, expand AuditLog and select AuditLog.Read.All
Click Add permissions.
On the API permissions page, click Grant admin consent for {Default Directory}, and then click Yes when prompted to confirm consent.
Note that Default Directory might have a different name in your environment.
Step 2. Get your Tenant Domain value
You need to get the Tenant Domain value from Entra ID so that you can integrate it into Identity Protection. This is the internal domain configured for the Azure account. Notice that this domain is different from the actual external domain assigned to the account.
For example, your external domain might be example.com, but your tenant domain might be example.onmicrosoft.com.
To get this value from Entra ID:
In your Azure portal, open the left portal menu, and then click Microsoft Entra ID.
On the left menu, click Overview, select the Overview tab, and make a note of the Primary domain value. For example, example.onmicrosoft.com.
You will use this value as the Tenant Domain during Step 5. Configure the Microsoft Entra ID connector in Identity Protection.
Step 3. Get your Application ID and Application Secret values
You need to get these values from Entra ID so that you can integrate it into Identity Protection.
Application ID: The identifier of the application created for this integration
Application Secret: The secret key of the application created for this integration
To get these values from Entra ID:
In your Azure portal, open the left portal menu, and then click Microsoft Entra ID.
On the left menu, click App registrations, and then select the application you created earlier. For example, "Identity Protection Connector".
In the left app menu, click Overview.
Make a note of the Application (client) ID value. You will use this value as the Client ID during Step 5. Configure the Microsoft Entra ID connector in Identity Protection.
In the left app menu, click Certificates & secrets.
In Client secrets, click New client secret.
In Description, enter useful notes about the purpose of the secret, for example, "Identity Protection Secret".
In Expires, select the length of time that the client secret is valid for. For example, 6 months.
Click Add.
Make a note of the generated Value. You will use this value as the Application Secret during Step 5. Configure the Microsoft Entra ID connector in Identity Protection.
Step 4. Create a custom role with access to read RBAC properties
To display information about Azure RBAC role assignments in Identity Protection, you need to grant the application permission to read the RBAC definitions and assignments.
It is recommended to create a custom role with the minimal permissions to read RBAC properties, and assign it to the application.
In your Azure portal, go to Management groups.
Click Tenant Root Group.
Select Access control (IAM) and then click Roles.
Click Add, and then select Add custom role.
On the Basics tab, enter a name and description for the custom role.
On the Permissions tab, add the following permissions to the custom role:
Microsoft.Authorization/roleDefinitions/read
Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/read
Click Review + create, check the new custom role, and then click Create.
To assign the custom role to the application you created earlier:
In your Azure portal, go to Management groups.
Click Tenant Root Group.
Select Access control (IAM) and then click Role assignments.
Click Add, and then select Add role assignment.
On the Role tab, select your new custom role.
On the Members tab, click Select members, locate the application you created earlier, for example "Identity Protection Connector", and then click Select.
Click Review + assign, check the new assignment to your app, and then click Review + assign again.
Step 5. Configure the Microsoft Entra ID connector in Identity Protection
In the Falcon console, go to Identity Protection > Configure > Connectors.
From the Select connector menu, in the IDAAS category, select Entra and then click Add.
In the connector settings, specify the values that you obtained from Entra ID:
Tenant Domain. Such as example.onmicrosoft.com
Application ID. Such as b879bb83-3rec-6jdc-9fbf-b3d673895e95
Application Secret. Such as BVZqLdFK1B....rnH8xjDrV9
To collect user and application sign-in activity for the tenant using the API, enable Collect Sign-In data.
If you are not interested in collecting sign-in based data or did not grant the above mentioned permissions, disable Collect Sign-In data.
Click Save.
This feature allows you to extend Identity Protection’s threat detection capabilities to all of your cloud applications protected by Okta, enabling the scenario where Identity Protection correlates SSO activities to the hybrid user accounts.
The following procedure covers the Identity connector for data ingestion. For more info about configuring response actions in Fusion SOAR, see Integrate with Okta for response actions.
Before starting the integration, make sure that the following prerequisites are met:
You have created an API token with the Read-Only Admin permission in your Okta instance that Identity Protection can use to authenticate to Okta APIs.
For more information about Okta API tokens and permissions, see these pages in the Okta developer documentation:
In the Falcon console, go to Identity Protection > Configure > Connectors.
From the Select Connector field, select Okta and then click Add.
In the Okta data connector:
In the Domain field, enter the URL of your organization’s Okta portal.
In the Token field, enter the Okta API token that has the Read-Only Admin permission.
After the connector is added and configured, Identity Protection automatically ingests data from Okta and begins displaying the cloud-based information.
OpenID Connect is an interoperable authentication protocol based on the OAuth 2.0 framework. It simplifies verifying the identity of users by using an Authorization Server to perform authentication and obtain user profile information. In these integrations, Falcon acts as an Authorization Server.
You can use OIDC integrations to add dynamic, risk-based prevention capabilities (allow, step-up authentication, and block) to third party, single sign-on (SSO) providers.
Improve your Microsoft Entra ID security posture with Entra ID external authentication method (EAM) OIDC integration in Falcon. For more info, see Manage an external authentication method in Microsoft Entra ID.
To integrate Identity Protection with Entra ID EAM, follow these steps:
Step 1. Create a Falcon OIDC client for Entra EAM
Step 1. Create a Falcon OIDC client for Entra EAM
Step 2. Create an Entra ID external authentication method
Create an external authentication method in your Entra ID tenant. For more info, see Manage an external authentication method in Microsoft Entra ID.
Step 3. Configure your Microsoft MFA policy
Improve your Okta security posture with Okta external authentication method (EAM) OIDC integration in Falcon. For more info, see Okta SSO.
Before starting the integration, make sure that the following prerequisites are met:
To integrate Identity Protection with Okta, follow these steps:
Step 1. Create a Falcon OIDC client for Okta
Step 1. Create a Falcon OIDC client for Okta
https://<tenant name>/oauth2/v1/authorize/callbackStep 2. Create an Identity provider in Okta
Step 3. Create an authenticator in Okta
Use the Risk Configuration page to view and configure Compromised Password Detection for your network.
The Compromised Password Detection feature identifies passwords on Microsoft AD that the system determines were previously compromised. This detection happens on the Domain Controller, so the passwords never leave the DC.
By default the Compromised Password Detection feature is enabled and set to use all its dictionaries to detect compromised passwords. Disabling this feature clears the set of currently detected Compromised Passwords and prevents the future detection of compromised passwords. If any Compromised Password Detection functionality is disabled, Identity Protection reevaluates the risk value assigned to all affected entities.
You can manage these Compromised Password Detection dictionaries:
HaveIBeenPwned dictionary
Custom Passphrases dictionary
The Compromised Password Detection feature integrates the HaveIBeenPwned dictionary that aggregates information about compromised and breached personal data. Identity Protection uses the offline version of the dictionary, so the passwords are not exposed to the Internet.
The ability to include the HaveIBeenPwned verification into a standard password check is enabled by default and can be disabled at any time
You can add words to the Custom Passphrases dictionary. For example, the names of local sports teams. The system uses these words to test the end user’s password strength.
You can increase the volume of passphrases and passwords contained in the Custom Passphrases dictionary by periodically uploading files that contain additional words.
To add words and passphrases to the customized password dictionary:
Prepare a text file (.txt) that contains one word per line. Identity Protection matches the individual words in the file.
In the Compromised Password Detection section, click Edit Configuration Settings.
The Compromised Password Detection page opens.
In the Custom Passphrases section, select the Active check box to use the Custom Passphrases dictionary.
Click Add Words, browse to the text file, and click Open.
The file is uploaded and the Custom Passphrases dictionary is incremented with the new words.
A confirmation message displays the number of words that were successfully loaded and the total number of words contained in the dictionary is displayed.
Identity Protection detects a wide range of potential risks to your organization's security posture and uses them to calculate the risk score for entities.
You can disable specific risk factors so that they do not contribute to risk scores, and are no longer added to the risk factor lists. For example, if you are following NIST recommendations and are enforcing strong passwords in your organization, you could potentially disable detection of the Insufficient Password Rotation risk factor.
Disabling risk factors does not affect related attributes and privileges. For example, disabling the Stealthy Privilege risk factor does not remove the Stealthy Administrators privilege from an entity, it only alters risk score calculations. Similarly, insights that rely on attributes rather than risk factors, such as stale accounts, remain unchanged when disabling a risk factor.
The effects of changing the risk configuration can take a long time to propagate. It could take several days for the Falcon console to fully reflect the updated risk factor list and relevant risk scores.
To disable detection for specific risk factors:
Go to Identity protection > Configure > Risk configuration.
In Risks Management, disable the Hide enabled switch to see all the available risks factors.
Tip: Use the search field to filter the list of risk factors.
To disable a risk factor, disable the switch next to its name and click Save.
A confirmation message appears.
To apply your changes, click Disable Anyway.
The Settings tab enables you to configure miscellaneous parameters.
Each of these parameters is described in the table below.
| Setting | Description |
|---|---|
|
Audit Log |
Enables you to view the audit log (see Audit Log). |
|
Time Zone |
Enables you to set the time zone (see Time Zone). |
|
View Preferences |
Enables you to select if you want to sort incidents according to their creation time. |
|
Threat Hunter feed |
Enables you to add routine queries for LDAP search events. Turning this on will significantly increase the total event quantity and could slow down analytics. |
|
MFA Branding |
Enables you to customize the logo that appears in the MFA application. |
|
Business Privileges |
Enables you to define different business privileges and the impact these privileges have. You can apply business privileges to users and groups. |
The Notifications area enables you to configure what email notifications are sent by Identity Protection. Email notifications are available for all detection types.
Notification emails can contain sensitive identifying information about your environment, such as host names. For security reasons, we recommend using email addresses from only the domains that you control. Using email addresses from domains outside of your control could introduce security risks.
Consider who should receive notifications to support your broader incident-response process. Email notifications can serve as important alerts about suspicious activity and potential attacks.
Click Email Notifications.
In the Edit Email Notifications dialog, specify this info:
Enable Email Notifications: Select this check box to enable email notifications.
Recipients: Specify one or more email addresses that receive the email notifications.
CC Recipients: Specify one or more email addresses that are carbon copied on email notifications.
Include All: Select this check box to initiate an email notification for all types of detection.
Include: Specify the individual detection types that initiate an email notification. This option is not available if Include All is selected.
Severity: Specify the severity level the detection must meet to initiate an email notification.
Click Save.
Click View Audit Log to display the audit log, which tracks logins, logouts and configuration changes. You can download a CSV version of the log by clicking CSV. The following audit log events are recorded:
3rd Party API Integration Status Changed
A user admin modified exceptions for an alert
Advanced Notification Configuration Modified
Alert Exceptions Configuration Modified
Connector Configuration Added / Deleted / Modified
Policy Applied
Policy Rule Added / Deleted / Modified
Policy Rules Reordered
Sensor Activated / Unpaired / Modified
Select the required time zone from the drop-down list in the Time Zone area. This selection affects only Identity Protection system operations, such as reports. It can also affect Threat Hunter search results, if the Time Zone value in the search criteria is set to Use System Time Zone.
Any other date or time that appears in Identity Protection is based on the browser settings.
You can add your own text and logo to the Falcon Identity Protection MFA notification. This helps to reflect an organization's brand and consequently build improved trust with users.
Required image properties
Image size must be 170px by 40px
Formatted as PNG
Transparent background
Text properties
Maximum of 2 lines
Maximum of 70 characters per line.
To customize the MFA UI with your brand:
In the MFA Branding section click Upload File.
Browse for and select the image file.
A green check mark and the message Uploaded is displayed when the file is successfully uploaded.
Enter text in the two text boxes.
Click Save.
To delete a saved image:
Click the Remove trash can to the right of Upload File.
Click Save.
Use Business Privileges to augment the underlying permissions assigned to your users and groups. For example, perhaps you have a number of users that have admin access to your social media platform, but that platform doesn't use Active Directory permissions. You can add these users to a custom Business Privilege.
Adding users or groups to custom Business Privileges marks those users as privileged. For example, they will show up in Privileged identities. You can also create policy rules that apply to users with a business privilege applied, by using the User privileges condition with the Business Privileged value.
Adding a Business Privilege to an entity that was not already privileged creates a Privileged Escalation event which shows on the entity's timeline, as well as in Threat Hunter.
You must specify the Impact of a business privilege. The impact represents your assessment of the potential damage that could be caused if the accounts in the business privilege were compromised. Available values are Low, Medium, and High. Higher impact values increase the probability that the severity of an alert involving the business privilege is higher.
In the Falcon Console, go to Identity protection > Configure > Settings.
In Business Privileges, enter a Name, select the Impact level, and click Add.
The business privilege is added to the list.
In the Groups / Users field, enter the user or group to add to the privilege, and then select it from the drop-down that appears.
To remove a user or group, click the delete (x) icon.
To change the Impact, select a new value from the list.
To rename a business privilege, enter the new name over the existing value in the Name column.
Note: Changes are automatically saved, there is no need to manually save your changes.
When the Falcon Cloud needs to contact a third-party service, such as an Identity as a Service (IDaaS) or multi-factor authentication (MFA) provider, the connection uses one of the following IP addresses, depending on which cloud region you are using:
| US-1 | US-2 | EU-1 | US-GOV-1 |
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
|
|
|
If necessary, configure the allowlists in your third-party services to accept inbound connections from these IP addresses.
You might also see these IP addresses in the logs of third-party services.
When integrating with ForgeRock MFA, save the following code snippet as a JSON file and import into ForgeRock as a journey. See Configure the ForgeRock journey.
{
"trees": {
"IdP-MFA": {
"tree": {
"_id": "IdP-MFA",
"_rev": "1347757709",
"identityResource": "managed/alpha_user",
"entryNodeId": "6c85818b-829a-467c-9cde-b6a73a9aae9f",
"nodes": {
"6c85818b-829a-467c-9cde-b6a73a9aae9f": {
"x": 203,
"y": 229.015625,
"connections": {
"outcome": "873fe4de-977e-4d92-9e42-8a97c80c1186"
},
"nodeType": "PageNode",
"displayName": "Page Node"
},
"873fe4de-977e-4d92-9e42-8a97c80c1186": {
"x": 466,
"y": 237.015625,
"connections": {
"push": "42fe551e-a6eb-4b02-8f3b-5576ee7191c3",
"otp": "665ad0a0-cba0-479e-b55b-802e1573b13c"
},
"nodeType": "ChoiceCollectorNode",
"displayName": "Auth Method"
},
"42fe551e-a6eb-4b02-8f3b-5576ee7191c3": {
"x": 709,
"y": 35.015625,
"connections": {
"SENT": "815fa9f7-e44a-4d31-af44-77136df24ac8",
"NOT_REGISTERED": "e301438c-0bd0-429c-ab0c-66126501069a"
},
"nodeType": "PushAuthenticationSenderNode",
"displayName": "Push Sender"
},
"665ad0a0-cba0-479e-b55b-802e1573b13c": {
"x": 703,
"y": 458.015625,
"connections": {
"successOutcome": "70e691a5-1e33-4ac3-a356-e7b6d60d92e0",
"failureOutcome": "e301438c-0bd0-429c-ab0c-66126501069a",
"notRegisteredOutcome": "e301438c-0bd0-429c-ab0c-66126501069a"
},
"nodeType": "OathTokenVerifierNode",
"displayName": "OATH Token Verifier"
},
"ae41bb71-b20f-4b32-9c58-bdf39fbd8423": {
"x": 1217,
"y": 23.015625,
"connections": {
"TRUE": "70e691a5-1e33-4ac3-a356-e7b6d60d92e0",
"FALSE": "e301438c-0bd0-429c-ab0c-66126501069a",
"WAITING": "815fa9f7-e44a-4d31-af44-77136df24ac8"
},
"nodeType": "PushResultVerifierNode",
"displayName": "Push Result Verifier Node"
},
"815fa9f7-e44a-4d31-af44-77136df24ac8": {
"x": 955,
"y": 35.015625,
"connections": {
"DONE": "ae41bb71-b20f-4b32-9c58-bdf39fbd8423"
},
"nodeType": "PushWaitNode",
"displayName": "Push Wait Node"
}
},
"staticNodes": {
"startNode": {
"x": 50,
"y": 250
},
"70e691a5-1e33-4ac3-a356-e7b6d60d92e0": {
"x": 1593,
"y": 285
},
"e301438c-0bd0-429c-ab0c-66126501069a": {
"x": 1592,
"y": 451
}
},
"enabled": true
},
"nodes": {
"6c85818b-829a-467c-9cde-b6a73a9aae9f": {
"_id": "6c85818b-829a-467c-9cde-b6a73a9aae9f",
"_rev": "-1603110960",
"nodes": [
{
"_id": "5e6bf0e8-3b73-46be-9439-3378b21d28ef",
"nodeType": "ValidatedUsernameNode",
"displayName": "Platform Username"
}
],
"pageDescription": {},
"pageHeader": {},
"_type": {
"_id": "PageNode",
"name": "Page Node",
"collection": true
},
"_outcomes": [
{
"id": "outcome",
"displayName": "Outcome"
}
]
},
"873fe4de-977e-4d92-9e42-8a97c80c1186": {
"_id": "873fe4de-977e-4d92-9e42-8a97c80c1186",
"_rev": "1265893229",
"defaultChoice": "push",
"choices": [
"push",
"otp"
],
"prompt": "Choose your preferred auth method",
"_type": {
"_id": "ChoiceCollectorNode",
"name": "Choice Collector",
"collection": true
},
"_outcomes": [
{
"id": "push",
"displayName": "push"
},
{
"id": "otp",
"displayName": "otp"
}
]
},
"42fe551e-a6eb-4b02-8f3b-5576ee7191c3": {
"_id": "42fe551e-a6eb-4b02-8f3b-5576ee7191c3",
"_rev": "1648942848",
"contextInfo": false,
"userMessage": {},
"pushType": "DEFAULT",
"customPayload": [],
"messageTimeout": 300000,
"mandatory": true,
"_type": {
"_id": "PushAuthenticationSenderNode",
"name": "Push Sender",
"collection": true
},
"_outcomes": [
{
"id": "SENT",
"displayName": "Sent"
},
{
"id": "NOT_REGISTERED",
"displayName": "Not Registered"
}
]
},
"665ad0a0-cba0-479e-b55b-802e1573b13c": {
"_id": "665ad0a0-cba0-479e-b55b-802e1573b13c",
"_rev": "-568668431",
"totpTimeInterval": 30,
"totpTimeSteps": 2,
"maximumAllowedClockDrift": 5,
"totpHashAlgorithm": "HMAC_SHA1",
"isRecoveryCodeAllowed": false,
"algorithm": "TOTP",
"hotpWindowSize": 100,
"_type": {
"_id": "OathTokenVerifierNode",
"name": "OATH Token Verifier",
"collection": true
},
"_outcomes": [
{
"id": "successOutcome",
"displayName": "Success"
},
{
"id": "failureOutcome",
"displayName": "Failure"
},
{
"id": "notRegisteredOutcome",
"displayName": "Not registered"
}
]
},
"ae41bb71-b20f-4b32-9c58-bdf39fbd8423": {
"_id": "ae41bb71-b20f-4b32-9c58-bdf39fbd8423",
"_rev": "876270017",
"_type": {
"_id": "PushResultVerifierNode",
"name": "Push Result Verifier Node",
"collection": true
},
"_outcomes": [
{
"id": "TRUE",
"displayName": "Success"
},
{
"id": "FALSE",
"displayName": "Failure"
},
{
"id": "EXPIRED",
"displayName": "Expired"
},
{
"id": "WAITING",
"displayName": "Waiting"
}
]
},
"815fa9f7-e44a-4d31-af44-77136df24ac8": {
"_id": "815fa9f7-e44a-4d31-af44-77136df24ac8",
"_rev": "-2033408293",
"challengeMessage": {},
"exitMessage": {},
"waitingMessage": {},
"secondsToWait": 3,
"_type": {
"_id": "PushWaitNode",
"name": "Push Wait Node",
"collection": true
},
"_outcomes": [
{
"id": "DONE",
"displayName": "Done"
},
{
"id": "EXITED",
"displayName": "Exit"
}
]
}
},
"innerNodes": {
"5e6bf0e8-3b73-46be-9439-3378b21d28ef": {
"_id": "5e6bf0e8-3b73-46be-9439-3378b21d28ef",
"_rev": "-1312641141",
"usernameAttribute": "userName",
"validateInput": false,
"_type": {
"_id": "ValidatedUsernameNode",
"name": "Platform Username",
"collection": true
},
"_outcomes": [
{
"id": "outcome",
"displayName": "Outcome"
}
]
}
},
"scripts": {},
"emailTemplates": {},
"socialIdentityProviders": {},
"themes": [],
"saml2Entities": {},
"circlesOfTrust": {}
}
}
}
Define rules that determine what actions to take in response to certain triggers observed in your environment.
The Policy Rules page is used to define a number of rules that determine what actions to take in response to certain triggers observed in your environment. These triggers can be authentication requests, alerts, or account changes, such as updating your password.
Each rule can have a set of conditions that must be met for the rule to apply. The combination of these rules forms your Identity Protection policy.
Each rule in your policy is made up of the following three components:
Trigger: Defines what invokes the rule.
Conditions: Any number of requirements that must be met for the rule to apply.
Actions: Defines what the rule does when its trigger occurs and all its conditions are met.
A trigger defines how the security rule is invoked.
There are 5 types of triggers:
Access: Triggers when access occurs. For example, accessing a server or connecting to a workstation.
Use conditions to control exactly the circumstances required for a policy rule to be applied. For example, you can include or exclude certain users or endpoints.
There is no limit to the number of conditions that you can apply to a rule. You can also use the same condition twice in a rule. In this case one use of the condition can use Include and the other can use Exclude. They can’t both have the same include or exclude values.
This table lists the different conditions that can be applied to rules, and which triggers they are available to:
| Condition | Description | Access trigger | Cloud access trigger | Federated access trigger |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Access type |
Filter based on the access type, such as Authentication, Remote desktop, or Logon.
Note: The Logon trigger should be used for 3rd party RDP clients and interactive console logins such as VMWare console access.
You can also enter custom values to filter by service-related access type:
|
Yes |
||
|
Baseline |
Filter based on how a user normally accesses the system, such as User owns or regularly uses the source endpoint. |
Yes |
Yes |
|
| Cloud data source | Filter based on their cloud data source, which can be any of the following:
|
Yes | ||
|
Data source |
Filter based on federated access that is managed by the specified identity provider, such as PingFederate or AD FS. |
Yes |
||
| DC domain |
Filter based on the DC domain. Note: This condition is only supported for exclusions. |
Yes | ||
|
Destination address |
Filter destinations based on the hostname of the endpoint, or the hostname if it is a web address. When the destination is an endpoint, select the endpoint's hostname. When the destination is a web address, select the hostname part of the URL. Note: When the destination is a web address, it is only shown in the drop-down list if it is defined as part of an HTTP class SPN in the active directory. |
Yes |
||
|
Destination application |
Filter destinations based on the application being accessed. |
Yes (Okta only) |
Yes |
|
|
Destination attribute |
Filter destinations based on their attributes. The attribute can be any of the following:
|
Yes |
||
| Destination domain |
Filter based on the destination domain. Note: This condition is only supported for exclusions. |
Yes | ||
|
Destination group |
Filter destinations based on the AD groups they are a member of. |
Yes |
||
|
Destination name |
Filter destinations based on their name. |
Yes |
||
|
Destination OU |
Filter destinations based on their organizational unit (OU). |
Yes |
||
|
Destination risk severity |
Adaptively filter destinations based on their risk severity. Select a range covering one or more of Low, Medium, and High. |
Yes |
||
|
Destination role |
Filter destinations based on their classified role. The available roles are workstation or server, and any of their sub types. Note: The destination must not be "in learning". |
Yes |
||
|
Destination ZTA score |
Filter destinations based on their Zero Trust Assessment (ZTA) score. Specify a range using values between 1 (insecure) and 100 (secure). |
Yes |
||
|
Protocol |
Filter based on the protocol type used. Possible values include:
|
Yes |
||
|
Site |
Filter based on the active directory sites on which they occur. Each activity occurs on a specific domain controller, so can be associated with a specific site. |
Yes |
||
|
Source attribute |
Filter sources based on their attributes. The attribute can be any of the following:
Note: Falcon installed is supported for Windows and macOS hosts that are in a domain that is managed by Identity Protection. Falcon installed is also supported for mobile hosts when using the Cloud access trigger. |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Source country |
Filter sources based on the country they are located in. |
Yes |
Yes |
|
| Source domain |
Filter based on the source domain. Note: This condition is only supported for exclusions. |
Yes | Yes | Yes |
|
Source group |
Filter sources based on their group. |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Source name |
Filter sources based on their name. |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Source network label |
Filter sources based on their network label. |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Source network type |
Filter sources based on properties of the underlying network activity that occurred when the condition was evaluated. Note: Only applies to the source endpoint. |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Source OU |
Filter sources based on their organizational unit (OU). |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Source risk severity |
Adaptively filter sources based on their risk severity. Select a range covering one or more of Low, Medium, and High. |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Source role |
Filter sources based on their classified role. The available roles are workstation or server and any of their sub types. Note: Source must not be "in learning". |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Source ZTA score |
Filter sources based on their Zero Trust Assessment (ZTA) score. Specify a range using values between 1 (insecure) and 100 (secure). |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Time |
Filter based on time, according to a set of configured attributes, such as:
General behavior
When selected, All day overrides the hour range options. |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
User attribute |
Filter users based on their attributes. The attribute can be any of the following:
Note: The attribute refers both to a user and a destination but is considered a user attribute. The user is considered to have a session on a destination after they log in to the destination. The session terminates some time after the user logs off from the machine. |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
User department |
Filter users based on their department. |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
| User domain |
Filter users based on their domain. Note: This condition is only supported for exclusions. |
Yes | Yes | Yes |
|
User group |
Filter users based on their group. |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
User name |
Filter users based on their name. |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
User OU |
Filter users based on their organizational unit (OU). |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
User privilege |
Filter users based on their privileges. The following are examples of privileged users:
|
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
User risk severity |
Adaptively filter users based on their Risk severity. Select a range covering one or more of Low, Medium, and High. |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
User type |
Filter users based on their type, which can be any of the following:
|
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
The action defines what the rule does when its trigger occurs, and all its conditions are met.
For example, you might want to block the user event that triggered the rule, audit the event, or require that the user performs additional verification.
The list of available actions are described below. Note that actions available in a rule are dependent on the trigger used.
| Action | Description | Dependencies |
|---|---|---|
|
Apply SSO Policy |
Okta Enables you to choose the specific SSO policy applied to the involved users, based on the SSO group policy available in the selected connector.To automatically remove the users from the policy group when the issue is closed (Auto Resolved, Resolved, Acknowledge & Trust), enable the option Unapply SSO Policy in the advanced settings. |
Okta
|
|
Add to Watch List |
Adds the source user to a watch list (the user is marked as watched by the system) and allows the activity to continue. |
None. |
|
Audit |
Audits the activity, and allows it to continue. |
None. |
|
Block |
Blocks the activity from continuing. |
Requires inline sensors. |
|
Identity Verification |
Performs an MFA against the source user (or its authorizer) and based on the result it performs an Audit/Block.
|
|
|
Reset Password |
Requires that users change their password when they next log in. Available in rules that use the Account Event or Alert triggers. |
|
You can manage Identity Protection rules by adding, editing, or duplicating rules. You can also modify the order in which the rules are processed.
You can add a new policy rule from one of the templates provided, or by duplicating an existing policy rule and then editing it with your new requirements. You can also create a rule from scratch.
For more info, see Identity Protection Use Cases.
To manage Identity Protection rules programmatically, see Identity Protection Policy Rules APIs
Go to Identity protection > Enforce > Policy rules, and click Add Rule.
In the Rule Name box, enter a name for the rule.
Optionally, select a Template from the list.
For details of the templates supplied with the application, see Use rule templates.
The Template drop-down list shows all the predefined templates supplied with the system, as well as other user defined rules that you can use as templates for the new rule you are creating.
From the Trigger drop-down list, select the event that triggers the rule.
Note: if you selected an existing template, the trigger is determined by that template and cannot be altered.
Click Next.
The rule details open up for editing.
Modify the following fields as required:
Rule Name: Modify the rule name, as required.
Action: From the Action drop-down list, select an action.
Connector: From the Connector drop-down list, select a connector.
Conditions: Modify or delete the conditions, as required. If you want to add new conditions, click Add rule condition. See Add rule conditions.
In the Advanced area, configure the following fields as required. Note that the presence of advanced settings depends on which action the rule performs.
Simulation mode: Enable simulation mode to evaluate the effects of the policy rule without risking any disruption to network traffic.
When Simulation mode is enabled, the Analytics audit log indicates when the policy matched, but was not actually enforced.
For example, MFA would have been required but was not requested.
Notify: Select this check box if you want to send an email notification on every rule match. To avoid email flooding, it is recommended to only use this feature on rules that are rarely expected to match. Separate multiple recipients using commas.
Prompt for user identification: Configure how often you want to prompt for user identification. For more info, see Session Management in the Identity Protection Policy.
You can select from:
Every time
Once a session
At most once per 24 hours
At most once per 7 days
At most once per 30 days
And apply these settings in the context of:
User + Source + Destination
User + Source
User
Fail mode: Applies to sensors in Enforcement mode, and allows you to override the default global fail mode settings. For more info, see Fail mode. To override the default settings, select Custom. You can then choose whether to Allow or Block authentication when any of these errors occurs:
MFA timeout: a timeout occurred when performing the MFA action
User Not Enrolled: could not match the user with an account enrolled with the MFA provider
Service Error: an unknown error occurred when attempting the MFA action, for example there may be temporary communication issues, or an internal error occurred in one of the related components. Note: we highly recommend that you set the fail mode for Service Error to Allow. This will ensure business continuity in the case of communication issues with the Falcon Cloud or with the MFA provider.
Enable On Screen Notification: Selected by default as this is mandatory when user interaction is required (for example, MFA method selection, one-time password input).
Group: Select a group of rules for your new rule, or create a new group. For example, you might want to group all your access rules together in a group.
Create alert on any rule match: Select if you want to create an alert, and then select the severity level at which you want to be alerted (High, Medium or Low).
Click Save.
The rule is saved, and set to Enabled.
To save the changes to your identity protection policy, on the Policy rules page, click Apply All Changes.
You can view a policy’s rule details and also edit a rule by adding more conditions to the rule. You can delete conditions that you have added, but you cannot delete any default conditions, if set.
On the Manage Rules tab of the Policy page, locate the rule whose details you want to edit.
Select the vertical ellipsis icon to the right of a rule, and then click Edit.
Note: You can also open the Edit Rule page by clicking Edit when you view a rule.
The Edit Rule page appears.
Modify the rule, as required. For example, add rule conditions.
Click Save.
The rule is saved, and set to Enabled.
To save the changes to your identity protection policy, on the Policy rules page, click Apply All Changes.
You can add new conditions to a rule. Any condition that you add to a rule can be deleted, but you cannot delete any condition that was part of the rule's template.
To edit a policy rule by adding new conditions:
On the Edit Rule page, click Add rule condition.
A new condition is added to the rule.
Click the arrow to the right of the condition to show a list of available conditions for that rule.
Select the required condition.
Select if you want the condition to Include or Exclude the values you are about to add in the next step.
In the At least one area, click the plus icon on the right of the condition, and add the required details according to the selected condition.
Click Save to save the rule.
The rule is saved, and set to Enabled.
To save the changes to your identity protection policy, on the Policy rules page, click Apply All Changes.
On the Policy rules page, locate the rule to delete.
Select the vertical ellipsis icon to the right of a rule, and then click Delete.
To save the changes to your identity protection policy, on the Policy rules page, click Apply All Changes.
You can copy a policy rule and then modify the copy to create a slightly different rule.
On the Policy rules page, locate the rule whose details you want to duplicate.
Select the vertical ellipsis icon to the right of a rule, and then click Duplicate above or Duplicate below.
The rule is duplicated and placed above or below the rule you duplicated.
If you want to edit the duplicated rule, select the vertical ellipsis icon to the right of a rule, and then click Edit.
To save the changes to your identity protection policy, on the Policy rules page, click Apply All Changes.
Policy rules are evaluated in the order in which they appear in the Manage Rules tab, from top to bottom.
If you have organized the policy rules into groups, they are evaluated in the order in which the groups appear on the page. Policy rules within the group are evaluated in the order in which they appear in the group.
You can intersperse policies and groups on the page, but the underlying evaluation process remains that policy rules are evaluated from top to bottom (including through groups).
If there are multiple rules with the same trigger, the first rule whose conditions are met is invoked and the others are skipped.
For example, suppose Rule A applies to all users with action "Block" and Rule B applies only to a specific user group with action "Identity Verification", if the connection belongs to that specific user group:
If Rule A is first, then it is invoked and the user is blocked. Rule B is skipped.
If Rule B is first, then it is invoked and the user is challenged with MFA. Rule A is skipped.
The following procedure specifically describes how to change the order of policy rules in the Manage Rules tab. The same procedure should be applied if you want to change the order of groups on the page and policies within each group.
To move a rule/group to a new position in the list:
On the Policy rules page, locate the policy rule you want to move.
Drag and drop the rule into the new position in the list.
To save the changes to your identity protection policy, on the Policy rules page, click Apply All Changes.
You can see details of which of your DC servers have been updated with the changes you make to policy rules, and when.
To view the details of policy rule distribution:
In Rule Distribution, click View Distribution Status.
In the DC Servers panel you can:
Sort a column by clicking the heading.
View details of a domain controller by clicking its name.
Export the results to a comma-separated file by clicking CSV.
View the exact time a domain controller was updated by hovering over the Date Applied value.
Falcon Identity Protection allows you to enforce MFA as part of your policy rules. You can apply MFA to a number of different triggers, allowing risk-based step-up authentication scenarios.
To enable MFA in a policy rule, you must meet these requirements:
Have at least one MFA connector configured in Falcon Identity Protection.
Have sensors installed on all Domain Controllers in the domain.
Have all sensors in Inline mode.
If you’re integrating with Falcon for Mobile to use FalconID for MFA, see FalconID for setup and configuration instructions.
Create an Identity Protection policy rule that enforces MFA.
In the Falcon console, go to Identity protection > Enforce > Policy rules , and click Add Rule.
Provide a Rule Name.
From the Trigger menu, select a trigger, and then click Next.
From the Action menu, select Identity Verification.
From the Connector menu, select the MFA connector to use.
If you select Any, the user is presented with the identity verification dialog, allowing them to choose which of the configured connectors to use for MFA:
Configure the remainder of the policy rule as required, and then click Save.
Falcon Identity Protection allows external integration applications such as PingFederate to enforce and manage MFA based on Identity Verification recommendations that the CrowdStrike Adapter provides.
To delegate enforcement of MFA you must:
Define a policy rule in Falcon Identity Protection to respond to a Federated Access trigger, and return the recommendation to the external integration.
Configure an authentication policy in the integrated external application to handle the possible results.
The identity verification results that a CrowdStrike Adapter can provide and the recommended follow up actions are:
| Identity Verification Result | Description | Recommended Action |
|---|---|---|
|
Fail |
An error occurred. |
Block |
|
Approve |
The CrowdStrike engine suggests allowing access. |
Allow |
|
Deny |
The CrowdStrike engine suggests blocking the log-in. |
Block |
|
Review |
The CrowdStrike engine suggests additional scrutiny before providing approval or denial. |
Confirm identity using MFA |
In the Falcon console, go to Identity protection > Enforce > Policy rules, and click Add Rule.
Set a meaningful name in the Rule Name text field.
From the Template drop-down menu select None.
From the Trigger drop-down menu select Federated access and then click Next.
From the Action drop-down menu select Identity Verification.
From the Enforced by drop-down menu select External.
Add any conditions for which the rule is enacted and then click Save.
You are now ready to create an authentication rule in your integrated external application to handle the possible results provided by Falcon. For an example, see Configuring PingFederate integration.
You can set Falcon Identity Protection to determine the action to take when the primary authentication is successful but the MFA provider is unreachable or the action has timed out.
You can see details of which of your DC servers have been updated with the changes you make to policy settings, and when.
To view the details of policy settings distribution:
In Settings Distribution, click View Distribution Status.
In the DC Servers panel you can:
Sort a column by clicking the heading.
View details of a domain controller by clicking its name.
Export the results to a comma-separated file by clicking CSV.
View the exact time a domain controller was updated by hovering over the Date Applied value.
The Settings tab on the Policy page enables you to set the following global rule settings:
Fail mode: Defines the actions that Falcon Identity Protection takes when the MFA provider produces errors.
Fallback Identity Verification Connector: Enables you to select a connector that supports the Push method. This connector is used as a fallback in case the on-screen notification cannot be displayed or is manually terminated.
MFA UI Fallback Timeout: Enables you to set the period of time in which users can respond to the MFA UI before it times out.
Fail mode applies to inline sensors and is the action that Falcon Identity Protection must take when the primary authentication is successful but an error occurs.
You can choose whether to allow or block authentication when any of these errors occurs:
MFA timeout: a timeout occurred when performing the MFA action
User Or Authorizer Not Enrolled: could not match the user or authorizer with an account enrolled with the MFA provider
Service Error: an unknown error occurred when attempting the MFA action, for example there may be temporary communication issues, or an internal error occurred in one of the related components.
Examples of service errors includes:
Communication problems between Identity Protection and the MFA provider
Communication problems between the Falcon sensor and the CrowdStrike Cloud. Check that your deployment meets the Networking requirements. For more info, see Networking requirements.
Internal errors in the MFA provider. Check the service status of the provider.
Internal errors in the Falcon sensor
Internal errors in the CrowdStrike Cloud
Note: We highly recommend that you set the fail mode for Service Error to Allow. This will ensure business continuity in the case of communication issues with the Falcon Cloud or with the MFA provider.
To set the global fail mode for each error type:
In the Falcon console, go to Identity protection > Enforce > Policy settings.
Select Allow or Block independently for each MFA action
Click Apply to save your selection.
You can also specify the fail mode in individual policy rules. The fail mode specified in a rule overrides the global settings above. For information on creating policy rules, see Manage Identity Protection rules.
In case the on-screen notification cannot be displayed for some reason (for example, unsupported operating system, or incorrect version of Internet Explorer) or is manually terminated, a connector that supports the Push method can be used for identity verification. To define such a connector, use the Fallback Identity Verification Connector drop-down list. The default setting is None.
If you are enrolled for more than one authentication method, you are asked which authentication method you want to use. In order for the fallback identity verification connector to work, you must select Any.
The MFA UI Fallback Timeout provides you with the capability to refine the period of time that a user has to respond when prompted for input by the Falcon Identity Verification Dialog. The MFA UI Fallback Timeout period is measured in terms of Seconds and has the following limits:
Minimum value = 10 seconds
Maximum value = 90 seconds
To set the MFA UI Fallback Timeout period:
In the Falcon console, go to Identity protection > Enforce > Policy settings.
Enter a value in the MFA UI Fallback Timeout text box.
Click Save.
Every rule is logged to the Analytics tab. By default, only matched rules are shown. You can show the unmatched rules by clicking Show Unmatched Rules (located at the top right of the page).
The Analytics tab includes the following sections:
The top section lists the matched rules for the selected time period (selected at the top right of the page). By default, details of all matched rules are listed in the lower section of the page. If you click one of the matched rules in the top section of the page, the details for that rule are displayed in the lower section.
The middle section of the page enables you to filter the matched rule details that appear in the lower section of the page.
Click a link in this area to expose other filter options.
Click any link in this area to only display the matched rule details for that filter item.
The lower section lists details of the matched rules. By default, details of all matched rules are listed, however, you can filter this list as described above. You can download a CSV version of this section by clicking the CSV link.
If there are events related to an event in the list, the Show Related Events icon appears when you move your cursor over the event list. Click the Show Related Events icon to display a list of the related events.
You can download the list of related events, by clicking the CSV link.
You can create rules from two types of templates:
Predefined: Represent the most common and recommended scenarios for you to adopt.
User defined: Represent existing rules that you can use as a template to create a new rule.
When you first use Falcon Identity Protection there are no user defined templates. After a rule is created and saved, it appears in the User Defined in the Templates list and you can then use it as a template for a new rule.
Each template includes a preset trigger that you cannot change, and conditions that you can change according to your requirements. These predefined triggers cover most access and authentication scenarios and use cases.
The following lists the predefined rule templates. User or Endpoint attributes and roles are predefined according to the rule preset and cannot be changed, added, or removed.
Detects a deviation from the user profile. The rule matches when an account is authenticated to an endpoint not previously associated (regularly used or owned) with the user.
Used to detect when an account is compromised and used on a new endpoint not previously associated with the account. The account owner can be prompted to approve the activity through a push MFA, email, or other methods or blocked.
Trigger: Access
Conditions:
Access type: Include "Authentication"
Baseline: Exclude "User regularly uses source endpoint"
Source: Exclude "VDI Endpoint"
Protocol: Include "NTLM" or "Kerberos"
User type: Include "Human" or "Has authorizer"
User Attribute: Exclude "In learning"
Source Attribute: Exclude "Impersonator"
Action: Identity Verification
Enforces MFA for accounts that log in to Federated applications from an irregular location.
Trigger: Federated Access
Conditions:
Baseline: Exclude "User regularly connects from this location"
User attribute: Exclude "In learning"
User type: Include "Human" or "Has authorizer"
Action: Identity verification (Fail mode set to Block)
Note: Enable On Screen Notification must be enabled.
Enables you to add second factor authentication to any internal corporate application without changes to the application.
For example, you have legacy or home-grown applications that cannot be re-coded to add MFA. You can add MFA when users login without having to make changes to those applications.
Trigger: Access
Conditions:
Source name: Required
Access type: Include "Authentication"
User type: Include "Human" or "Has authorizer"
Action: Identity verification
Restrict and block all operations from an account that is flagged as honeytoken. Use this template if you flagged honeytoken accounts and you want to ensure no usage of them.
Trigger: Access
Conditions:
User attribute: Includes At least one "Honeytoken"
Action: Block
Detects passwords that are compromised and requires the user to change the password when they next log in.
You must enable compromised password detection for this rule to function.
Trigger: Account Event
Conditions:
Event type: Includes "Compromised password"
User type: Includes "Human"
User attribute: Excludes "Password never expires"
Action: Reset Password
Enforces second factor authentication for user accounts that haven’t been used for over 21 days.
For example, a user has been on extended leave but their account is taken over by a rogue user. The account owner or an authorizer can be notified in real time or the activity can be blocked.
Trigger: Access
Conditions:
User attribute: Include "Inactive"
User type: Include "Human"
Source attribute: Excludes "Impersonator"
Action: Identity verification (Fail Mode set to Block)
Enforces MFA for privileged accounts that use compromised passwords.
Trigger: Access
Conditions:
User attribute: include "Compromised password"
User privilege: Include "Privileged"
User type: Include "Human" or "Has authorizer"
Source attribute: Exclude "Impersonator"
Action: Identity verification (Fail mode set to Block)
Note: Enable On Screen Notification must be enabled.
Enforces Multi-Factor Authentication for privileged accounts that use the LDAP protocol for authentication. The rule is not enforced when the LDAPS protocol is used.
Trigger: Access
Conditions:
User privilege: Include "Privileged"
Protocol: Include "LDAP"
User type: Include "Human" or "Has authorizer"
Source attribute: Exclude "Impersonator"
Action: Identity verification (Fail mode set to Block)
Note: Enable On Screen Notification must be enabled.
Enables you to control the actions that take place when Privileged Users authenticate or access services on endpoints.
Use this template if you want to strengthen Privileged Users Access Management by adding an additional factor to any authentication of a privileged user.
Trigger: Access
Conditions:
User privilege: Include "Privileged"
Baseline: Exclude "User owns source endpoint"
Protocol: Include "NTLM" or "Kerberos"
User attribute: Exclude "In learning"
User type: Include "Human" or "Has authorizer"
Source attribute: Excludes "Impersonator"
Action: Identity verification
Restrict and block Microsoft Remote Desktop operations from an account that is programmatic; for example, a service account.
Trigger: Access
Conditions:
Access type: Include "Remote desktop (RDP)"
User type: Include "Programmatic"
Protocol: Include "NTLM" or "Kerberos"
Action: Block
Helps to enforce best practices where you do not want privileged users' account credentials to be used on workstations that by their nature are more exposed than servers. Servers contain or reduce the level of threat to be revealed or taken over by attacks, such as pass the hash.
Use this template to require that administrators use their credentials on servers only, and prevent administrators from using their privileged account credentials on workstations, as workstations are more prone to malware that can take over their credentials from the system memory or by using a keylogger.
Trigger: Access
Conditions:
User privilege: Include "Privileged"
User type: Include "Human"
Source: Include "Workstation"
Baseline: Exclude "User owns the source endpoint"
User attribute: Exclude "In learning"
Action: Block
Create workflows so Falcon automatically takes steps in response to detections and to updates made by users.
Falcon Identity Protection monitors network traffic to build user behavioral profiles to help identify unusual user behavior. It enables frictionless Zero Trust security with real-time threat prevention and IT policy enforcement through the use of identity, behavioral, and risk analytics. Identity Protection data is available to use with Fusion SOAR workflow triggers, conditions, actions. You can create workflows so Falcon automatically takes steps in response to detections and to updates made by users. For example, you can set workflows to send email notifications or contain source endpoints with Falcon sensors.
For more info, see Identity Protection Overview or Fusion SOAR.
This document shows how to create workflows that use Identity Detection triggers and actions.
You can set up automated actions that are triggered by identity detections.
Subscriptions:
Falcon Identity Threat Detection or Falcon Identity Threat Protection
Roles:
Falcon Administrator
Workflow Author
Click Create workflow.
Click Create workflow from scratch and then click Next.
In the Add trigger panel, search for identity.
From the Top results list or the lists after those results, select Detection > Identity Detection.
Click Next.
Optional. In the Add next panel or on the workflow canvas, select Condition .
Select any identity-based detection detail as the condition.
In the Add next panel or on the workflow canvas, select Action .
Click Save and exit.
Click Save and exit.
You can set email notifications for non-information detections and privileged escalations using a workflow playbook. When you customize the playbook, you can send email to different people and include different info depending on the nature of the detection.
Subscriptions:
Falcon Identity Threat Detection or Falcon Identity Threat Protection
Roles:
Falcon Administrator
Workflow Author
Click Create workflow.
In the Workflow Playbooks section, select the Identity detections email notification playbook, and then click Next.
Click Customize playbook.
Set up emails about non-information detections.
In the Recipients field, specify the email addresses you want to receive emails about the detections.
Optional. In the Data to include field, add or remove data to be sent in the emails.
Click Next.
Set up emails about detections with privilege escalations.
In the Recipients field, specify the email addresses you want to receive emails about the detections.
Optional. In the Data to include field, add or remove data to be sent in the emails.
Click Update playbook.
Click Save and exit.
Click Save and exit.
You can combine Identity Protection policy rules with Fusion SOAR workflows to increase security. For example, you can add users and endpoints involved in endpoint protection, or EPP, detections to the Identity Protection watchlist and require that they perform multi-factor authentication until the detection is marked as resolved.
Subscriptions:
Falcon Identity Threat Protection
Falcon Prevent or Falcon Insight XDR
Roles:
These roles can create Falcon Identity Protection policy rules:
Falcon Administrator
Identity Protection Policy Manager
These roles have access to Fusion SOAR:
Falcon Administrator
Workflow Author
Click Create workflow.
Click Create workflow from scratch and then Next.
In the Add trigger panel, search for epp detection.
From the Top results list or the lists after those results, select Detection > EPP Detection.
Click Next.
The trigger appears on the workflow canvas.
In the Add next panel or on the workflow canvas, select Sequential Action .
In the Add action panel, search for and select the action Add endpoint to watchlist, and then click Next.
In the Add action panel, search for and select the action Add user to watchlist, and then click Next.
Click Save and exit.
Click Save and exit.
The completed workflow resembles the following:
Click Create workflow.
Click Create workflow from scratch and then Next.
In the Add trigger panel, search for audit event endpoint.
From the Top results list or the lists after those results, select Audit event > Endpoint detection > Status.
Click Next.
The Audit event trigger appears on the workflow canvas.
In the Add next panel or on the workflow canvas, select Condition .
In Parameter, select Target status.
In Operator, select is equal to.
In Value, select Closed.
Click Next and then Next again.
In the Add next panel or on the workflow canvas, select Action .
In the Add action panel, search for and select the action Remove endpoint from watchlist.
Click Next.
Click Save and exit.
Click Save and exit.
The completed workflow resembles the following:
Click Add Rule.
Enter a meaningful rule name.
In Template, select None.
In Trigger, select Access.
Click Next.
In Action, select Identity Verification.
Click Add rule condition.
In Select condition type, select User attribute.
Click the plus icon, and select Watched.
Click Add rule condition again.
In Select condition type, select User type.
Click the plus icon, and select Human.
Click the plus icon again, and select Has authorizer.
Click Add rule condition a third time.
In Select condition type, select Access type.
Click the plus icon, and select Authentication.
Optional. Add any additional conditions you might require. See Managing identity protection rules.
The completed rule resembles the following:
Click Save.
The new rule is listed on the Manage Rules tab.
Click Apply All Changes.
Click Add Rule.
Enter a meaningful rule name.
In Template, select None.
In Trigger, select Access.
Click Next.
In Action, select Identity Verification.
Click Add rule condition.
In Select condition type, select Source attribute.
Click the plus icon, and select Watched.
Click Add rule condition again.
In Select condition type, select User type.
Click the plus icon, and select Human.
Click the plus icon again, and select Has authorizer.
Click Add rule condition a third time.
In Select condition type, select Access type.
Click the plus icon, and select Authentication.
Click Add rule condition a fourth time.
In Select condition type, select Source attribute.
Change the include value to exclude.
Click the plus icon, and select Impersonator.
Optional. Add any additional conditions you might require. See Managing identity protection rules.
The completed rule resembles the following:
Click Save. The new rule is listed on the Manage Rules tab.
Click Apply All Changes.
You can create a workflow to send a multi-factor authentication prompt to users when an alert is triggered. You can also add a condition that targets the workflow to a specific technique.
The completed workflow resembles the following:
You can use information available in Identity Protection as conditions for workflows triggered by detections. This can help you create a more precise automatic response with more confidence based on involved entities' identities.
In the Add trigger panel, search for identity.
From the Top results list or the lists after those results, select Detection > Identity Detection.
Click Next.
In the Add next panel or on the workflow canvas, select Action .
In the Add next panel or on the workflow canvas, select Action .
Select Condition .
In the Add next panel or on the workflow canvas, select Action .
Hover over TRUE, click , and then select Parallel Action
.
Click Save and exit.
The completed workflow resembles the following:
You can revoke Entra ID refresh tokens and sign in sessions, as well as revoke Okta sessions, when Identity Protection triggers a new detection with medium or higher severity.
In the Add trigger panel, search for identity.
From the Top results list or the lists after those results, select Detection > Identity Detection.
Click Next.
In the Add next panel or on the workflow canvas, select Action .
In the Add next panel or on the workflow canvas, select Condition .
In the Add next panel or on the workflow canvas, select Action .
refresh and select the Entra ID - Revoke Existing Refresh Tokens action.
In the Add next panel or on the workflow canvas, select Action .
Hover over the last TRUE, click , and then select Parallel action
.
sign-in and select the Entra ID - Revoke Existing Sign-in Sessions action.
In the Add next panel or on the workflow canvas, select Action .
Click Save and exit.
The completed workflow resembles the following:
Eliminate standing privileges and stop identity-based attacks by enforcing just-in-time access across hybrid environments.
Falcon Privileged Access delivers real-time, risk-based privileged access control across hybrid environments without requiring manual onboarding of identities or resources. To view all of your JIT policies, go to Privileged access > Just-in-Time access > Policies.
You can configure your environment to allow end users to submit JIT permission requests through different interfaces or triggers. All of your JIT policies automatically include all of the triggers that you have configured in your environment. The following JIT request triggers are supported:
The Teams trigger allows end users to submit JIT permission requests in Teams by clicking Request permission in the Permission Request bot or view current permissions by clicking List current permissions. Teams displays a notification to end users when permissions are granted or revoked.
The Teams bot also allows end users to self-revoke JIT permissions before the permission duration is reached, if they already completed the task that required elevated permissions.
By default, end users will get notifications when permissions are granted, revoked, and 5 minutes before permissions are revoked. If you would like to turn off the notifications end users get 5 minutes before permissions are revoked, go to Privileged access > Just-in-Time access > Settings.
To add Teams as a trigger for your end users, you must complete the following requirements:
JIT allows end users to assume eligible permissions as part of the Entra EAM login process when they log in through the external authentication method (EAM) integration, following the initial authentication.
Entra EAM trigger requirements
To add Entra EAM as a trigger for your end users, you must complete the following requirements:
You can configure each JIT policy to provide the appropriate end user experience.
At Microsoft EAM login, users governed by an automatic JIT policy are automatically granted all of the permissions that they are eligible for. In Teams, the user is granted the permissions that they are eligible for when they click Request permissions.
Users that don’t have a Teams account, for example AD-only accounts or shared accounts, can also have permissions requested for them by an authorized user. The authorized user must use the Teams trigger to request permissions for another user. The authorizer also chooses the duration the permissions will last.
The JIT request interface displays only the users for which the authorizer has been configured. For more info about authorizer configuration, see Authorizers.
You can configure any JIT policy to require that the end user completes MFA before the requested permissions are granted by selecting Identity was verified with MFA in the Workflow settings section while creating or editing policy.
By default, end users will be prompted with MFA as part of the JIT flow. The end user can select any MFA connector that you have configured in your environment. To view your list of configured connectors, go to Identity protection > Configure > Connectors .
Permission sets allow you to seamlessly grant users all of the permissions needed for a given responsibility. This removes the need for the end user to know which permissions are necessary to complete their tasks.
After you define permission sets in the policy wizard that group the technical permissions needed for specific business tasks, end users can select from clearly named permission sets during elevation requests, without needing to understand underlying technical requirements. Users can also request multiple permission sets if their workflow requires it.
For example, instead of users needing to know they require the Entra ID roles User Administrator, Groups Administrator, and Directory Readers to onboard a new employee, they can simply select an Employee Onboarding permission set that contains all these roles. The user focuses on their business need while you ensure the correct technical permissions are granted.
This approach reduces friction in access requests while maintaining security through admin-controlled permission groupings.
You can configure JIT policies to grant privileges for the appropriate amount of time, when all conditions specified in the policy are met. By default, you can select a JIT policy duration for any amount of time from 2 minutes up to 3 days.
You can also configure a JIT policy to continuously monitor the user and device. If the conditions specified in the policy are no longer met, the granted privileges are revoked within 5 minutes. When creating or editing a JIT policy, select Continuously monitor conditions and revoke if conditions are no longer met in the Workflow settings section.
You can use the FPA overview dashboard to review current JIT policy implementation, track elevation requests to high-risk users, and monitor the usage status across your environment. Go to Privileged access > Just-in-Time access > Dashboard.
You can create as many JIT policies as needed to cover all of the user scenarios in your organization. Configure each JIT policy to provide the appropriate permissions for your end users, if they meet your specified conditions. Each JIT policy is limited to a single integration. However, each JIT policy supports all of the triggers that you have configured for end users in your environment. For more info, see JIT triggers.
This toggle allows you to pause all currently enabled JIT policies. Disabling JIT prevents end users from obtaining JIT privileges, either automatically or by request. Turning off the toggle restores all policies to their previous state, re-enabling all previously enabled policies while previously disabled policies remain disabled.
With JIT audit events you can review end user requests, their justification, if the permissions were extended or revoked, and when each event happened.
Alternatively, you can query the same JIT events in Event search. For more info about JIT events, see Falcon Privileged Access.
Secure privileged access to Entra ID resources by dynamically managing role assignments.
Just-in-Time (JIT) access for Entra ID allows you to secure privileged access to your organization’s Entra ID resources by dynamically managing role and group assignments. Instead of maintaining permanent roles or group membership, users can temporarily elevate their privileges when needed, reducing the attack surface and improving security posture. For more info, see Falcon Privileged Access Overview.
When Entra ID privileges are granted to the end user through Falcon JIT, they are displayed in Entra ID in the Active assignment tab, with an End time of Permanent. When Entra ID privileges expire, they are no longer displayed in Entra ID, but the role assignment and removal events are displayed in both Microsoft and Falcon audit logs. For more info, see View JIT audit events.
Secure privileged access to on-premises AD resources by dynamically managing group memberships.
Just-in-Time (JIT) access for Active Directory (AD) groups allows you to secure privileged access to your organization’s on-premises AD resources by dynamically managing group memberships. Instead of maintaining permanent access, users can temporarily elevate their privileges when needed, reducing the attack surface and improving security posture. For more info, see Falcon Privileged Access Overview.
Create workflows so Falcon automatically takes action to manage JIT privilege assignments.
Just-in-time (JIT) access allows you to manage the entire permission lifecycle by ensuring that users only have access to the permissions they need, for only as long as required, if the user and device remain within the configured parameters of risk. You can create Fusion SOAR workflows to revoke JIT permissions when a critical alert or any specified Fusion trigger occurs. For example, you can set a Fusion workflow to revoke all JIT permissions from any user that triggers an identity detection.
For more info, see Falcon Privileged Access Overview or Fusion SOAR.
This document shows how to create workflows that use Falcon Privileged Access actions.
You can set up automated actions to revoke active JIT permission assignments.
Integrate with your Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) environment to enable the same conditional controls for use by your federated services.
Falcon Identity Protection eliminates insider threat and security breaches by continuously preempting threats based on identity behavior and risk. It applies conditional, adaptive access controls on any network resource, including access to file shares, services, domain logins, and any application.
Integrating Falcon Identity Protection into your Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) environment enables the same exact conditional controls for use by your federated services, whether they are accessed by using a web browser or desktop applications, including Office 365. This also includes additional applications that are configured for single sign-on (SSO) by using AD FS.
AD FS v4.0
Windows Server 2016
.NET Framework 4.5.2 or later must be installed
CrowdStrike provides the Falcon Identity Protection AD FS Adapter, which integrates with AD FS to add the Falcon Cloud as a secondary authentication provider to the AD FS farm.
Each time a user attempts to authenticate using AD FS, the Falcon Identity Protection policy engine is called. Falcon Identity Protection evaluates the authentication based on the defined policy. If required by a policy rule, an authentication can be blocked or MFA enforced, as shown below:
To configure Falcon Identity Protection for AD FS integration, you must:
Create an API client that AD FS will use to authenticate to Falcon Identity Protection.
Ensure that AD FS can successfully connect and access the Falcon Cloud.
Create an API client to allow the AD FS authentication adapter to authenticate to the Falcon Platform. You need to provide the client ID and secret when installing the AS FS adapter.
In the Falcon console, go to Support and resources > Resources and tools > API clients and keys .
Click Create API client.
Complete the form:
Client Name (required)
Description (optional)
API Scopes (required):
Identity Protection Enforcement: Read / Write.
Identity Protection Health: Read
To complete the configuration and display the client ID and secret, click Add.
For more information, see API clients.
Configure your network to allow the AD FS instance to communicate with Falcon Identity Protection using HTTPS on port 443.
Your AD FS instance must trust the certificate authority CrowdStrike uses to digitally sign certificates and enable secure connections.
If necessary, download the following Digicert certificate chains, and import them to the trust store on your AD FS instance:
This section describes how to download, install, and configure the Identity Protection AD FS Adapter.
To install the AD FS authentication adapter:
Go to Support and resources > Resources and tools > Tool downloads , and download the Falcon Identity Protection AD FS Adapter MSI file: CrowdStrike.AdfsAuthenticationAdapterInstaller.msi
Run the installer.
When installing on the primary node, complete the following additional steps:
In the configuration dialog, complete the fields as follows:
US-1: https://api.crowdstrike.com
US-2: https://api.us-2.crowdstrike.com
EU-1: https://api.eu-1.crowdstrike.com
US-GOV-1: https://api.laggar.gcw.crowdstrike.com
US-GOV-2: https://api.us-gov-2.crowdstrike.mil
API Client ID: The ID of the API client the adapter uses to authenticate to Falcon. See Create an API client.
API Client Secret: The client secret of the API client the adapter uses to authenticate to Falcon.
Proxy Host: (Optional) The IP address or FQDN of the proxy connection, if required.
Proxy Port: (Optional) The port number of the proxy connection, if required.
Bypass CrowdStrike on Error: Enable to allow unconditional access in situations when Falcon Identity Protection cannot be contacted.
Click Apply Configuration.
Restart the Active Directory Federation Service on the primary node.
After installing the AD FS Authentication Adapter on each AD FS node, you must enable the integration by completing the following steps on the primary node only:
In the AD FS administration console on the primary node, go to AD FS > Service > Authentication Methods > Multi-factor Authentication Methods, and click Edit.
On the Multi-factor tab, enable CrowdStrike AD FS Integration.
Choose or create an MFA policy for your federated applications to use.
We recommend the built-in Permit everyone and require MFA authentication policy.
This option delegates policy management to Falcon Identity Protection. Note that this doesn’t imply that every authentication will require MFA. It merely delegates the decision to Falcon Identity Protection.
Repeat the following steps for each application federated through AD FS:
Go to AD FS > Relying Party Trusts, and select the federated application.
For example, Microsoft Office 365 Identity Platform.
In the Actions pane, click Edit Access Control Policy.
On the Issuance Authorization Rules tab, click Use access control policy.
Select the policy you chose or created in the previous step.
For example, Permit everyone and require MFA.
Click OK.
AD FS is now configured to delegate authentication decisions to Falcon Identity Protection policy rules, which should use the Federated Access trigger. For more information, see Identity Protection Policy.
Use the configuration dialog on the primary node to modify the AD FS Authentication Adapter Configuration:
On the primary node, go to Start > CrowdStrike AD FS Integration, and then click AD FS Integration Configuration.
In the Configuration window, modify the fields as required and click Apply Configuration.
Restart the Active Directory Federation Service on ALL nodes, as follows.
First, restart the primary node.
Wait for AD FS configuration sync - the default is every 5 minutes
Restart all secondary nodes.
Add Falcons risk and behavioral-based conditional access to client applications and use multi-factor authentication alongside your PingFederate deployment.
This guide is for IT and security personnel who want to add Falcon Identity Protection's risk and behavioral-based conditional access to client applications and use multi-factor authentication alongside their PingFederate deployment.
CrowdStrike provides the Falcon Identity Protection PingFederate Adapter, which you can integrate into a PingFederate deployment. This adapter allows PingFederate to communicate with Falcon Identity Protection to provide conditional access to federated applications and endpoints.
A functional PingFederate environment, version 7 or later
At least one adapter to use as the primary form of authentication: for example, the HTML Form Adapter
To integrate PingFederate with the Falcon platform, you must create an API client and ensure that your PingFederate instance can communicate with the Falcon platform.
Create an API client to allow PingFederate to authenticate to the Falcon platform:
In the Falcon console, go to Support and resources > Resources and tools > API clients and keys.
Click Create API client.
Complete the form:
Client Name (required)
Description (optional)
API Scopes (required):
Identity Protection Enforcement: Read / Write.
Identity Protection Health: Read
To complete the configuration and display the client ID and secret, click Add.
For more information, see Managing your API clients.
Ensure your network allows your PingFederate instance to communicate with the base URL of the Falcon platform's API gateway, using HTTPS on port 443.
The examples in this guide use the API gateway base URL for US-1: api.crowdstrike.com
US-2: https://api.us-2.crowdstrike.com
EU-1: https://api.eu-1.crowdstrike.com
US-GOV-1: https://api.laggar.gcw.crowdstrike.com
US-GOV-2: https://api.us-gov-2.crowdstrike.mil
Your PingFederate instance must trust the certificate authority CrowdStrike uses to digitally sign certificates and enable secure connections.
If necessary, download the following Digicert certificate chains and import them to your PingFederate instance:
To integrate PingFederate with the Falcon platform, you must deploy and configure the adapter in your PingFederate instance. You can then create policies in PingFederate to invoke the Identity Protection adapter, which can allow, block, or force multi-factor authentication (MFA) on a federated login.
High-level steps:
Download and install the adapter
Set up the adapter in PingFederate
This section describes how to download the adapter and install it in a PingFederate instance.
In the Falcon console, go to Support and resources > Resources and tools > Tool downloads, and download the PingFederate adapter ZIP file:
pf-crowdstrike-integration-kit-<version>.zip
Expand the downloaded ZIP file.
Stop the PingFederate instance.
Copy the pf-crowdstrike-integration-kit-<version>.jar file to:
<pingfederate-install>/pingfederate/server/default/deploy/
Copy the following HTML files to <pingfederate-install>/pingfederate/server/default/conf/template/
crowdStrikeMfaUI.html
crowdStrikeNextState.html
Start the PingFederate instance.
This section explains how to use the PingFederate administration console to configure PingFederate to recognize and use the adapter.
In the PingFederate administration console, go to Identity Providers > Application Integration, and then click Adapters.
Click Create New Instance.
On the Type tab, specify the following parameters, and then click Next:
Instance Name: The name for the instance
Instance ID: A unique instance ID. This can be the same as the Instance Name.
Type: CrowdStrike Identity Protection Adapter <version>
Parent Instance: None
On the Adapter tab, specify the following parameters, and then click Next:
US-1: https://api.crowdstrike.com
US-2: https://api.us-2.crowdstrike.com
EU-1: https://api.eu-1.crowdstrike.com
US-GOV-1: https://api.laggar.gcw.crowdstrike.com
US-GOV-2: https://api.us-gov-2.crowdstrike.mil
API Client ID: The ID of the API client the adapter uses to authenticate to Falcon
API Secret ID: The client secret of the API client the adapter uses to authenticate to Falcon
Proxy host: (Optional) The IP address or FQDN of the proxy connection, if required
Proxy port: (Optional) The port number of the proxy connection, if required
Fail Mode: The required system response in situations when Falcon Identity Protection cannot be contacted
On the Extended Contract tab, click Next.
On the Adapter Attributes tab, enable the Pseudonym checkbox, and then click Next.
On the Summary tab, review the adapter configuration, and then click Done.
To complete the configuration, click Save.
Falcon Identity Protection integrates with PingFederate in two operation modes:
Enforcement by Falcon : Delegate authentication decisions to Falcon Identity Protection policy rules, which might include requiring multi-factor authentication (MFA), also enforced by Falcon.
External enforcement : Falcon returns one of three possible recommendations to PingFederate—approve, deny, or review—to help it make authentication decisions.
In this operation mode, Falcon is responsible for both making authentication decisions and, if necessary, prompting for MFA.
Enable enforcement by Falcon in an Identity Protection policy rule:
In the Falcon console, go to Identity protection > Enforce > Policy rules.
Click Add Rule.
Provide a Rule Name.
From the Trigger menu, select Federated access, and then click Next.
From the Enforced By menu, select CrowdStrike.
Configure the policy rule as required, and then click Save.
Falcon returns either fail or success to PingFederate.
Configure PingFederate to handle the two possible outcomes, as required:
In the PingFederate administration console, go to Identity Providers > Authentication Policies, and then click Policies.
Open an existing authentication policy or create a new one.
In the Policy area, scroll through the policy tree, identify the location, and select an adapter instance.
Map the Username to the adapter instance:
Under the adapter instance, click Options.
In the Options dialog box, from the Source list, select a previous authentication source that collects the Username.
From the Attribute list, select Username, and then click Done.
Configure each of the Fail and Success policy paths.
To complete the authentication policy, click Done.
To enable external enforcement in an Identity Protection policy rule, see Configuring external authentication.
When using external enforcement, Falcon returns one of three possible outcome recommendations to PingFederate: approve, deny, or review.
Configure PingFederate as described in Configuring enforcement by Falcon. Additionally, set the adapter to expose these possible outcomes:
In your PingFederate policy, under the PingFederate Adapter instance, click Rules to map each adapter result to a PingFederate result value.
Configure policy paths for each of the possible outcomes returned by the adapter.
Click Done.
X-Forwarded-For header.PingFederate adapters write their logs remotely to the server by default.
To use local files, add the Logger and RollingFile blocks shown below to the <pingfederate-install>/pingfederate/server/default/conf/log4j2.xml file.
Logger block:
<Logger name="com.pingidentity.adapter.idp.crowdstrike"
level="INFO" additivity="false">
<AppenderRef ref="CROWDSTRIKEFILE"/>
</Logger>
RollingFile block:
<!-- Log -->
<RollingFile name="CROWDSTRIKEFILE"
fileName="${sys:pf.log.dir}/crowdstrikeIdpAdapter.log"
filePattern="${sys:pf.log.dir}/crowdstrikeIdpAdapter.log.%i"
ignoreExceptions="false">
<PatternLayout>
<pattern>%d %-5p[%t][%c{1}] %m%n</pattern>
</PatternLayout>
<Policies>
<SizeBasedTriggeringPolicy size="10000 KB" />
<OnStartupTriggeringPolicy />
</Policies>
<DefaultRolloverStrategy max="10" />
</RollingFile>
Set up and configure FalconID.
FalconID is a phish-resistant multi-factor authentication (MFA) solution that uses the Fast Identity Online 2 (FIDO2) authentication standard. FalconID works together with Falcon for Mobile and Identity Protection to provide a seamless, end-to-end MFA experience.
Requires all of these subscriptions:
Falcon Identity Threat Protection
FalconID
Sensor:
Android: Falcon for Mobile Android sensor version 2025.22.4190000 and later
iOS: Falcon for Mobile iOS sensor version 2025.11.x and later
Operating system support:
Android version 14 and later
iOS version 18 and later
Default roles:
To configure Identity Protection policies, you need one of these roles:
Falcon Administrator
Identity Protection Policy Manager
To configure OIDC integrations, you need one of these roles:
Falcon Administrator
Identity Protection Administrator
To manage Falcon for Mobile enrollment, you need one of these roles:
Falcon Administrator
Mobile Admin
CrowdStrike clouds: Available in US-1, US-2, and EU-1
FalconID is installed and enrolled on end users' devices with the Falcon for Mobile sensor. Manage FalconID users through Identity Protection in the Falcon console.
During enrollment with FalconID, users are prompted to create a passkey. This passkey is bound to the device and is stored in the device’s secure, trusted execution environment. Passkeys are inherently phish-resistant and allow users to authenticate to your organization’s resources with the same methods used to unlock a device, such as Face ID, Touch ID, or a passcode.
When users attempt to authenticate, whether from their mobile devices or workstations, they’re prompted to approve and complete authentication with FalconID using the CrowdStrike Falcon app on their mobile devices.
The CrowdStrike Falcon app delivers a complete security solution and includes the following:
FalconID, a phish-resistant multi-factor authentication using FIDO2 Passkeys
Falcon for Mobile, which continuously monitors and protects your devices
Device Trust, which leverages Falcon Identity Protection to help you make real-time conditional access decisions using identity and workload context
This integrated approach means that you're not just proving who you are, but you're proving you're using a secure and trusted device.
Consider these points when enrolling users with FalconID:
FalconID requires that the device’s lock screen is configured.
FalconID needs to be enabled as an autofill credential provider. If the user disables the credential provider in the device’s OS settings after enrollment, they’ll be prompted to enable it again before they can use FalconID.
Only one passkey can be created per device. This passkey isn’t synced to the cloud. If a device is lost or stolen, or the passkey is otherwise inaccessible, the user must re-enroll their device using a new enrollment email.
If a user removes the lock screen, which deletes the biometrics or passcode, the passkey becomes invalid. For Android devices, it's not possible to recover the passkey even if the lock screen is enabled again, and those users must re-enroll their devices using a new enrollment email.
FalconID supports up to two devices per user.
If Android users want to use biometrics for their passkey, the Android device must have a BIOMETRIC_STRONG (Class 3) hardware sensor.
If a device is network contained, whether manually through Host Management or automatically during a detected man-in-the-middle attack, FalconID is disabled. Users can’t authenticate with FalconID until containment is lifted.
For more info about network containment, see Network containment for mobile hosts.
This workflow describes the high-level steps to set up and use FalconID:
In Identity Protection, add the FalconID connector. This connector is preconfigured and is ready to use as soon as it’s added.
Configure access policy rules that use the FalconID connector.
Send emails to users inviting them to enroll with FalconID.
Users follow the instructions in the email to create a passkey and complete enrollment using the CrowdStrike Falcon app on their devices.
Users are then ready to authenticate with FalconID.
Before you can set up FalconID, you must deploy Falcon for Mobile to your mobile devices.
For full deployment instructions, see:
Deploying Falcon for Mobile to Android Devices
Deploying Falcon for Mobile to iOS Devices
If you’re using Microsoft Entra, you must configure the OIDC integration in Identity Protection. For more info, see Entra ID EAM.
Add the FalconID connector and configure access policy rules.
The FalconID connector is based on the Cloud MFA OIDC connector. This connector is preconfigured and is ready to use after being added.
Configure an access policy rule that uses the FalconID connector.
Click Add rule.
Enter a rule name.
From the Trigger dropdown list, select the access type. If you’re using Microsoft Entra, select Cloud access. Otherwise, select Access.
Click Next.
From the Action dropdown list, select Identity Verification.
From the Connector dropdown list, select CrowdStrike FalconID (OIDC).
Configure other rule settings as needed. For more info about how to configure Identity Protection policy rules, see Identity Protection Policy.
Click Save.
Use the Falcon console to send invitation emails to users. Users follow the instructions in the email to enroll their devices with FalconID.
FalconID supports up to two devices per user.
The FalconID page displays details about FalconID users and their enrollment status, whether pending, active (enrolled), or expired. Each entry shows info about the user and device, including the user risk severity and device ZTA score. You can also filter entries by criteria such as the enrollment status or the expiration date.
To view and manage invitations, go to Identity protection > Configure > FalconID .
Provide email addresses manually or by uploading a TXT or CSV file.
The domain of the email addresses must match the domain you have registered for Falcon. This domain can be from these options:
Domain controller server
For more info, see Domains.
IDaaS connectors
For more info, see IDaaS connectors.
When uploading email addresses in a TXT file, use one email address per line. Use Unix or macOS format, not MS-DOS or classic Mac OS.
The enrollment link and the QR code in each invitation is single-use. If a user has two devices, they need an invitation for each device. You must repeat the workflow to send an invitation and either re-enter their email address or upload another TXT or CSV file with the address.
To send invitation emails, complete these steps:
Click Invite employees.
Select one of these options:
Upload file: Click Select file and open the TXT or CSV file containing users’ email addresses.
Manually add addresses: Enter the email addresses.
Select the enrollment code expiration date.
If a user doesn’t enroll within the specified time frame, they’ll need a new invitation email.
Click Send Invites.
If any email addresses are entered incorrectly or don’t match the domain registered with Falcon, select whether to fix the email address or to send only to valid addresses.
Fix email addresses: Go back to correct email addresses that were entered manually or upload a new TXT or CSV file.
Send to valid addresses only: Ignore incorrect email addresses and send invites only to emails with a status of Ready to send.
If a user’s invitation has a pending or expired status, you can send a new invitation email.
Select one of these options:
To send a new individual invite, click the Actions menu for the email address and select Reinvite enrollment.
To resend new invites in bulk, select one or more email addresses and click Reinvite enrollment.
Select the expiration date.
Click Reinvite.
If you need to unenroll a user from FalconID, you can delete their invitation.
If a user no longer has access to their passkey, such as in the event of a lost or stolen device, it’s not possible to recover the passkey. You must unenroll the user and send a new enrollment email. The user must then complete enrollment on their device, including creating a new passkey, to continue using FalconID.
Select one of these options:
To delete an individual invite, click the Actions menu for the email address and select Delete enrollment.
To delete in bulk, select one or more email addresses in the list and click Delete selected enrollments.
Confirm the deletion.
Users follow the instructions in the invitation email and the CrowdStrike Falcon app to set up a passkey and enroll the device.
Open the CrowdStrike Falcon app on the mobile device.
Open the enrollment email and select one of these options:
Open the Enroll now link in the email.
In the Crowdstrike Falcon app, scan the QR code.
For iOS, tap FalconID, or for Android, tap the navigation menu and tap FalconID.
Tap Scan QR code.
Scan the QR code in the email.
Follow the on-screen instructions to create a passkey and enroll the device.
When users are prompted to authenticate, they can authenticate directly with the Sign in with passkey option or authenticate indirectly with the Verify manually option. In some cases, FalconID can automatically select the most secure and appropriate authentication method on behalf of the user.
Direct authentication, which uses FIDO2, is recommended whenever possible. FIDO2 performs domain checks to prevent phishing and uses Bluetooth for cross-device authentication. For example, if a user attempts to authenticate from a desktop endpoint, FIDO2 lets FalconID ensure that the mobile device running Falcon for Mobile is in physical proximity to the desktop endpoint.
In the following cases, users might need to use indirect authentication by selecting the option to verify manually:
If Bluetooth isn’t available, such as when authenticating from a virtual machine with Bluetooth restrictions
If the Identity Protection policy rule uses the Cloud access trigger and the app the user is authenticating to is an Android, Windows, macOS, or Linux app
If the Identity Protection policy rule uses the Access trigger and the user is connecting to a remote server through RDP
When authenticating indirectly, FalconID prompts users to approve the incoming authentication request before they use their passkey. FalconID displays details about the request, such as the website and source location, which provides the user context about whether the request is legitimate.
The following examples show the authentication workflow in different situations and configurations.
The following example describes cross-device direct authentication from a desktop endpoint using a QR code. In this case, the Identity Protection policy rule’s condition is set to Cloud access to use Microsoft Entra and the rule’s connector is set to FalconID.
In your desktop endpoint, open the app you want to authenticate to.
Sign in to the app.
When prompted to verify your identity, click Approve with FalconID.
Click Sign in with passkey.
When prompted on the desktop endpoint, click Use a phone, tablet, or security key.
Use your phone to scan the QR code that appears.
When prompted, tap the option to continue or to use your passkey, and then follow the on-screen prompts to authenticate with your passkey.
The following example screenshot shows authenticating with Face ID on an iOS device.
The following example describes cross-device indirect authentication from a desktop endpoint with Microsoft Entra. In this case, the Identity Protection policy rule’s condition is set to Cloud access and the rule’s connector is set to FalconID.
In your desktop endpoint, open the app you want to authenticate to.
Sign in to the app.
When prompted to verify your identity, tap Approve with FalconID.
Tap Verify manually.
Open the CrowdStrike Falcon app and go to FalconID.
For Android, tap the navigation menu and tap FalconID.
For iOS, tap FalconID.
Tap Approve.
Tap the option to continue or to use your passkey, and then follow the on-screen prompts to authenticate with your passkey.
The following example screenshot shows authenticating with Face ID on an iOS device.
The following example describes same-device direct authentication with Microsoft Entra. In this case, the Identity Protection policy rule’s condition is set to Cloud access and the rule’s connector is set to Any.
On your mobile device, open the app you want to authenticate to.
Sign in to the app.
When prompted to verify your identity, click Approve with FalconID.
When prompted to choose the authentication method, click Sign in with FalconID.
Click Sign in with passkey.
When prompted, tap the option to continue or to use your passkey, and then follow the on-screen prompts to authenticate with your passkey.
The following example screenshot shows authenticating with your fingerprint for an Android device.
The following example describes same-device direct authentication with Microsoft Entra. In this case, the Identity Protection policy rule’s condition is set to Cloud access and the rule’s connector is set to FalconID.
On your mobile device, open the app you want to authenticate to.
Sign in to the app.
When prompted to verify your identity, tap Approve with FalconID.
Tap Verify manually.
When prompted, open the CrowdStrike Falcon app and go to Falcon ID.
For Android, tap the navigation menu and tap FalconID.
For iOS, tap FalconID.
Tap Approve.
Tap the option to continue or to use your passkey, and then follow the on-screen prompts to authenticate with your passkey.
The following example screenshot shows authenticating with your fingerprint for an iOS device.
See authentication attempts in the Identity Protection audit log at Identity protection > Enforce > Policy analytics . The Status column contains these statuses for FalconID:
Approved (CrowdStrike FalconID - OIDC)
Denied (CrowdStrike FalconID - OIDC)
Timed out (CrowdStrike FalconID - OIDC)